MIXED METHODS INVESTIGATION OF DISTRESS RELATED TO PSYCHOSIS EXPERIENCES by Akoral, Melissa
 
 
 
MIXED METHODS INVESTIGATION OF 
DISTRESS RELATED TO PSYCHOSIS 
EXPERIENCES 
 
 
  
 
 
 
MELISSA AKORAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
 
QUEEN MARGARET UNIVERSITY 
2019  
ii 
 
  
iii 
 
Abstract 
Distress associated with psychosis experiences has been related to the maintenance of 
psychosis experiences and people’s need for care. However, the mechanisms 
responsible for its maintenance remain unclear. Thus, this mixed methods project 
investigates experiential and psychological vulnerability factors contributing to 
distress related to psychosis in a clinical sample living in the community. This is done 
in order to determine whether specific vulnerability factors also act as maintenance 
factors for people in care. Therefore, these are assumed to be distinct. 
  
In the first study, a cross-sectional design (N= 60) was used to investigate the role of 
specific emotion regulation and metacognitive difficulties in the relationship between 
insecure attachment dimensions and distress related to psychosis experiences. Multiple 
regression analyses were conducted to determine which subscales predicted distress 
related to psychosis and significant predictors were taken forward to mediation 
models. Mediation analysis showed that only need for control mediated the 
relationship between insecure attachment and distress related to positive symptoms. 
Further, only limited access to emotion regulation strategies mediated the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and distress associated with both negative symptoms and 
to depressive symptoms in psychosis. These results expand on previous research by 
suggesting specific vulnerability factors that are related to distress associated with 
different symptoms. 
  
In the second study, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis was used to analyse 10 
in-depth qualitative interviews which explored people’s appraisals of their experiences 
of psychosis. Four inter-related themes emerged; (1)lacking control, (2)change – 
renegotiating a personal and social identity, (3)living in fear, and (4)multiple realities. 
The importance of ‘control’ is highlighted throughout all the themes, as negative 
appraisals about perceived control underpins experiences. This study demonstrates the 
importance of people’s appraisals to how they make meaning of and respond to 
psychosis experiences.  
  
Together, these studies emphasise that distress relates to psychosis experiences as a 
whole rather than specific symptoms. The two studies were integrated and interpreted 
using a joint display method. People’s perceived lack of control and unhelpful 
interpersonal relationships were found to contribute to the maintenance of distress 
related to psychosis experiences. Implications of these findings are discussed. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
This thesis is concerned with expanding understanding of distress related to 
psychosis experiences. In 2014, around the time that this PhD journey began, the 
British Psychological Society published a report titled ‘Understanding Psychosis and 
Schizophrenia’ (Cooke, 2014). The report highlighted that everyone’s experience of 
psychosis is different and suggested that many people do not come in contact with 
mental health services because they do not find their experiences distressing (Romme 
& Escher, 1993). Distress therefore seems to be an important predictor of the onset 
and maintenance of psychosis experiences and help-seeking behaviour (Brett, Heriot-
Maitland, McGuire & Peters 2014). The report prompted a question which has come 
to lay the foundations of this thesis: What are the psychological factors and 
experiences that contribute to the maintenance of distress related to psychosis 
experiences in a clinical sample?  
 
Psychotic-like experiences are not inherently distressing nor do they 
systematically lead to mental health conditions (Brett et al., 2014; Peters, Day, 
McKenna & Orbach, 1999a). Indeed, there is evidence that psychotic-like experiences 
occur in the general population. Bentall, Claridge and Slade (1989) suggested that 
psychosis experiences exist on a ‘continuum’ rather than being categorical, thus 
existing independently from psychiatric diagnoses. Comparative work looking at 
experiences in clinical and non-clinical populations found that both groups reported 
similar overall levels of psychotic-like experiences, but were characterized by distinct 
types of experience; clinical groups tended to be more distressed by their experiences 
than non-clinical groups (e.g. Brett, Johns, Peters & McGuire, 2009, 2014; Lovatt, 
Mason, Brett & Peters, 2010; Peters et al., 1999a).  Cognitive models of psychosis 
suggest that the appraisals people make of their psychosis experience are key 
mediators in determining the outcome of their experiences (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, 
Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001, 2007; Morrison, 2001). This, suggests that coming in 
contact with mental health services and consequently receiving a diagnosis is related 
to how people make sense of their experiences, and the appraisals they form of their 
anomalous experiences. However, this area of inquiry is in its infancy, and the studies’ 
comparative design (e.g. Brett et al., 2009; Lovatt et al., 2010) led to the omission of 
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negative symptoms, as non-clinical groups are less likely to experience them. This 
project was therefore designed to begin to address this gap. It does so by investigating 
both the appraisals and psychological vulnerability factors involved in the 
maintenance of distress related to positive, negative and depressive symptoms in a 
clinical sample living in the community. Psychological vulnerability factors were 
investigated because of their association with the onset and maintenance of psychosis 
experiences, and the likelihood that they contribute to the maintenance of distress 
related to psychosis.  
 
It is important here to highlight that vulnerability and maintenance factors are 
not interchangeable. That is to say, vulnerability and maintenance factors may overlap 
but the assumption should not be made that they are one and the same. Vulnerability 
to psychosis can be explained through biopsychosocial components (Freeman, Garety, 
Kuipers, Fowler & Beddington, 2002;  Ingram & Price, 2010), which may also serve 
as maintenance factors. However, not all vulnerability factors will contribute to the 
maintenance of people’s experiences. Likewise, a maintenance factor need not 
necessarily constitute a vulnerability factor (e.g. stigma following diagnosis; Ingram 
& Price, 2010). Investigating factors contributing to the maintenance of psychosis (e.g. 
attachment theory, emotion regulation and metacognition) is relevant in the context of 
this research since the participants of this project are still in receipt of care. Thus, 
known vulnerability factors of psychosis are investigated to determine whether they 
also act as maintaining factors in relation to distress. 
 
Psychosis is constructed of a set of life changing events that can be understood 
as an expression of people’s developmental adaptation: a response to critical life 
events and transitions (Gumley & Schwannauer, 2006). Research increasingly has 
been exploring the role psychosocial developmental factors may play in the 
development and maintenance of psychosis. Adverse social environments people 
might be in and the dysfunctional schemas they form are likely to contribute to the 
development and maintenance of psychosis experiences by leading the person to hold 
distorted beliefs about the self, others, and the world (see Garety et al., 2001). Amidst 
a vast literature dedicated to various vulnerability factors, attachment theory has 
emerged as a key paradigm of interest. Insecure attachment dimensions are associated 
with negative beliefs about the self and others, and maladaptive methods of regulating 
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distress, and may have a negative effect on the course of psychosis (Berry, Shah, Cook, 
Geater, Barrowclough & Wearden, 2008). Insecure attachment patterns were found to 
mediate the relationship between childhood adversity and psychosis (Read & Gumley, 
2008). However, not all people experiencing psychosis have insecure attachment 
dimensions. This suggests that the relationship in question is more complex than 
previously thought, and may be mediated by other vulnerability factors such as 
emotion regulation (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012) and metacognition (Macbeth, 
Gumley, Schwannauer & Fisher, 2011). While all these factors have independently 
been related to psychosis experiences, their role in the maintenance of distress related 
to psychosis experiences has yet to be investigated. Moreover, it is unclear whether 
insecure attachment dimensions relate to the development of psychotic-like 
experiences, or whether they relate to pathogenic appraisals that transform people’s 
experiences into psychosis symptoms. Investigating psychological vulnerability 
factors is necessary to further develop psychological understandings of how distress 
related to psychosis experiences is maintained.  
 
A further aspect of distress related to psychosis experiences that requires 
further investigation is that of the deeply personal and unique nature of experiencing 
psychosis. Important individual differences can be observed not only in the 
symptomatology, but also in the course and outcome of psychosis. Focusing on the 
phenomenological and experiential elements of people’s experiences is one way 
through which a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of individual experiences 
and appraisals of psychosis experiences can be generated. Understanding what keeps 
people in contact with mental health services may also inform efforts to more 
effectively support people living with psychosis experiences. Previous work 
investigating people’s appraisals of psychosis experiences did so using self-report 
measures (Brett, Peters, Johns, Tabraham, Valmaggia & McGuire, 2007), 
taxonomising experiences into pre-defined categories, or investigating experiences 
qualitatively in comparative studies focusing on similarities and differences between 
clinical and non-clinical groups (Heriot-Maitland, Knight & Peters, 2012). Despite the 
important contribution of these studies, further qualitative research is required to 
explore the beliefs and appraisals people hold of their experiences and the meaning 
they attribute to them, while being sensitive to the context in which they occur.  
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In order to examine these hitherto neglected elements of psychosis and related 
distress, the present study drew on a mixed-methods design to conduct two studies that 
would consider in detail these experiences and their meanings for those experiencing 
them. The underlying logic of mixing qualitative and quantitative findings is that on 
their own, neither method provides sufficient details to capture people’s experiences. 
The studies were given equal weighting, analysed separately, and later combined in 
the interpretation and discussion of the overall research findings (Bazeley, 2018; 
Creswell, 2003). The combination of qualitative and quantitative studies provides a 
novel comprehensive picture of the characteristics of distress related to psychosis 
experiences.  
 
The first study comprised a quantitative study that had as its primary aim 
investigating the impact of insecure attachment on distress related to psychosis 
experiences taking into account individual differences in emotion regulation and 
metacognition in a clinical population. However, while quantitative inquiries are very 
helpful in gaining a good understanding of the associations between concepts and 
variables across larger samples, they consequentially overlook the depth and nuance 
of people’s experiences. Therefore, the second study comprised a qualitative study that 
was conducted to capture this experiential dimension. This study sheds light on how 
people appraise their experiences of psychosis through the interpretive 
phenomenological analysis of in-depth interviews.  
 
This project is a novel empirical exploration of distress related to psychosis 
experiences. The integration of the findings of the quantitative and qualitative studies 
in addition to their individual conclusions provides a strong emphasise on the potential 
mixed methods research has in investigating complex psychological constructs. The 
integrated discussion at the end of the thesis warrants further research on distress 
related to psychosis experiences. Key clinical implications which emerged from the 
research include the use and further development of attachment-informed care, peer 
support workers and metacognition therapy. All of which can contribute to increasing 
people’s perceived control over their psychosis experiences and facilitating supportive 
relationships. 
 
 
 5 
Thesis outline 
In this section, an overview of each chapter of the thesis will be provided in 
order to set out the context from which these arguments will emerge. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an in depth review of the current state of the literature on 
psychosis. After presenting the characteristics of psychosis and the components of 
psychosis spectrum disorders, its multi-disciplinary aetiology is laid out. Given the 
focus of this thesis, particular attention is paid to the psychological vulnerability 
factors related to psychosis. Additionally, in order to emphasise the role distress 
related to psychosis experiences had on people’s help seeking behaviours, the 
literature on dimensional approaches to psychosis is also discussed. The cognitive 
models of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001; Morrison et al., 2001) are then presented in 
order to situate the importance of people’s beliefs and experiential appraisals. Next, 
and perhaps of most relevance to this thesis, the chapter addresses existing research on 
distress related to psychosis experiences (e.g. Brett et al., 2009), and it is from this 
synthesis that gaps in the literature emerge. The varied components presented 
throughout the chapter attest to the complex and deeply personal nature of psychosis 
experiences, the chapter is thus concluded on a review of experiential literature of 
psychosis experiences.  
 
Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature on potential vulnerability factors 
to the development and maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences. 
Attachment theory is a framework for understanding psychosis, further the 
vulnerability factors investigated in this project develop in relation to a person’s 
attachment dimensions (Berry, Barrowclough & Wearden, 2007), it is thus defined and 
described first. Next, by drawing on the emotion regulation and metacognition 
literature, it is argued that they represent potential mediators in the relationship 
between insecure attachment dimensions and psychosis within an attachment theory 
framework (Read & Gumley, 2008). After exploring the conceptual literatures on 
emotion regulation and metacognition, links between them are established, paying 
attention to critical findings and neglected research areas. Ultimately, this chapter 
justifies the need to consider these specific psychological vulnerability factors in order 
to shed light on the shortcomings of current conceptualisation of distress related to 
psychosis experiences.  
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Chapter 4 outlines the rationale adopted for conducting mixed methods 
research. First the overall aim of the project is presented, this is followed by details on 
mixed methods research. A pragmatic lens is employed in this project as this allows 
for both qualitative and quantitative research to be explored concurrently. Specific 
research questions for study 1 and 2 and a mixed methods research question are then 
posed. For this project, the two studies are conducted in parallel using a triangulation 
design, the qualitative study is analysed first to limit the findings being influenced by 
the quantitative analysis, the integration of the two studies took place after they have 
been discussed individually to preserve their independent contribution.  
 
Chapter 5 describes the quantitative research approach and design adopted in 
study 1. Here, the details of the self-report measures are presented, as well as, the 
procedures used in the study. The ethical considerations of the project are elaborated 
upon and the details of the recruitment, completed throughout the Lothians (a region 
of Scotland) and third sector organisations are detailed. The characteristics of the 
sample (N=60) are then introduced and the analytical plan is presented. 
 
Chapter 6 details the empirical findings of study 1. After the norms of the 
scales are provided, inter-correlations of variables are conducted and associations 
between the study variables presented. The inferential results are divided in three 
components. Each section focuses on the exploration of distress related to positive 
symptoms, negative symptoms and depressive symptoms. Multiple regressions were 
conducted to determine which specific subscales of emotion regulation predicted 
distress related to various psychosis experiences, when the other subscales were held 
constant. This was also done for metacognition subscales. Important predictors were 
then carried on to mediation models in order to test if any of these factors mediated 
the relationship between insecure attachment and distress related to psychosis. 
Mediation analyses indicated that need for control significantly mediated the 
relationship between insecure attachment dimensions (anxiety and avoidance) and 
distress related to positive symptoms. Moreover, limited access to emotion regulation 
strategies mediated the relationship between attachment anxiety and distress related 
to negative symptoms of psychosis and depressive symptoms in psychosis. Negative 
beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts mediated the relationship 
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between attachment dimension and distress related to depressive symptoms of 
psychosis. These findings provide support for the theoretical proposition that insecure 
attachment dimensions are associated with distress related to psychosis experiences. 
They also provide empirical support for the model suggested by Read and Gumley 
(2008), as both emotion regulation and metacognition mediated the relationship 
between insecure attachment and distress related to psychosis. Interestingly, different 
variables mediated the relationship between attachment dimensions and distress 
related to positive and negative symptoms. Overall, these findings provide a novel and 
important addition to the literature addressing distress related to psychosis 
experiences.  
 
Chapter 7 starts with background information for the rationale of study 2. It 
contains information on qualitative methods considered prior to choosing 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis (discourse analysis, thematic analysis and 
grounded theory). A detailed overview of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
(Smith et al., 2009) is then presented and highlights the aspects making this method 
the most appropriate choice given the focus and the aim of the study. Semi-structured 
interviews were designed and conducted with ten individuals with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders living in the community in Lothian (a region in 
Scotland). Participants who completed study 1 were asked if they would be interested 
in taking part in interviews. Participants were asked open questions to explore 
individual experiences, shedding novel light on the fluidity and subjectivity of the 
concepts in ways inaccessible to quantitative inquiry. The analysis was conducted 
following the steps provided by Smith and colleagues (2009). In addition, a number of 
other steps were taken to ensure rigour and quality throughout the project.   
 
Chapter 8 details the empirical findings of study 2. Here, the appraisals of 
people’s experiences of psychosis that they relayed are discussed. The four inter-
related themes that emerged from those conversations are presented in detail. They are 
evidenced and illustrated with extensive reference to the data generated with the 
participants. These themes are; (1) lacking control, (2) change – renegotiating a 
personal and social identity, (3) living in fear, and (4) multiple realities. Together, 
these themes are intended to elucidate the appraisals people have of their experiences. 
The nuance and variations observed amongst participants and within the themes 
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illustrate additional dimensions of appraisals of psychosis experiences which are less 
acknowledged in the literature and less accessible to quantitative study. Focusing on 
people’s appraisals of psychosis, instead of specific symptoms, may help reduce 
people’s distress associated with psychosis experiences by rendering visible the 
processes and experience that play into the production of distress.  
 
Chapter 9 is dedicated to a detailed discussion and integration of the findings 
of both studies, and drawing conclusions from the research presented. Quantitative and 
qualitative findings were combined in this project to determine overlapping or 
different facets of people’s experiences in order to achieve a more in-depth 
understanding of distress related to psychosis experiences. Integration was completed 
using a joint display meta-matrix. Taken together, both studies highlight the centrality 
of a perceived lack of control and the significance of interpersonal relationships to the 
development and maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences. It is argued 
that these findings can inform psychological care for people experiencing psychosis, 
by being sensitive to the origins of this distress as it is located in the accounts of the 
experts by experience, rather than focusing on the symptoms themselves. The clinical 
implications suggested for reducing distress related to psychosis experiences include 
attachment-informed care, peer support services and metacognitive therapy. The 
findings of this project and the suggestions made from them should be translated into 
efforts towards providing better outcomes for people experiencing psychosis.   
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Chapter 2. Psychosis and Distress Related to Psychosis Experiences   
2.1 Defining Psychosis 
 
The term psychosis is considered as an integrative and collective term used to 
describe a range of human experiences (Gumley and Schwannauer, 2006). Mainly, 
psychosis refers to severe and distressing experiences affecting and altering a person’s 
perceptions, thoughts, feelings and behaviours (National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence, 2014). Repeated recurrence of psychosis can bring increasingly pervasive 
and distressing psychotic experiences and social disability, as well as additional losses 
(Gumley & Schwannauer 2006). Psychotic illness is classified both within the DSM-
V (APA, 2014) and the ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) through several categories; 
schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, delusional 
disorder, brief psychotic disorder, depression/bipolar disorder with psychotic features 
and psychotic disorder not otherwise classified. These categories are distinguished in 
relation to their duration, dysfunction, associated substance use, bizarreness of 
delusions and presence of depression or mania (van Os & Kapur, 2009).  
 
Although schizophrenia constitutes a small proportion of a much broader 
multidimensional psychotic syndrome, it has become the focus through which 
psychosis is predominantly observed, discussed and researched (Guloksuz & van Os, 
2017). Even people who have subtle psychosis experiences are classified in relation to 
schizophrenia, e.g. ‘ultra-high-risk of schizophrenia’ (van Os & Guloksuz, 2017). 
Schizophrenia was first identified as a pathological condition by Emile Kraepelin 
(1902) who described it as a set of specific symptoms, originally divided into positive 
and negative categories. Although Kraepelin did not name them as positive and 
negative, he recognised a distinction between symptoms that are more florid and those 
that were marked by losses and deficits. It is now agreed upon that there is an 
additional category distinct from the first two: ‘disorganised’ symptoms (Liddle, 
1987). 
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2.1.1 Positive, negative and disorganised symptoms  
 
Positive symptoms of psychosis are defined as an excess or distortion of 
normal behaviour or cognition, including hallucinations and delusions (Andreasen, 
Flaum, Swayze, Tyrrell, & Arndt, 1990). Hallucinations are perceptions in the absence 
of any stimulus. They are cognitive intrusive mental experiences (Fowler, 2006). It is 
suggested that hallucinations result from cognitive difficulties in integrating 
information in the brain, problematic self-monitoring, and information processing (see 
Frith, 1992; Cosway et al., 2000; Hemsley, 1992, 1995). Delusions are fixed or falsely 
held beliefs (Rollins, Bond, Lysaker, McGrew, & Salyers, 2010) and can take on a 
range of themes (e.g. paranoid delusions, delusions of grandeur). It is often the 
presence of voices and delusional beliefs that leads to hospital admissions (Garety & 
Hemsley, 1994).  
 
Negative symptoms on the other hand can be distinguished by the absence or 
reduction of normal functions (Cutting, 2003; Galderisi, Mucci, Buchanan & Arango, 
2018). They include anhedonia (described as a loss of interest or pleasure), apathy 
(where the person is unaffected by what happens in their lives), emotional withdrawal, 
low energy and motivation, poor attention to hygiene and grooming (Kirkpatrick, 
Fenton, Carpenter, & Marder, 2006). Negative symptoms can be very heterogeneous 
and it is important to differentiate primary symptoms from secondary and persistent 
from transient (Galderisi, Mucci, Buchanan & Arango, 2018). Whilst negative 
symptoms may go unnoticed by their sufferers, they are often apparent to people in 
contact with them (Rollins et al., 2010). Kraepelin (1919) considered negative 
symptoms to be more devastating than positive symptoms (cited in Andreasen et al., 
1990). Negative symptoms are a major cause of reduced quality of life  (Bow-Thomas 
et al., 1999; Ho et al., 1998; Stahl & Buckley, 2007). They are often related to poor 
clinical outcome and arrested recovery (Milev, Ho, Arndt & Andreasen, 2005; 
Macbeth, Gumley, Schwannauer, Carcione, Mcleod & Dimaggio, 2015; McLeod, 
Gumley, MacBeth, Schwannauer, & Lysaker, 2014a). Further, no medical nor 
psychosocial treatment have shown robust efficacy in dealing with primary and 
enduring negative symptoms (Galderisi, Rossi, Rocca, Bertolino et al., 2014; Stahl & 
Buckley, 2007; Lutgens, Garieoy & Malla, 2017). This may lead to people 
experiencing multiple episodes primarily exhibiting negative symptoms and fewer 
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positive or disorganised symptoms (Hulshoff Pol & Kahn, 2008). Negative symptoms 
of psychosis are under-researched and poorly understood compared to positive 
symptoms, as are the mechanisms involved in their development and maintenance 
(Couture, Blanchard, & Bennett, 2011; Galderisi et al., 2018).   
 
In addition to positive and negative symptoms, factor analytic studies 
investigating psychosis symptoms found that they can be divided into three 
uncorrelated dimensions with the inclusion of disorganised symptoms (Liddle, 1987). 
This three factor model proposed by Liddle (1987) has been confirmed by several 
studies (Eaton, Thara, Federman, Melton & Liang, 1995; Arndt, Andreasen, Flaum, 
Miller & Nopoulos, 1995). Disorganised symptoms refer to disorganised behaviour, 
speech and thought and are often displayed by individuals experiencing psychosis 
(Cutting, 2003). They can be understood as a reflection of the broader cognitive 
disorganisation which potentially underlies psychosis (Basso, Nasrallah, Olson, & 
Bornstein, 1998). Examples of such symptoms are; inappropriate emotional reactions 
and disorganised thoughts that are evident in the person’s speech which cannot be 
understood by others (Cuesta & Peralta, 1994). 
 
A combination of positive, negative and disorganised symptoms occurring for 
a period of one month is necessary to receive a diagnosis of schizophrenia (WHO, 
1992). Both classification manuals (DSM, APA, 2013; ICD, WHO, 1992) require that 
the experiences are associated with a certain degree of social or occupational 
impairment. Psychotic symptoms that occur as a result of drug or alcohol intoxication 
or dependence (Tien & Anthony, 1990), other disorders with psychotic symptoms, and 
certain developmental disorders (APA, 2013) need to be excluded according to both 
the DSM and the ICD.  
 
Psychiatric diagnoses such as schizophrenia allow for the labelling of a cluster 
of behaviours and experiences, and are also useful in devising the appropriate course 
of treatment for a given diagnosis. However, diagnostic approaches do not reflect the 
variability present within psychosis experiences (Boyle, 2014). Indeed, two people can 
have the same diagnosis but have completely different presentations and outcomes 
(Bentall, Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988; Read, 2004). In addition, psychosis diagnoses can 
be unreliable as an individual’s symptoms can vary over time (Fowler, 2000; Heslin 
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et al., 2015). Thus, the classification system may be an over simplification of people’s 
experiences (Kitamura, Okazaki, Fujinawa, Yoshino & Kasahara, 1995). It can also 
be suggested in line with the variability of people’s experiences both over time and 
between individuals that, first-episode diagnoses should be avoided since they may be 
transient (Heslin et al., 2015).  
 
Another point of critique for diagnostic models of psychosis is that diagnostic 
criteria changes with each new version of the diagnostic manual, it is thus not 
established as an objectively existing concept and lacks reliability (Bentall, Jackson & 
Pilgrim, 1988; Coryell, 2011; Kendell & Jablesky, 2003; Read, 2004). The categorical 
framework imposed by diagnostic models was further criticised following findings 
suggesting that psychosis experiences are present in the general population as well as 
clinical population, thus altering perceptions of these experiences (van Os, Gilvarry, 
Bale, Van Horn, Tattan & White, 1999, van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul 
& Krabbendam, 2009). Moreover, categorical frameworks of experiences often do not 
acknowledge comorbid experiences, such as depression, which are very common 
(Hyman, 2010; Valderas, Starfield, Sibbald, Salisbury & Roland, 2009).  
 
2.1.2 Depression in psychosis  
 
Factor analysis studies suggest that depression is an additional dimension 
alongside positive and negative symptoms (cited in Birchwood, 2003). Depressive 
symptoms can precede psychosis (Hafner, Maurer, Trendler, and der Heiden, Schmidt 
& Konnecke, 2005), emerge in concurrence with psychosis experiences or following 
a psychosis episode (Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwock & Trower, 2000; Kuipers, 2005). 
Depressive symptoms may also contribute to the occurrence or persistence of positive 
symptoms like hallucinations and delusions (Garety et al., 2001; Freeman, Garety, 
Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002). Existing research suggests that experience of 
depression is a key factor in poor quality of life in psychosis (Iqbal, Birchwood, 
Chadwick & Trower, 2000) and schizophrenia (Meijer, Koeter, Sprangers & Schene, 
2009). Birchwood (2003) suggested that there are three potential pathways to 
depression in psychosis. First, depression might be intrinsic to psychosis. Second, 
depression may arise from individuals’ reaction to psychosis, their appraisals of their 
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experiences and their reaction to ‘patienthood’, for example, hopelessness. Third, 
childhood trauma, developmental disturbances or both can lead to dysfunctional 
cognitive schemas that affect a person’s adaptation to their experiences of psychosis 
(Birchwood, 2003).  
 
Birchwood and colleagues (2000) conducted a longitudinal study investigating 
depression in psychosis; 36% of their sample developed depression of moderate 
intensity within a year of the onset of psychosis. Patients that did develop post-
psychotic depression, had a greater sense of loss and humiliation and felt entrapped by 
their illness compared to people who did not (Iqbal et al., 2000). In a second paper 
from the same study, Iqbal and colleagues (2000) compared groups with and without 
post-psychosis depression (PPD) and investigated people’s appraisals and 
vulnerability factors (beliefs about psychosis, insight and cognitive vulnerability). 
They found that the PPD groups had significantly more negative appraisals of their 
experiences compared to the non-PPD group. These included entrapment (control over 
illness), shame, loss of autonomy and valued social role, humiliation and attribution 
(self or illness responsible for experiences). Further, people who developed PPD had 
lower self-esteem when compared to the non-PPD group even before developing 
depression. In relation to insight, no differences were observed at the first time point. 
When depressed however, the PPD group had significantly higher insight with 
reference to their awareness of their illness, labelling of symptoms and need for 
treatment. This suggests that people may indeed be depressed about their psychosis. 
In that sense, the nature and type of appraisals leading to depression may also influence 
the distress people feel in relation to psychosis. It is therefore important to investigate 
psychological vulnerability factors contributing to the maintenance of distress related 
to depressive symptoms in psychosis. Besides the maintenance of psychosis 
experiences, the factors influencing the development of psychosis experiences are 
unclear. Therefore, gaining a better understanding of the factors involved in the 
development and maintenance of psychosis experiences is of great importance for 
interventions, treatment and prevention of psychosis (Fowler, 2000). 
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2.2 The Aetiology of Psychosis 
 
 There is no one theory that provides a full understanding of the aetiology of 
psychosis (van Os & Kapur, 2009). Rather, a holistic understanding of psychosis 
experiences can be achieved by linking phenomenological experiences with social, 
psychological, and neurobiological levels of explanation (Garety et al., 2001). In the 
biological literature, the neurotransmitter dopamine hypothesis (Kapur, Mizrahi & Li, 
2005) and neurodevelopmental genetic theories (Gottesman, 1991) are understood to 
contribute to the development of psychosis. On the other hand, psychosocial theories 
of psychosis explore adverse childhood experiences as vulnerability factors to 
psychosis (Bebbington, Bhugra, Brugha, Singleton, Farrell, Jenkins & Meltzer, 2004). 
These vulnerability factors will be elaborated upon next. Each of these models make 
a contribution to the understanding of the aetiology of psychosis. Acknowledging their 
limitations and accepting that all contribute to the development of psychosis led to the 
adoption of the biopsychosocial approach to the aetiology of psychosis.  
 
2.2.1 Biological factors 
 
 The dopamine hypothesis is the longest enduring biological theory of 
schizophrenia. It attempts to elucidate pathogenic mechanisms of the disorder in 
relation to increased dopamine levels (Howes & Kapur, 2009; van Os and Kapur, 
2009). Kapur (2003) posits that in psychosis an increased release of dopamine leads 
to increased attributions of salience to events and stimuli. This induces a “somewhat 
novel and perplexing state marked by exaggerated importance of certain percepts and 
ideas” (p. 15), thus creating confusion. It is argued that an over-activity of dopamine 
systems in the mesolimbic pathway has an influence on the positive symptoms of 
psychosis (Kapur, Mizrahi & Li, 2005). Antipsychotics suppress the dopamine 
function in the brain by blocking the dopamine receptors. Since antipsychotics reduce 
positive symptoms, the consensus was that schizophrenia must be due to increased 
dopamine levels (Kapur et al., 2005). Although this appears straightforward, 
antipsychotic drugs have no effect on negative or disorganised symptoms and 
therefore, the dopamine hypothesis alone does not explain the development of all 
psychotic symptoms (Kapur et al., 2005). 
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Genetic theories on the other hand, suggests an underlying genetic component 
to psychosis that results in the biological or neurological disturbances observed (van 
Os & Kapur, 2009). The evidence for genetic theories of psychosis comes from twin 
studies, suggesting the syndrome has 80% heritability (see Gottesman, 1991; van Os 
& Kapur, 2009 for reviews). While these attest to the existence of a relationship, single 
genes of major effect have not been identified and high phenotypic heterogeneity has 
been acknowledged (Derks, Boks & Vermunt, 2012). There is, therefore, evidence for 
an increased risk amongst family members, which is indicative of a genetic 
transmission of increased vulnerability (Gottesman & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 2001). 
However, nine out of ten children of parents who have a diagnosis of psychosis do not 
experience psychosis. Similarly, nine out of ten people who do experience psychosis 
do not have a family member who does (Gottesman & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 2001; 
French & Morrison, 2004). Gene theories are therefore not sufficient to explain the 
development of psychosis. A recent development has been the shift towards 
identifying genes that are associated with a cognitive ‘endophenotype’ that is in turn 
associated with schizophrenia (David, 2010). These differences have also been 
observed in close relatives of people experiencing schizophrenia. Furthermore, these 
cognitive markers (endophenotypes) can be identified before the development of any 
psychotic symptoms, therefore suggesting a more productive avenue in understanding 
the genetic risk of schizophrenia (Greenwood et al., 2007; Gur, Keshavan & Lawrie, 
2007). Overall, the existing knowledge suggests that genetic predisposition is unlikely 
to be a sufficient explanation for the expression of psychosis, rather, biological 
explanations for psychosis are compounded by psychosocial vulnerability factors 
(Broome et al., 2005; van Os & Sham, 2003).  
2.2.2 Psychosocial models of psychosis  
 
Research has associated a number of vulnerability factors as contributors to the 
onset of full blown psychosis, for instance, urbanicity (Krabbendam & van Os, 2005; 
Spauwen, Krabbendam, Lieb, Wittchen & van Os, 2004), ethnic minority status 
(Cantor-Graae & Selten, 2005), childhood trauma (Read, Flowers & Larkin 2005; 
Varese et al., 2012), major life events (Van Os et al., 2009) and cannabis use (Henquet, 
Murray, Linszen & van Os, 2005). Whilst it is important to acknowledge the variety 
of vulnerability factors related to the onset of psychosis experiences, not all of these 
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factors will be elaborated upon in this thesis.   
The stress-vulnerability model of psychosis is a widely accepted approach, it 
states that biological factors do not exist in a vacuum and thus, incorporates the need 
for circumstances to elicit genetically encoded materials (Myin-Germeys, van Os, 
Schwartz, Stone & Delespaul, 2001; Myin-Germeys & van Os, 2007; Zubin & Spring, 
1977). The stress-vulnerability model postulates that when the stress people 
experience surpasses the individual’s vulnerability level, mental health difficulties 
may occur (Zubin, Magaziner & Steinhauer, 1983; Morrison, Nothard, Bowe & Wells, 
2004). For instance, Wicks, Hjern, Gunnell, Lewis and Dalman (2005) investigated 
socio-economic status in childhood and the incidence of schizophrenia in a Swedish 
sample of two million. They found a ‘dose-response’ association between indicators 
for adversity during childhood and the incidence of schizophrenia in adulthood; the 
higher the adversity the more likely people were to develop schizophrenia later on in 
life. Adverse childhood experiences lead to disruptions in cognitive processes of 
attention, and perception or judgement often alongside emotional changes (Fowler, 
Garety & Kuipers, 1995). Bebbington and colleagues (2004) interviewed over 8000 
adults with a range of mental health difficulties. They found that experiences of 
victimisation during childhood were particularly closely associated with developing 
schizophrenia. Early developmental adversities are therefore considered key to the 
development of psychosis, these vulnerabilities include adverse childhood 
experiences, interpersonal trauma, including physical, sexual and psychological abuse, 
parental emotional neglect and dysfunctional parenting (Birchwood, 2003; Read, van 
Os, Morrison & Ross, 2005; Varese et al., 2012). Indeed, insecure attachment patterns 
are also psychological constructs that are proposed to be related to the developmental 
trajectory from childhood adversity to psychosis phenomena (Berry, Wearden, 
Barrowclough & Liversidge, 2006).  
A key point to reiterate here is that not all individuals who experience 
childhood adversity will develop psychosis and not all people who have psychosis 
experiences had traumatic childhoods.  The association is therefore more complex and 
causality cannot be inferred (Romme & Escher, 2000). Research into childhood 
adversity and associated developmental and psychological difficulties form 
vulnerability factors to the development and maintenance of psychosis (Varese et al., 
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2012). Biological models are also likely to constitute a vulnerability factor and 
contribute to the development of psychosis. Therefore, a holistic biopsychosocial 
approach to the onset and maintenance of psychosis seems to be the most appropriate 
to understand and to treat psychosis experiences. The increased evidence for an 
important role played by psycho-social vulnerability factors in relation to the aetiology 
of psychosis has also been heightened by the understanding that psychotic-like 
experiences also exist in the general population, thus proposing dimensional 
approaches to psychosis. 
2.3 Dimensional Approaches to Psychosis 
 
Approaches to the study of psychosis on a continuum derive from two models 
that mainly differ in their prediction of the frequency of sub-clinical symptoms in the 
general population. First, the quasi-dimensional model derived from Meehl’s (1989) 
work assumes that only a small portion of the population carries the ‘schizogene’ 
which produces an aberration in synaptic signal selectivity leading to the production 
of a defect in neurointegrative processes called ‘schizotaxia’. He postulated that in 
some cases, schizotaxia led to schizotypy, a necessary but not sufficient precursor for 
the emergence of schizophrenia. Overall, his approach suggested that only a small 
percentage of the population can be represented on the psychosis continuum (Meehl, 
1989 in DeRosse & Karlsgodt, 2015). It is now known that there is not one risk allele 
but rather a large number of genetic variants (Purcell et al., 2009), Meehl’s 
understanding is therefore partly supported by research focusing on schizotypal 
personality (e.g. Haslam, Holland & Kuppens, 2012; Rawlings, Williams, Haslam & 
Claridge, 2008). The fully dimensional model mainly derives from the work of 
Claridge (1987) and it assumes that psychotic symptoms exist along a continuum 
encompassing the entire population rather than its presence or absence. This approach 
treats schizotypy as a personality trait continually distributed in the general population 
(Ettinger, Meyhöfer, Steffens, Wagner & Koutsouleris, 2014). Claridge (1987) posited 
that this trait highlights individual differences, and in extreme cases lead to a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia. The high prevalence of psychotic-like experiences in the general 
population is in accordance with the fully dimensional approach (e.g. Lincoln, 2007). 
Although there is not a definite conclusion as to whether quasi- or fully dimensional 
models are most accurate, based on their operational definitions, research into the 
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continuum of psychosis mainly ascribes to one model above another (DeRosse & 
Karlsgodt, 2015). For instance, and of relevance to this project, the Community 
Assessment of Psychic Experience scale (CAPE; Stefanis et al., 2002) is viewed as 
ascribing to and measuring a fully dimensional understanding (DeRosse & Karlsgodt, 
2015).   
 
There are three ways in which psychosis continuity is considered: 
phenomenological, temporal and structural (Linscott & van Os, 2013). 
Phenomenological continuity refers to psychotic experiences that can be characteristic 
of disorders but are not exclusive to disorders. Psychosis experiences are independent 
of disorders, thus, they are only quantitatively different to personality variables 
explored in psychosis-proneness or schizotypy (Linscott & van Os, 2013). Temporal 
continuity refers to experiences persisting over time. Finally, structural continuity 
refers to the distribution of psychotic experiences in the general population. Thus 
relating to whether the overall population is composed of one class of people with a 
similar phenotype without quantitative variations or multiple classes of people with 
qualitatively distinguishable phenotype that also may vary quantitatively (Johns et al., 
2014; Linscott & van Os, 2013). van Os and colleagues (2009; van Os & Linscott, 
2012) devised the psychosis-proneness-persistence-impairment model that involves 
both phenomenological and temporal continuity. This model postulates that 
expressions of psychotic experiences are common and often transient in nature. 
However, stressors can act to prolong and exacerbate people’s experiences which 
increases the probability for a need for care, and possibly a diagnosis (van Os et al., 
2009). 
 
On the phenomenological continuum of psychosis, the ‘high end’ of the scale 
represents people with clinical psychotic experiences such as schizophrenia and 
delusional disorder, with experiences severe and frequent enough to meet the 
diagnostic criteria and causing significant distress and/or functional impairment (van 
Os et al., 2009). Next, there are the ‘prodromal’ or ‘ultra-high risk’ groups that have 
isolated or attenuated symptoms that are distressing and prompt help-seeking 
behaviour, whilst not being enough for a diagnosis. Further, there are individuals in 
the general population who experience psychotis-like experiences (PLEs), which can 
be defined as mild psychotic symptoms. These are ‘subclinical’ manifestations and are 
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usually transient (DeRosse & Karlsgodt, 2015; Dominguez, Wichers, Lieb, Wittchen 
& van Os, 2009) and not distressing enough that the person will seek help (Ahmed, 
Buckley & Mabe, 2012). Overall, the psychosis phenotype expressed at levels below 
its clinical manifestation is commonly and interchangeably referred to as psychotic 
experiences (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000), psychosis proneness (Chapman, 
Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad & Zinser, 1994), at-risk mental states (Yung, Phillips, 
Yuen & McGorry, 2004) or schizotypy (Stefanis et al., 2002; Mason & Claridge, 
2015).  
 
There is a wealth of evidence suggesting that psychotic-like phenomena can be 
detected within non-clinical populations (Bentall, 1993; Hanssen, Bak, Bijl et al., 
2005; Rössler et al. 2007, 2015; Scott, Chant, Andrews & McGrath, 2006; van Os et 
al., 2000; van Os et al., 2009). A way to approach this inquiry is to investigate 
psychotic-like anomalous experiences in the general population (Johns & van Os, 
2001). Beck and Rector (2003) did that and reported that 4-25% of the general 
population experience auditory hallucinations at some point in their lives: in 80% of 
these cases, the experiences disappear and do not come back and therefore people do 
not come in contact with mental health services. This attests to the transient nature of 
some experiences of psychosis (Hanssen, Bak, Bijl, Vollebergh & van Os, 2005). It 
also strengthens the understanding that psychosis experiences can occur on a 
continuum independently from psychotic disorders (Allardyce, Gaebel, Zielasek, & 
van Os, 2007; Heckers et al., 2013; Guloksuz & van Os, 2017; Linscott & van Os, 
2010, 2013; van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009). 
Simply put, members of the general population can have psychosis experiences that 
are merely quantitatively different from those experienced by people with a diagnosis 
of psychosis. Evidence suggests that the experiences differ mainly in terms of their 
frequency and intensity, as well as the degree of associated distress and impairment 
(Johns & van Os, 2001).  
The large scale (N=7076) Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence 
Study (NEMESIS study; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 2000) also focused on a 
general population sample. They found that 17.5% of the sample endorsed at least one 
of the positive psychotic symptoms while only 2.1% had a DSM diagnosis (then DSM-
III-R; APA, 1987). This demonstrates that only a small portion of the total phenotypic 
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contribution is represented by clinically identified cases. In the UK, Johns and 
colleagues (2004) analysed self-reports from the National Survey of Psychiatric 
Morbidity (N=8,580) to determine prevalence rates in adults (aged 16-74). They 
assessed psychotic symptoms in the last year (they used the psychosis screening 
questionnaire, PSQ; Bebbington & Nayani, 1995) and 5.5% of the sample reported at 
least one psychotic symptom. Interestingly, a large number of endorsements were 
present for initial probe questions (e.g. the statement “Have there been times when you 
felt that people were deliberately acting to harm you or your interests?” was affirmed 
by 9.1%) compared to more specific secondary questions (e.g. the statement “Have 
there been times when you felt that a group of people were plotting to cause you serious 
harm or injury?” was affirmed by 1.5%). This suggests that whilst people do seem to 
hold unusual beliefs, their beliefs were perhaps not as developed as most psychosis 
delusions might be. It is therefore important to treat the numbers associated with 
psychotic-like experiences with caution as they might be over representative.  
 
Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul & Krabbendam (2009) conducted 
a systematic review and meta-analysis of population studies of subclinical psychotic 
symptoms. Their results suggested substantial variations across cohorts and studies 
and they found that more than 8% of the population report psychotic experiences, the 
median prevalence overall was 5.3%. However, it is possible that this number is an 
overestimation as they included self-report measure that records experiences that, 
while they may be similar to psychotic experiences, they likely do not constitute 
evidence of psychosis. To test this, Linscott and van Os (2012) conducted a more 
conservative systematic review. They still found a prevalence of 7.2% which is 
consistent with their previous review. They also identified that psychotic-like 
experiences share similar vulnerability factors with psychosis experiences, 
schizophrenia in particular, in that the risk is higher with younger people, ethnic 
minorities and migrant groups, and lower paid less educated people (Linscott & van 
Os, 2012). Exposure to alcohol, drug use, stressful or traumatic events, and a family 
history of mental illness all predicted greater risk of psychotic experiences.  
 
There is therefore strong evidence for a continuum of psychotic experiences in 
the general population. These findings lead to the understanding that the distinction 
between ‘normal’ and psychosis beliefs are a matter of degree, not a qualitative 
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difference (Johns et al., 2014). Research focusing on a normal population consistently 
found that a percentage of the population have psychotic-like experiences at some 
point in their lifetime but they are not prominent or frequent, or distressing enough to 
lead to a need for care and a diagnosis (Bak, Myin-Germeys, Hanssen, Bijl, 
Vollebergh, Delespaul & van Os, 2003; van Os et al., 2009). The evidence of 
psychotic-like experiences in the general population suggests that the clinical 
definition of psychosis only represents a minor selection of the total phenotypic 
continuum (Johns & van Os, 2001). The presence of disorder is perceived to be related 
to symptom factors such as intrusiveness, frequency and psychopathological 
comorbidities, as well as personal and cultural factors such as coping, illness 
behaviour, and the degree of associated developmental impairment (Johns & van Os, 
2001). 
 
Another line of inquiry within the continuum view of psychosis has been to 
investigate the similarities and differences in psychosis experiences of individuals in 
the general population who report psychotic experience but are not in contact with 
mental health services (non-need for care) and individuals in the clinical population 
who are in contact with mental health services (need for care). Most recently, Peters 
and colleagues (2016) conducted a very detailed investigation of clinical 
characteristics in individuals with persistent psychotic experiences with and without a 
need for care. They measured psychotic experiences using three measures (AANEX, 
Brett et al., 2007; SAPS, Andreasen, 1983; SANS, Andreasen, 1984). They found that 
first rank symptoms were also commonly reported in non-clinical sample, however 
their lifetime frequency (but not current) was higher in the clinical group. One 
important difference was that the clinical group had more severe and frequent 
symptoms compared to the non-clinical group (Bak, Myin-Germeys, Hanssen et al., 
2003). Thus, the intensity and recurrence of psychosis experiences can contribute to 
distress and need for care. Participants in the non-clinical group had nearly no negative 
symptoms. Peters and colleagues’ (2016) results are in line with other study findings 
suggesting that positive symptoms are weaker predictors of transition to full blown 
psychosis and poor outcomes; instead, negative and disorganised symptoms and 
subjective cognitive difficulties are better predictors (Fusar-Poli et al., 2012; Morita, 
Kobayashi, Takeshi, Tsujino, Nemoto & Mizuno, 2014; Valmaggia, Stahl, Yung, 
Nelson, Fusar-Poli & McGorry, 2013). However, comparative studies (clinical vs. 
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non-clinical) predominantly focus on positive symptoms to gain a better understanding 
of people’s appraisals and beliefs. This can be explained by the lack of negative 
symptoms in the non-clinical and control populations. Clinical research is therefore 
necessary to investigate appraisals and distress related to negative symptoms of 
psychosis.  
 
In a seminal study for the understanding of distress related to psychosis 
experiences, Peters, Day, McKenna and Orbach (1999a) compared experiences of 
delusions in different groups. They found that individuals belonging to a new religious 
group (NRMs) showed similar levels of florid delusions as psychotic patients, and 
further, they could not be differentiated from the clinical group on the number of 
delusional ideation items, or their level of conviction. However, they were 
significantly less distressed and preoccupied by their experiences. The distress people 
associate with their experiences relates to the importance with which experiences are 
perceived and interpreted. Peters and colleagues (1999a) suggest that the form of the 
experiences may be more important than their content; “it is not what you believe, it 
is how you believe it” (p.94). This is understood within the context of cognitive models 
of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001). They suggest that a key component 
that leads people to seek help for their experiences is how psychosis experiences are 
appraised, their context and people’s emotional responses to their experiences (Brett 
et al., 2007). Cognitive models of psychosis are elaborated upon before exploring how 
people experiencing psychosis appraise their experiences in more detail.  
 
2.4 Cognitive Models of Psychosis  
 
Cognitive theories of psychosis elucidate the mechanisms involved in the onset 
and maintenance of psychosis experiences. They allow for insight into how appraisals 
and beliefs about one’s experiences relate to psychosis related distress (Chadwick & 
Birchwood, 1994; Fowler, 2000; Garety et al., 2001; Garety, Bebbington, Fowler, 
Freeman &Kuipers, 2007; Morrison, 2001). Cognitive models of psychosis are 
compatible with the continuum view of psychosis (Kuipers, Garety, Fowler, Freeman, 
Dunn & Bebbington, 2006). They identify social, emotional and cognitive processes 
as crucial in facilitating the transition between sub-clinical and clinical presentations 
 23 
(Garety et al., 2001; 2007; Morrison, 2001). Furthermore, they integrate the complex 
interaction of predisposing neurobiological, environmental, cognitive and behavioural 
factors with the specific symptoms displayed by the person (Beck, 1976 in Morrison, 
2001). Two main models address the integrated cognitive components of psychosis 
with a focus on delusions (Garety et al., 2001, 2007) and hallucinations (Morrison, 
2001).  
 
The cognitive model developed by Garety et al. (2001) begins with the 
assumption that psychosis occurs in people who have a vulnerable predisposition of 
bio-psycho-social origin (Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994; Frith, 1992; Hemsley, 
1993). Garety and colleagues (2001) emphasise disruption in cognitive processes and 
periods of emotional change as being related to the development of symptoms, 
suggesting that cognitive changes lead to anomalous conscious experiences. They 
predict that the development of psychotic-like experiences stem from two proximal 
routes (see figure 1). The first route is deemed the most common and includes both 
affective and cognitive changes. It starts with a triggering event in a predisposed 
person. This creates a disruption in cognitive processing which results in the 
perception of an ambiguous or anomalous experience. It is worth mentioning at this 
point that this cognitive model of psychosis argues that adverse early experiences 
create an enduring cognitive vulnerability, through negative schematic models, which 
then lead to external attribution of experiences. This perception is followed by an 
emotional response and search for meaning. At this stage, the transition between 
subclinical level and full-blown psychosis depends on whether or not people perceive 
their experiences as being personally significant, external and threatening. These 
perceptions are influenced by a number of cognitive biases (e.g. jumping to 
conclusions, attentional biases; Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Morrison, 1998). 
Dysfunctional schemas and adverse social environments are also believed to 
contribute to the onset and maintenance of psychosis experiences. Specifically, 
distorted beliefs about the self, others and the world are likely to contribute to the 
maintenance of psychotic beliefs (Garety et al., 2001). Contextual factors (such as 
isolation) may also maintain the appraisal of anomalous experiences in reducing the 
person’s ability to find alternatives. In addition, emotional distress (e.g. anxiety and 
depression) are likely to contribute to the maintenance of psychotic appraisals through 
other processes, such as metacognitive beliefs that may increase distress related to 
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psychosis (Freeman & Garety, 1999). Finally, ‘secondary appraisal’ is related to 
appraisal of the psychosis itself, and how it is perceived by the person and others. The 
second route described by Garety and colleagues (2001) solely involves affective 
responses; life events are seen to trigger experiences. Hence, an externalising appraisal 
of experiences is made without the need for a cognitive disturbance producing the 
anomalous experience. Once developed, the authors propose that the maintenance of 
psychosis experiences follows a similar reasoning. This model provides impetus for 
an understanding of the pathways and mechanisms associated with the appraisals that 
lead to distress related to psychosis experiences (Brett et al., 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1. A cognitive model of positive symptoms of psychosis (as discussed by 
Garety et al., 2001 in Kuipers et al., 2006) 
 
In parallel with Garety and colleagues (2001), Morrison (2001) also developed 
an integrated cognitive model of psychosis with slight differences (see figure 2). He 
argues that positive psychotic experiences can be conceptualised as intrusion into 
awareness (e.g. hearing voices) or culturally unacceptable interpretations of these 
intrusions (e.g. persecutory delusions). Morrison (2001) thus explores interpretations 
of intrusions; in this context, interpretations are defined as external stimulus 
information, cognitive state information and body state information (Wells & 
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Matthews, 1994). How intrusions are interpreted mediates the relationship between 
the intrusion and its associated distress and consequent difficulties. Morrison (2001) 
proposes that it is the appraisal of the experiences that result in distress and disability 
(see also Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994). This appraisal process is shaped by the 
individual’s beliefs formed through life experiences about the self, the world and 
others. These intrusions are maintained through a number of factors including mood, 
and cognitive, behavioural and physiologic responses. These behavioural responses 
are highlighted in the cognitive analysis of a number of psychological difficulties, 
including GAD, OCD and panic disorders (Wells, Clark, Salkovskis, Ludgate, 
Hackman & Gelder, 1995; Salkovskis, 1985; Clark, 1986).  
 
This attests to the transdiagnostic approach of the cognitive model (Harvey, 
Watkins, Mansell & Shafran, 2004). What does differentiate psychosis from other 
psychological difficulties is that psychosis experiences are perceived as culturally 
unacceptable (e.g. a lump related to cancer fear vs. a lump as an indication of an alien 
transmission device). Morrison (2001) proposed that beliefs about the dangerousness, 
unwantedness or uncontrollability of mental events rather than their content predict 
both distress and voice occurrence. He predicted that people who hold beliefs about 
mental events being unwanted and unacceptable are more likely to attribute them to 
an external source in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Morrison & Baker, 2000). 
This is in line with Garety and colleagues’ (2001) cognitive model of psychosis, as 
they suggest that psychotic outcome only occurs if people appraise their experiences 
as being externally caused and of personal significance.  
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Figure 2. A model of psychosis by Morrison (2001, p. 261) 
 
Both models allocate great importance to distress related to psychosis 
experiences by associating it to appraisals and the beliefs about experiences of 
psychosis as well as the maintenance of these experiences. A factor differentiating the 
two models is that Morrison (2001) views psychotic experiences as normal 
psychological phenomena, that is, they are perceived to be normal and understandable 
for the person experiencing them. Morrison (2001) considers the ‘cultural 
unacceptability’ of psychosis experiences as differentiating from other psychological 
difficulties. Contrastingly, Garety and colleagues (2001) perceive cognitive 
dysfunction (e.g. information processing deficits) as leading to anomalous 
experiences, and distinguishing psychosis from anxiety or depression. Morrison 
(2001) suggests that people’s interpretations are dependent of the beliefs they form 
through life experiences regarding the self, others and the world (Morrison, 2001). 
Overall, cognitive models attribute importance to people’s search for meaning and 
subsequent interpretations of their experiences which is determined by their past 
experiences. Cognitive models of psychosis propose that within the continuum of 
psychosis a key factor in determining whether someone will seek help for their 
experiences (need for care) is people’s appraisals of their experiences. When 
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experiences are interpreted as threatening and external or personally significant, 
people are likely to be distressed about them (Garety et al., 2001). Thus, appraisals are 
key to understanding distress related to psychosis experiences and its maintenance.  
 
2.5 Appraisals and Distress Associated with Psychosis Experiences 
 
As psychosis experiences exist on a continuum, and thus can be identified in 
the general population, it is now accepted that psychotic-like experiences do not 
necessarily lead people to seek help and receive a diagnosis. It is therefore important 
to understand what leads people to develop a need for care (Johns & van Os, 2001). 
Previous research found that it is not the implausibility of the conviction but rather 
people’s degree of conviction and distress that lead to help seeking (Garety and 
Hemsley 1994; Peters et al., 1999a).  Distress related to psychotic-like experiences has 
been identified as a primary indicator of problematic mental health and an important 
predictor for the onset and relapse in psychosis (Brett et al., 2014). Distress related to 
psychosis experiences results from people’s interpretations of their experiences and 
specific appraisals (Bentall, 2003; Morrison, 2003). Cognitive models of psychosis 
suggest that individuals’ appraisals of their experiences are key in predicting the 
outcomes of their anomalous experiences (Garety et al., 2001). Research has therefore 
focused on gaining a better understanding on people’s appraisals to better understand 
what leads to distress and help seeking.  
Brett and colleagues (2007) focused on the factors suggested in the cognitive 
models of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001, 2007; Morison, 2001) to develop and validate 
a semi-structured interview assessing anomalous experiences, appraisals, context and 
emotional responses to anomalous experiences. They found that the clinical group 
appraised their experiences to be more negative and dangerous. They were also more 
distressed by their experiences when compared to the non-clinical group. Clinical 
groups were more likely to perceive their experiences to be caused by someone else 
(personalising) (Brett et al., 2007) and psychosis experiences were identified as having 
personal significance (Mawson, Cohen & Berry, 2010). They were deemed to have 
external causes (Garety et al., 2001, 2007) and were experienced as uncontrollable 
(Garety et al., 2007; Morrison & Petersen, 2003). These appraisals can in turn lead to 
distress associated with psychosis experiences which can lead to help seeking 
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(Underwood, Kumari & Peters, 2016). The non-clinical sample, on the other hand had 
more normalising appraisals of their experiences: they appraised their experiences as 
relatively more positive and benign (Brett et al., 2007). Brett and colleagues (2007) 
suggested that the positive appraisals people held about their experiences are likely to 
act as a protective factor from distress.   
In a later study, Brett and colleagues (2014) investigated the predictors of 
distress related to psychosis experiences. They measured distress by asking people 
how they felt/feel when they experienced a particular symptom. The responses were 
categorised as negative emotional response, positive emotional response, neutral 
arousal and unengaged. These were then coded individually and negative emotional 
responses were taken to represent distress. The authors therefore did not measure the 
frequency or severity of distress but its presence or absence. This provides limited 
information about distress as it can be expected, in line with the continuum of 
psychosis, that people will have variable levels of distress. Despite this limitation, the 
findings of this study are important to move forward in understanding the factors 
involved in leading to distress. Brett and colleagues (2014) also found that changes in 
awareness and cognitive processes, appraisals of experiences as caused by ‘other 
people’ (e.g. Do you think this was caused by someone or something else? AANEX-
CAR, Brett et al., 2007) and greater attempted control over experiences predicted 
higher levels of distress. On the other hand, the predictors of lower distress were 
having ‘spiritual’ appraisals, people perceived having greater social 
support/understanding and greater perceived controllability as well as reacting to 
experiences with a neutral response (Brett et al., 2014). These findings are in line with 
the cognitive models of psychosis suggesting that distress relates to how people 
appraise their experiences and not the experiences themselves (Bentall, Corcoran, 
Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001; Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001).   
The large majority of research studies that investigated appraisals and then 
distress related to people’s experiences have used the AANEX measure (Brett et al., 
2007, 2015; Peters et al., 2016). The AANEX-inventory records the presence or 
absence of experiences in pre-determined categories (e.g. dimensions of appraisals 
include danger, externality, valence and agency). There is also the AANEX-CAR 
measuring people’s context, appraisals and responses to experiences. Even though the 
 29 
questions were designed in line with cognitive models of psychosis (Fowler, 2000; 
Garety et al., 2001; see Brett et al., 2007 for details of the scale), the measure was 
designed to be coded easily using ordinal ratings for most questions. Its self-report 
nature is likely to overlook individual differences and personal experiences, context 
and feelings surrounding people’s experiences. It is therefore important to turn to 
qualitative research to gain a well-rounded understanding of people’s appraisals 
relating to the experiences of psychosis and associated distress in more depth.  
2.6 Experiential Accounts of Psychosis  
 
 The perspective of the experts by experience has been largely overlooked in 
mental health research (Larsen, 2004), thus failing to acknowledge the heterogeneity 
of people’s experiences (Read, 2004), and variations in outcomes following psychosis 
(Allardyce, Suppes & van Os, 2007; Liberman & Koperlowicz, 2002). These 
observations and limitations led researchers and service users to advocate that 
conceptualisations of psychosis should be more inclusive of subjective accounts of 
experiences and their phenomenological nature (Laing, 1960; Boyle, 1990; Bentall, 
1990; 2003). Indeed, a benefit of accounting for subjective experiences is a nuanced 
grasp of people’s beliefs, understandings, and interpretations of a series of complex 
lived experiences as well as individuals’ emotional responses to psychosis as a major 
life event (or set of events) (Anthony, 1993; Gumley, White & Power, 1999). This can 
be best understood from the experts by experiences’ perspective (Willig, 2013). For 
example, the recovery approach to psychosis developed from this understanding. It 
focuses on personal narratives, citizenship, participation and experiential 
understanding instead of symptoms, impairments and professional knowledge 
(Boumans, Baart, Widdershoven & Kroon, 2016; Deegan, 1993).  
 
 The focus therefore needs to shift to what matters to the person, in order to 
improve understandings of how subjective experiences relate to psychological ones 
(Wilkinson, Joffe & Yardley, 2003). This is important across the entire temporal 
experience of psychosis. The growing evidence base comprising of qualitative 
accounts of psychosis from a service user perspective investigates important factors 
such as understanding the symptoms of psychosis (McCarthy-Jones, Trauer, 
Mackinnon, Sims, Thomas & Copolov, 2012), their impact on others (McCann, 
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Lubman & Clark, 2011), stigma (Knight, Wykes & Hayward, 2003), and recovery 
(e.g. Wood & Alsawy, 2017). By looking at psychosis as a cluster of experiences 
through a phenomenological lens, the literature is directed towards an in depth and 
more holistic understanding and appreciation of psychosis experiences. Such a focus 
can also allow for investigations beyond the symptoms of psychosis, allowing people 
to focus on their experiences in order to explore the appraisals they make of their 
psychosis experiences.  
 
 The factors that lead people to contact mental services remain unclear (Heriot-
Maitland et al., 2012). Distress associated with psychosis experiences has been related 
to help-seeking (Lovatt et al., 2010). To the researcher’s knowledge, there is no 
qualitative research that has for primary aim to better understand distress associated 
with people’s psychosis experiences. This may be because distress relates to multiple 
concepts in the literature such as anxiety and depression comorbid with psychosis (e.g. 
Birchwood, 2003), people may be focusing on different things when they answer 
questions about distress. Brett and colleagues (2007) postulated that the appraisals 
people make of their experiences are key in determining whether they will seek help 
for their psychosis experiences. It may therefore be useful to investigate people’s 
appraisals of their psychosis experiences to understand how they make sense of their 
experiences. To date there is no qualitative research that provides a nuanced 
understanding of the appraisals people in contact with mental health services make of 
their psychosis experiences either. However, a number of studies provide in-depth 
information on people’s experiences of psychosis and their appraisals. A review of the 
literature highlighted a number of studies investigating people’s experiences of 
psychosis. Studies focused on (1) people’s search for understanding and meaning 
making of their experiences, (2) their perception of the self in relation to psychosis, 
(3) people’s sense of lacking control, and (4) feeling isolated.  
2.6.1 Searching for understanding  
A common concern that arose across the studies reviewed was that participants 
try to make sense of their experiences and search for understanding as a first response 
following the onset of psychosis. Holt and Tickle (2015) specifically investigated how 
people construct meaning about the origins and maintenance of their voice hearing. 
They proposed that meaning making takes place in three sub-categories; personal 
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meaning-making, shared sense-making and mental health services. Personal meaning 
making related to people’s active attempts to make sense of their voices through private 
enquiry. When trying to make sense of their experiences, people were confused by the 
variations in voice presentations and the different traits voices can have. Shared sense-
making took place when people were unable to make sense of their experiences alone, 
they therefore sought information from various sources such as peer support groups or 
internet searches. The role played by mental health services in understanding voice 
hearing experiences were mentioned as a form of shared-sense making (Holt & Tickle, 
2015).  At times, people felt like they were misunderstood by others and the mental 
health services. This led people to feel unsupported in trying to understand their 
experiences. It also had an effect on how people reacted and dealt with their 
experiences (Chin, Hayward & Drinnan, 2009). Identifying how people construct and 
understand the origins and maintenance of distressing voices was deemed important 
to understanding how people make sense of their experiences (Boumans, Baart, 
Widdershoven & Kroon, 2016; Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012). In Stopa, Denton, 
Wingfield and Newman-Taylor’s (2013) research, participants described a ‘parallel 
understanding’ where people were aware that their perceptions of their experiences 
were not shared by others. This awareness was related to further difficulties in meaning 
making, isolation and an increased sense of being different (Makdisi, Blank, Bryant, 
Andrews, Franco & Parsonage, 2013; Stopa et al., 2013). 
 
Despite individuals’ efforts and the involvement of others, some people felt 
like they still did not gain a satisfactory explanation for the origins or meaning of their 
experiences. This led to feelings of helplessness and hindered efforts to come to terms 
with their experiences, making it more difficult for people to move forward (Holt & 
Tickle, 2015; Waite, Knight & Lee, 2015). For instance, people who were not in 
contact with mental health services, engaged in ‘active acceptance’ (Boumans et al., 
2016, p.6) as a key coping strategy, this facilitated their understanding and they moved 
forward in their lives through acceptance.  
 
How people perceive others’ understandings of their experiences therefore 
seems to play an important role in how people experience and make sense of psychosis. 
Boumans and colleagues’ (2016) non-clinical sample suggested that when people had 
previous knowledge and background understanding of psychosis, this helped them 
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incorporate the experiences by providing a meaningful context. Heriot-Maitland and 
colleagues (2012) interviewed people with both psychotic-like experiences, and with 
a diagnosis. Participants in the clinical groups were more likely to have awareness of 
their experiences being pathologised than normalised (Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012). 
Similarly, in relation to interactions with others, the clinical sample had less validating 
interactions and more invalidating ones (Waite et al., 2015). Heriot-Maitland (et al., 
2012) concluded that prior conceptual knowledge and receiving validation and 
acceptance from others was an aspect differentiating non-clinical and clinical groups, 
which may act as protective factors against negative appraisals, distress and need for 
help. Thus, both appraisals and the social context in which they occur seem to be 
important in the meaning making process. Further investigation of people’s meaning 
making is needed to better understand the appraisals contributing to the maintenance 
of distress related to psychosis experiences. This had consequences for the way 
experience were incorporated in people’s lives.  
2.6.2 Perception of the self 
 
Several studies highlighted that participants reported grappling with their 
perceptions of the self and where the self sits in relation to psychosis experiences. 
People described a sensation of ego loss as a result of the emergence of psychosis 
experiences (Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012). This was explained as a breakdown of the 
normal psychological relationships between mind and body, as well as interpersonally 
between the self and others (Holt & Tickle, 2015; Stopa et al., 2009). 
 
Waite, Knight and Lee (2015) investigated the critical processes that promote 
recovery from psychosis through a person’s relationship to the self. They interviewed 
ten people from a community mental health team, and used Interpretative 
Phenomenological analysis (IPA). They claim that a person’s relationship to their self 
may facilitate or hinder recovery. They specifically focused on self-to-self relating, 
self-compassion and self-criticism. Self-criticism relates to how a person interacts with 
themselves (Hutton, Kelly, Lowens, Taylor & Tai, 2013) and it was common when 
people reflected on themselves and their experiences. Waite, Knight and Lee (2015) 
uncovered a vicious cycle where psychosis triggered self-criticism and this 
perpetuated psychosis experiences. For instance, the development and role of 
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grandiose beliefs in people’s lives were described as a defence against low self-worth 
and powerlessness, as well as a lack of support (Strand et al., 2015). Self-worth was 
also mentioned in relation to people’s efforts to deal with their voices (Chin et al., 
2009) and paranoia (Campbell & Morrison, 2007) and the power attributed to them.   
 
Waite and colleagues (2015) suggested that distress is composed of a 
multiplicity of experiences, caused by internal and external factors. How people 
perceive their self can thus be distressing (Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012; Makdisi et al., 
2013; Waite et al., 2015). High self-criticism and low self-compassion could 
contribute to the maintenance of distress, leading people to remain in contact with 
mental health services (Waite et al., 2015). In a recent quantitative study, 
Scheunemann and colleagues (2018) investigated the role of self-compassion in the 
distress associated with psychotic-like experiences. They found that self-compassion 
was associated with less distress related to psychosis experiences (Scheunemann, 
Schlier, Ascone & Lincoln, 2018). Negative self-compassion (specifically 
overidentification and isolation), on the other hand, more strongly related to distress 
associated with voices and delusions than the frequency of symptoms. Negative 
experiences of psychosis in negative contexts may reinforce and lead to the 
maintenance of a negative sense of self and self-criticism. If this is also combined with 
a lack of self-compassion, then psychosis experiences will be maintained (Waite et al., 
2015). In order to move forward, people may perceive psychosis as part of their life 
experiences, by engaging in compassionate self-acceptance, with the awareness that 
psychosis does not reflect their sense of who they are (Waite et al., 2015).  
2.6.3 Lack of control 
 
Lack of control was a narrative common to all the qualitative studies reviewed. 
Participants frequently recounted the notion of an external locus of control and loss of 
personal control (Chin, Hayward & Drinnan, 2009; Strand, Olin & Tidefors, 2015; 
Tully, Wells & Morrison, 2017). For example, Chin and colleagues (2009) 
investigated how voice hearers related to their voices and their relational 
understanding of their voices. One of the themes that emerged from their data was 
about the conflict between the hearer and their voices. Voices were perceived as an 
overwhelming ‘other’ that had control over people’s lives.  
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Tully and colleagues (2017) conducted in-depth interviews with 15 service 
users in order to understand how people respond to their experiences of psychosis. 
They identified different levels of participants’ perceived ability to control their 
experiences. The lowest level was when people felt defeated and not in control. 
Participants described losing their ego, losing control of their bodies and being 
controlled externally. Next, Tully and colleagues (2017) described that people 
attempted to avoid, escape or control their experiences. Followed by, not being in 
control and looking for rescue, hoping external help can assist in improving the 
situation. In the last level, people described reaching a state of acceptance about what 
cannot be controlled. Participants related their greater sense of control to a reduction 
in their distress, as well as in their ability to go about their everyday life (Tully et al., 
2017). Chin and colleagues (2009) on the other hand, investigated people’s perceptions 
of any ‘relationships’ they might have with their voices, to do so, they recruited 10 
people from CMHTs and used IPA. They found that people spoke of their voices as 
overwhelming, describing them as an ‘other’ that control every aspect of their life. 
Contrastingly, other participants described that they did not always remain powerless 
and resisted their voices to some extent. How people perceived their psychosis 
experiences and determined the extent of the control they had over them is important 
to how they appraise their experiences. 
 
Control was also important to non-clinical groups and was highlighted as an 
important difference between clinical and non-clinical groups. Boumans and 
colleagues’ (2016, p.4) non-clinical groups felt strongly about ‘doing it your own way’ 
and managing their experiences independently from mental health services. Beyond 
having control over their experiences of psychosis, it was also key to have control 
about how they chose to live their lives. Boumans and colleagues (2016) argued that 
for their participants, developing a sense of agency was more important than trying to 
eliminate psychotic-like experiences. Comparative qualitative research studies thus 
posit that that increased control is key to reducing people’s need for care.  
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2.6.4 Isolation  
 
People who were asked about their experiential accounts of psychosis 
frequently mentioned feeling isolated. Makdisi and colleagues’ (2013) participants 
found that being alone aggravated their distress and increased their experience of 
psychosis. Thus, people’s social context is important for their wellbeing. Isolation can 
be the result of people’s social networks not being responsive to, or understanding of 
their experiences, or it may be a starting point or a trigger for their experiences (Strand 
et al., 2015). Heriot-Maitland and colleagues (2012) also suggested that isolation may 
trigger the psychosis experiences. Interestingly, both their clinical and non-clinical 
groups equally reported isolation. They proposed that this may be because isolation 
encourages retrospection, and therefore lead people to uncover previously hidden 
emotional and existential uncertainties thus triggering the experience itself (Heriot-
Maitland et al., 2012). In contrast, another study found that a number of participants 
reported choosing to isolate themselves as a result of fear or mistrust caused by 
psychosis experiences (Makdisi et al., 2013).  
 
Other people misunderstanding what the person was going through also made 
it difficult for people to maintain their social relationships. It functioned as a signal of 
their normative transgression, and heightened their feelings of isolation (Stopa et al., 
2013). Ruminating beliefs the person engages in can also be exacerbated when feeling 
isolate, thereby possibly increasing and maintaining the distress they associate with 
their experiences (Tully et al., 2017). In studies specifically focusing on voice hearers, 
some people mentioned developing intimacy with their voices to compensate for a lack 
of social relationships (Chin et al., 2009). For instance, Boumans and colleagues’ 
(2016) participants perceived their voices to be adaptive and a ‘safe heaven to turn to’ 
(p.8), helping people avoid feeling alone and isolated. Overall, isolation can be a 
trigger or a consequence of people’s psychosis experiences. If isolation precedes 
psychosis experiences, it is likely that the person would have to make meaning of their 
experiences alone.  
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2.6.5 Summary of experiential accounts of psychosis experiences and relation to 
quantitative research 
 
Focusing on the phenomenological and experiential elements of people’s 
experiences is one way through which more in-depth understanding of individual 
experiences and appraisals of psychosis experiences can be generated. Previous 
qualitative work has investigated some aspects of psychosis experiences. The 
qualitative studies identified from the literature focused on similar aspects of people’s 
experiences of psychosis, these provide a baseline for understanding the nuance in 
people’s experiences; (1) searching for understanding, (2) perception of the self, (3) 
lack of control, (4) isolation. All of these components are aligned with the quantitative 
literature focusing on people’s appraisals and distress related to psychosis experiences 
(Brett et al., 2007, 2014).  
  
Searching for understanding was related to people’s attempts to understand the 
origin and the nature of psychosis experiences. Similar to Brett and colleagues (2007) 
findings, the clinical groups in the qualitative studies reported less social 
understanding relative to non-clinical groups. Prior knowledge of psychosis 
experiences eased the meaning making process (Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012). This 
facilitated people’s development of multiple beliefs including normalising 
understandings of psychosis that have also been identified in the quantitative literature 
(Brett et al., 2014; Lovatt et al., 2010). People were more distressed about their 
experiences when they had no prior knowledge of psychosis and they only could hold 
one negative belief about them compared to the multiple beliefs held by the non-
clinical group (Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012). Quantitative inquiries also suggest that 
people’s understandings of their experiences were not associated with the content of 
their experiences, but the beliefs people hold about them (Chadwick & Birchwood, 
1994, Birchwook & Chadwick, 1997). In people’s qualitative accounts of their 
experiences, their social context was key to determining whether experiences of 
psychosis are distressing or not (Holt & Tickle, 2015). If people felt unsupported in 
their attempts to understand and accept their experiences, they were more distressed 
by them. How others reacted and whether they facilitated the person’s understanding 
was key to how the experiences were incorporated into their everyday lives. Earlier 
quantitative research also identified social support as a factor differentiating between 
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clinical and non-clinical groups (Brett et al., 2007). Qualitative studies however, 
provided multiple ways people make meaning of their experiences (Holt & Tickle, 
2015), which expands quantitative findings.  
 
Participants of the qualitative studies also talked about the role of psychosis on 
how they perceive the self. Suggesting that if the person was highly self-critical, their 
psychosis experiences would be maintained (Waite et al., 2015). Thus, self-acceptance 
and self-compassion were described as key to recovery (Waite et al., 2015). It is 
important to acknowledge that Waite and colleagues (2015) set out to investigate these 
factors specifically. Consequently, it is possible that there may be other under-
researched factors involved in reducing distress related to the insecurities of the self. 
Cognitive models of psychosis postulate that distorted beliefs about the self, others 
and the world are likely to contribute to the maintenance of psychotic beliefs (Garety 
et al., 2001). Brett and colleagues (2007) suggested that one implication of appraisals 
related to psychosis experiences is its impact on people’s self-understanding, however, 
this association did not reach significance in their study and was not mentioned again. 
This is a good example of the nuance qualitative research can provide in understanding 
the complexity of people’s experiences.   
 
Lack of control was identified in all the studies reviewed. Participants 
described being controlled by their experiences, whereby their locus of control was 
external to them. Once more, this expands on quantitative research that also found that 
people perceived their experiences as being uncontrollable (Garety et al., 2007; 
Morrison & Peterson, 2003). High levels of distress related to psychosis experiences 
have been theoretically related to worries that experiences are uncontrollable (Freeman 
& Garety, 1999; Freeman et al., 2002).  In Brett and colleagues’ (2007) research, 
clinical groups had lower perceived control than non-clinical groups.  
 
Further, in line with the qualitative findings (Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012), 
higher levels of distress were identified when people were aware that their experiences 
were pathologised by others in quantitative studies (Brett et al., 2014; Lovatt et al., 
2010). Moreover, in the quantitative literature, negative social context and believing 
external influences as the cause of psychosis made it more difficult for people to 
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develop a sense of agency (Brett et al., 2007; 2014). These difficulties contributed to 
the maintenance of people’s psychosis experiences and the distress they attached to 
them.  
 
Study findings on isolation varied as people’s accounts were heterogeneous; 
some people talked about isolation as a trigger for psychosis experiences (see Heriot-
Maitland et al., 2012; Strand et al., 2015), others as a vulnerability factor (see Makdisi 
et al., 2013), or as the result of people’s psychosis experience (see Tully et al., 2017). 
For people who experienced the latter, isolation may result from people reducing their 
social contact out of fear or a sense of unease it causes. Equally, social groups may 
move away from the person as a result of not understanding what the person is going 
through. In their cognitive model of psychosis, Garety and colleagues (2001) proposed 
isolation as a factor increasing distress, a contextual factor that maintains the appraisal 
of anomalous experiences in reducing the person’s ability to find alternatives.  
 
These qualitative studies evidence the variety of perceptions and variations in 
the understandings of psychosis people develop. However, none of the studies focused 
specifically on exploring and identifying people’s appraisals of their psychosis 
experiences, thus some key factors may have been missed. Brett and colleagues (2007, 
2009 and 2015) used self-report measures to investigate appraisals, thus, participants 
did not have the opportunity to articulate their appraisals of their psychosis experiences 
in their own words. The second study of this project (outlined in Chapters 6 and 7) 
begins to address this gap in the literature. It is argued that developing qualitative 
accounts of people’s appraisals of their psychosis experiences provides a worthwhile 
and nuanced understanding of people’s experiences and the beliefs that contribute to 
the maintenance of distress related to psychosis, as well as the maintenance of contact 
with mental health services. Experiential accounts extend and complement extant 
quantitative research, providing a well-rounded understanding of a complex issue.  
2.7 Chapter Summary   
 
Recent research on psychosis focuses on people’s experiences as being on a 
continuum. Indeed, a number of studies have found psychotic-like experiences in the 
general population (van Os et al., 2009). One of the factors that differentiates clinical 
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and non-clinical groups is that clinical groups have more negative appraisals about 
their psychosis experiences and are more distressed by them (Brett et al., 2009; Lovatt 
et al., 2010). Peters and colleagues (2016) established that the non-clinical groups had 
virtually no negative symptoms of psychosis. Further, negative symptoms are not 
sufficient for a psychosis spectrum disorder diagnosis. Therefore, as most research 
investigating appraisals and distress related to psychosis experiences have a 
comparative focus (clinical and non-clinical groups), the focus is overwhelmingly on 
positive symptoms (Brett et al., 2014; Hill et al., 2012), and negative and depressive 
symptoms are often neglected. This project therefore focuses on a clinical group alone 
in order to investigate vulnerability factors contributing to the maintenance of distress 
related to psychosis experiences.  
The cognitive models of psychosis (Fowler, 2000; Garety et al., 2001, 2007; 
Morrison, 2001) posit that people’s appraisals of their experiences are important to 
whether people are distressed by their experiences (Bentall, 2003; Morrison, 2003). 
Specifically, clinical groups perceived their experiences as having external causes 
(Brett et al., 2007; Garety et al., 2001; Lovatt et al., 2010) and were experienced as 
more uncontrollable (Brett et al., 2007). These concepts were also identified in the 
qualitative research, which provided more depth and nuance. For instance, multiple 
ways people make meaning of their experiences (Chin et al., 2009) were identified. 
This was also the case for the presence of pathologising explanations on people’s 
experiences (Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012; Holt & Tickle, 2015), nuances in change in 
people’s self (Waite et al., 2015), lack of control (Stopa et al., 2013; Tully et al., 2007) 
and isolation as a vulnerability factor or a consequence of psychosis (Strand et al., 
2015) as recurrent concepts. None of these studies had as their main aim to determine 
the appraisals people hold about their psychosis experiences, they may therefore not 
have explored all appraisals in depth. Therefore, an in depth qualitative investigation 
is needed to gain a nuanced understanding of people’s appraisals leading to distress.  
Garety and colleagues (2001, 2007) propose in their cognitive model that the 
beliefs people hold about their thought processes and internal experiences as well as 
the beliefs they hold about themselves, others and the world determine the kind of 
appraisals they will make of their psychosis experiences. People’s appraisals and their 
responses to psychosis experiences and factors related to social context predict distress 
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(Brett et al., 2014). Past interpersonal relationships and traumas are likely to affect 
people’s beliefs about themselves, others and the world, and have been linked to the 
development and maintenance of psychotic-like (Fisher, Appiah-Kusi & Grant, 2012) 
and psychosis experiences (Macbeth et al., 2014; Varese et al., 2012) and contribute 
to people’s appraisals. Attachment theory is a developmental theory of distress 
regulation and a key framework for understanding the development and maintenance 
of psychosis (Mallinckrodt, 2000). Some research found links between attachment 
dimensions and distress related to voices (Berry, Wearden, Barrowclough, Oakland & 
Bradley, 2012; Pilton et al., 2016). However, the relationship between attachment 
dimensions and distress related to positive and negative psychosis experiences, and 
depressive symptoms in psychosis is unclear. Attachment theory will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. Emotion regulation and metacognition will also be presented 
as their development is dependent on attachment dimensions, thus, they are explored 
as potential mediators in the relationship between insecure attachment dimensions and 
distress related to psychosis experiences. 
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Chapter 3. Attachment Theory as a Framework Towards Understanding Distress 
Related to Psychosis Experiences and Potential Mediators of This Relationship 
 
3.1 The Development of Attachment Theory  
 
In the time since its inception, attachment theory has become “the most 
powerful contemporary account of social and emotional development available to 
science” (Steele, 2002, p.518 in Danquah & Berry, p.3). Attachment theory was first 
described by John Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) and originally aimed to explain the 
infant-caregiver relationship by exploring how human beings make strong affectional 
bonds. As well as accounting for the emotional distress and personality disturbances 
that separation from a significant other may cause (Bowlby, 1977), the theory 
highlights the evolutionary benefits of forming a consistent and stabilising bond in 
order to establish a ‘secure base’ from which infants can explore their environment 
(Bowlby, 1977, 1980). In childhood, attachment behaviours are triggered in certain 
conditions by environmental threats, fear, illness, separation and fatigue and they are 
defined as any type of behaviour that results in the individual regaining or retaining 
contact with their attachment figure (Bowlby, 1973, 1982).  
 
Early life experiences underpin the development and internalisation of 
representational models of the self, others and the world, thus creating a template for 
interpersonal functioning throughout the life cycle (Bowlby, 1969). As a result of their 
interactions with their attachment figure in infancy and childhood, individuals develop 
mental representations about the self in relation to significant others and expectations 
about how others behave in social relationships (Bowlby, 1969). These internal 
working models (IWMs) are therefore mental representations of the quality of an 
individual’s attachment. They guide attention, interpretation, memory and predictions 
about future interpersonal interactions (Cassidy & Shaver, 1999). Working models are 
hypothesised to involve cognitive elements reflecting beliefs about whether the 
individuals themselves are worthy of attention and whether other people are reliable 
(Berry et al., 2014). Furthermore, they represent emotions that are related to 
interpersonal experiences, for examples, happiness, fear and anger (Pietromonaco & 
Barrett, 2000).  
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Bowlby's understanding of attachment was operationalised by Mary 
Ainsworth, Bell and Stayton (1971) with the ‘strange situation’. In their experiment, a 
child is put in a situation of discomfort within controlled conditions; the caregiver-
infant dyads are systematically separated, then reunited. The quality of childhood 
attachment is grounded in the degree to which the infant relies on the attachment figure 
as a source of security (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978), which is determined 
largely by the caregiver’s response to the child, their availability, sensitivity and 
responsiveness. From this experiment, Ainsworth (1978) initially identified three 
major patterns of response. In their original sample, 66% of the children were 
classified as securely attached. Secure attachment was identified in children who 
actively sought their caregiver and were easily soothed upon their return. Secure 
children often had a caregiver who was attentive and responsive to their needs. During 
and beyond infancy, secure attachment is associated with the development of positive 
self-image, ability to manage distress, ease in autonomy and ability to form 
relationships with others (Berry & Danquah, 2014).  
 
The three insecure attachment patterns identified by Ainsworth and colleagues 
(1978) were avoidant, ambivalent and disorganised. Avoidant children showed few 
signs of distress upon separation and ignored their mother on reunion. They remained 
watchful of her and inhibited in their play: this pattern was observed in 20% of children 
(Ainsworth et al., 1978). Parents of avoidant children tend to be controlling and/or 
rejecting. These children, therefore, learn to deactivate their attachment systems in 
order to avoid the pain and disappointment that follows an unsuccessful attempt to 
bond (Danquah & Berry, 2014). Further, 12% of the sample were identified as having 
an ‘ambivalent attachment’, characterised by high distress at separation and inability 
to sooth upon reunion. This attachment style relates to an unpredictable style of 
parenting, to which infants respond by escalating their display of distress, potentially 
as an attempt to make their needs too difficult to ignore. Main and Solomon (1986, 
1990) later added disorganised attachment style, children classified as disorganised 
were described as bizarre, contradictory and at times incomprehensible. These 
behaviours came to be understood in association with fear relating to explicitly abusive 
responses from caregivers, maltreatment and abuse. Consequently, the child is in a 
paradoxical context where the attachment figure is the cause of the fear and distress, 
as well as the supposed provider of a ‘safe haven’ (Bowlby, 1979). Van Ijzendoorn 
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and Kroonenberg (1988) conducted a meta-analysis of over 30 studies that used the 
strange situation. Their findings confirmed the acceptance of the procedure, and they 
identified these attachment patterns as reliable and valid. Subsequent research focusing 
on attachment theory did so by investigating attachment in adulthood (Hazan & 
Shaver, 1987; Main, Kaplan & Cassidy, 1985). 
 
3.2 Adult Attachment Theory 
 
Attachment in adulthood has been identified as a predictor of interpersonal 
functioning, self-esteem, regulation of affect, psychological distress and 
psychopathology (Bartholomew & Horowitz 1991; Platts, Tydon & Mason, 2002). 
Research on adult attachment is investigated through two related yet distinct 
paradigms; the narrative and the self-report paradigms (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Main 
et al., 1985). Both paradigms argue that working models develop as a result of earlier 
interpersonal experiences and influence psychosocial functioning in adulthood (Berry, 
Barrowclough & Wearden, 2007). However, they differ in their understanding of the 
content and structure of the model leading to varied methods of investigation (Simpson 
& Rholes, 1998). A key reason for this differentiation is their focus; the social 
psychological approach investigates romantic love as an attachment process (Hazan & 
Shaver, 1987), whereas the developmental or psychoanalytic orientation relates 
attachment differences to the organisation of mental representations of earlier 
attachment figures (George, Kaplan & Main, 1985; Main, Goldwyn & Hesse, 2003 in 
Dozier, Stovall-Mcclough & Albus, 2008). It is important to acknowledge these 
differences as the research carried out within these paradigms should not be construed 
as interchangeable (Roisman et al., 2007). Roisman and colleagues (2007) established 
the meta-analytic association between AAI and self-report attachment; the association 
amounted to r=.09 (range r=.02-.17) thus a trivial to small empirical overlap, it can be 
suggested that they measure different domains. Below is a summary of each approach.  
 
The narrative approach was operationalised by the Adult Attachment Interview 
(AAI; George, Kaplan & Main, 1985). It measures ‘attachment states of mind’ that are 
determined in relation to the accuracy with which the individual describes and reflects 
upon their childhood attachment relationships. Accordingly, the AAI does not focus 
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on current attachment relationships but relies on the perception of primary caregiver 
experiences. Therefore, it cannot be used to infer how childhood attachment patterns 
influence expectations and behaviours in adult attachment relationships (Bartholomew 
& Shaver, 1998). With the AAI, individuals are classified as secure-autonomous, 
dismissing or preoccupied. A fourth category, called unresolved, relates to abuse and 
loss, characterised by confusion and disorganisation in answering the interview 
questions (Crowell, Fraley & Shaver, 1999).  
 
The second paradigm emerged from Hazan and Shaver’s (1987) work; it 
conceptualises romantic relationships as a function of the same processes that are 
established within child and caregiver attachments. Self-report measures are used to 
identify three attachment styles; secure, and insecure (avoidant and anxious 
ambivalent). Adults with a secure attachment style get close to and can depend on 
others easily. When others are not responsive, and proximity seeking is not a viable 
option, ‘insecure’ or secondary attachment strategies develop as alternative 
approaches to regulating emotional states. Avoidant attachment style relates to 
discomfort with closeness and a preference for emotional distance and self-reliance 
and cases are characterised by a denial or non-recognition of an emotional response 
and distress (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Anxious attachment style is characterised 
by a strong desire for closeness and protection, high levels of worry about others’ 
availabilities (Danquah & Berry, 2014; Hazan & Shaver, 1987), exaggeration of 
negative affect and compulsive threat monitoring (Diamond, Hicks & Otter-
Henderson, 2006).  
 
Existing attachment measures either assign people to categories (Hazan & 
Shaver, 1987; Main et al., 1985) or rate people according to various dimensions 
(Fraley, Waller & Brennan, 2000). Categorical measures have been criticised for 
disregarding individual differences within the categories. This can lead to 
misclassifications if individuals fall in between two categories, therefore limiting 
potential for change and progress (Crittenden & Landini, 2011; Cummings, 1990; 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Wei, Russell, Mallinckrodt & Vogel, 2007). Dimensional 
approaches are more flexible as attachment styles can vary in degree as opposed to 
kind (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010). Consequently, they are argued to be more adequate 
for explaining adult attachment (Fraley & Spieker, 2003; Hazan & Shaver, 1994). A 
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dimensional approach to attachment occurs on a spectrum and factor analysis 
identified two dimensions for measuring attachment (Brennan, Clark & Shaver, 1998); 
these are attachment anxiety and avoidance (Allen et al., 2001; Crowell, Fraley & 
Shaver, 1999; Ravitz, Maunder, Hunter, Sthankiya & Lancee, 2010; Stein et al., 2002). 
People who score low on both dimensions have secure attachment styles (Mikulincer 
& Shaver, 2007). These dimensions are associated with specific patterns of goal-
congruent cognitions and responses in the face of distress, each relating to a different 
emotion regulation style (Goodall, Rush, Grünwald, Darling & Tiliopoulos, 2015; 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; see section 2.9 for more on emotion regulation). 
Attachment theory is key to understanding emotional life and how people form 
relationships both in childhood and adulthood, however, whether childhood 
attachment transfers directly to adulthood is debated. 
 
3.3 Attachment Across the Lifespan 
 
Bowlby argued that the quality of the relationship a child has with their 
caregiver influences the way the child will relate to others and manage emotional 
experiences in adulthood (1973). Attachment experiences are thought to be stored by 
internal working models (IWMs), which are used to conceptualise attachment 
experiences and shape how future experiences are perceived (Lewis, Feiring & 
Rosenthal, 2000). Thus, IWMs are said to act as templates for attachment experiences 
in adulthood. However, Bowlby also acknowledged that if changes occur in someone's 
quality of life and interactions, then it is likely that their attachment style or level of 
attachment security could change (Bowlby, 1982; Cozzarelli et al., 2003; Crowell & 
Treboux, 1995).  
 
Keeping in mind that existing attachment assessment methods used at different 
stages are not comparable (Bifulco & Thomas, 2013), a growing body does suggest 
that attachment styles can change a little or drastically, depending on context (Davila, 
Burge & Hammen, 1997; Pinquart, Feußner & Ahnert, 2013; Waters, Merrick, 
Treboux, Crowell & Albersheim, 2000; Weinfield, Sroufe & Egeland, 2000), 
relationships and experiences (Hamilton, 2000; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007, 2012). It 
is therefore beneficial in cross-sectional studies to use self-report measures to 
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investigate attachment at a given present moment instead of relating it to past 
relationships that may no longer represent the person’s attachment style. It is also 
established in the literature that early adversity such as loss and trauma, will likely 
lead attachment styles to be, or to become, more insecure, and are strongly linked to 
psychological difficulties in adulthood (Rutter, 2000; Varese et al., 2012).  
 
3.4 Attachment Styles and Psychopathology 
 
Adverse childhood experiences including neglect and trauma have been 
associated with greater risk of mental health difficulties (Cuijpers et al., 2011; Green 
et al., 2010; Read & Bentall, 2012; Varese et al., 2012). A meta-analysis conducted by 
Varese and colleagues (2012) found that people experiencing psychosis were twice as 
likely to have been exposed to childhood adversity as controls. Childhood adversity 
includes but is not limited to, mother’s ill health, witnessing interparental violence, 
parental substance abuse, bullying, childhood physical or sexual abuse, poverty 
(Bebbington et al., 2004; Read & Bentall, 2012). Disruptions to care not only influence 
the way people relate to others in adulthood, they also change the neuroendocrine 
stress regulation functions of the brain (Barker, Gumley, Schwannauer & Lawrie, 
2015). Moreover, experiences of childhood adversity are all likely to threaten the 
security of the attachment bond (Bowlby, 1973). 
 
Attachment theory provides a framework for conceptualising the role of social 
cognition, interpersonal experiences and regulation of affect in the development of 
both interpersonal functioning and psychological distress (Barker, Gumley, 
Schwannauer & Lawrie, 2015; Mallinckrodt, 2000). Bowlby himself suggested a 
relationship between attachment and mental health difficulties (see Personality and 
Mental Illness, 1942). Goodwin (2003) proposed that attachment theory, and therefore 
relationships and their difficulties, can influence mental health in three distinct yet 
interrelated ways. First, the rupture of a bond with a significant other may cause 
significant long-term distress. Second, disrupted relationships may lead to the 
internalisation of unhelpful internal working models; this can hinder a person's ability 
to form protective relationships, in turn leaving the person vulnerable to distress. 
Third, attachment states of mind can have an effect on how current relationships are 
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perceived and interpreted, making them more vulnerable to break down in the face of 
adversity (Holmes, 1993 in Goodwin, 2003). Through similar mechanisms, it can be 
suggested that secure attachment in infancy may act as a buffer and protect against the 
development of mental health difficulties (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012; Longden, 
Madill & Westerman, 2012).  
 
Although insecure attachment may be perceived as an adaptive response to 
unpredictable and rejecting environments in childhood, it has been related to 
psychopathology in adulthood (Dozier, Stovall-McClough & Albus, 2008; Mickelson 
et al., 1997). Bakermans-Kranenburg and van Ijzendoorn (2009) conducted a large-
scale review looking at studies using the AAI and found an over-representation of 
insecure attachments in clinical groups. Insecure attachment can, therefore, be 
understood as a vulnerability factor to mental health difficulties in general (Mikulincer 
& Shaver, 2012). However, differences in diagnostic classifications, co-morbidities 
and the use of varied attachment measures prevent direct comparison of studies (Ma, 
2006). Further, it is crucial to consider the potential relationship between attachment 
and the onset of a disorder as dynamic and potentially open to multiple interacting 
influences, specifically considering how the onset of the disorder may in itself 
influence attachment patterns (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012). Therefore, research 
moved from general psychopathology to investigating attachment within specific 
disorders (Read & Gumley, 2008). These include depression (Cantazaro & Wei, 2010; 
Fowler et al., 2013), anxiety (Bosmans, Braet & Van Vlierberghe, 2010), obsessive 
compulsive disorder (Carpenter & Chung, 2011) and post-traumatic stress disorder 
(Ortigo et al., 2013). Insecure attachment has also been associated with severe mental 
health difficulties such as bipolar disorder (Morriss, van der Gucht, Lancaster, & 
Bentall, 2009) and of particular relevance to this thesis, psychosis (Gumley et al., 
2014; Korver-Nierberg et al., 2014). 
3.5 Attachment as a Framework for Understanding Psychosis 
 
Interpersonal adversity, both past and current plays an important role in 
psychotic-like and psychosis experiences (Berry et al., 2006; Berry et al., 2007b). 
Research has been focusing on increasing understanding of the mechanisms through 
which interpersonal trauma exacerbates the risk of developing psychosis (Fisher, 
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Appiah-Kusi & Grant, 2012; Read & Bentall, 2012). Historically, the focus on factors 
relating to the development and maintenance of psychosis had predominantly been on 
biological factors, thus psychological theories such as attachment theory were given 
little attention (Read & Gumley, 2008). Attachment theory provides a strong 
theoretical framework to elucidate the impact of distressing or traumatic early 
interpersonal relationships (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman & Bebbington, 2001; 
Morrison et al., 2003; Freeman & Garety, 2003), as it integrates cognitive, emotional 
and neuroscientific data on psychosis (Berry et al., 2007b). Insecure attachment styles 
are therefore hypothesised to increase vulnerability to the development of psychosis 
and can be associated with poor outcomes with regard to symptom severity and course 
of illness (Korver-Nieberg, Berry, Meijer, de Haan, & Ponizovsky, 2015). Indeed, 
research studies revealed that people experiencing psychosis have higher levels of 
insecure attachment when compared to control groups (Couture, Lecomte & Leclerc, 
2007; Dozier, 1990, 1991, 2008; Dozier & Lee, 1995; Ponizovsky, Nechamkin & 
Rosca, 2007).   
3.5.1 Attachment and psychotic-like experiences in non-clinical samples 
 
Within the continuum perspective of psychosis experiences, analogue studies 
have investigated the relationship between attachment patterns and psychotic-like 
experiences in non-clinical populations. These studies found associations between 
insecure attachment, specifically avoidant attachment styles and schizotypal traits 
(Berry et al., 2006, 2007a; Pickering, Simpson & Bentall, 2008; Sheinbaum, Bedoya, 
Ros-Morente, Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2013; Macbeth et al., 2008; Tiliopoulos & 
Goodall, 2009; Wilson & Costanzo, 1996), however, this relationship was not 
consistent. For instance, Tiliopoulos and Goodall (2006) found that anxious 
attachment was related to both positive (r=.32; medium effect) and negative 
schizotypy (r=.25; small effect), whilst avoidant attachment was related to negative 
schizotypy (r=.37; medium effect) alone. Pickering and colleagues (2008) investigated 
the association between attachment and individual psychotic-like experiences; 
paranoia and hallucinations. They found a relationship only between insecure 
attachment (avoidance, r=.24; small effect; anxiety, r=.48; medium effect) and 
proneness to paranoia. Berry and colleagues (2006) found that attachment anxiety was 
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most strongly associated with the paranoia scales (r=.50; large effect) and avoidance 
was most strongly associated with social anhedonia (r=.44; medium effect).  
 
Differences in the assessment instruments employed to measure both 
attachment and psychotic-like experiences may account for the discrepancies amongst 
the studies. Moreover, in all three studies detailed here, the samples were constituted 
of self-selected students. It is possible that people who self-select for such studies may 
be more prone to psychological difficulties (Freeman et al., 2005). While these studies 
offer an important starting point, their applicability to clinical samples are limited due 
to their heterogeneity as well as their debatable applicability to the experiences of 
psychosis sufferers, particularly with people who have a chronic history of psychosis 
(Ma, 2006).  
 
3.5.2 Attachment and positive symptoms of psychosis  
 
Systematic reviews (Gumley, Taylor, Schwannauer & MacBeth, 2014; 
Korver-Nieberg, Berry, Meijer & de Hann, 2014) and a meta-analysis (Carr, Hardy & 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 2018) of studies looking at attachment and psychosis concluded 
that attachment avoidance has a small to medium, positive association with positive 
symptoms. The relationship between anxious attachment styles and symptoms severity 
is more equivocal in clinical populations (Korver-Nieberg et al., 2014). Thus, the 
meta-analysis (Carr et al., 2018) findings are considered; for clinical samples positive 
symptom severity was associated to both anxiety (k=11, r=.23. CI [.14-.33]) and 
avoidance (k=11, r=.15. CI [.04-.25]) with a small effect size.   
 
Indeed a number of studies found that both attachment avoidance and anxiety 
related to positive symptom frequency (Korver-Nieberg et al., 2013; Korver-Nieberg, 
Berry, Meijer, de Hann & Ponizovsky, 2015; Ringer, Buchanan, Olesek & Lysaker, 
2014; Wickham, Sitko & Bentall, 2015) ranging from r=.20-.41 for avoidance and 
r=.31-.57 for anxiety. However, Berry, Barrowclough & Wearden (2008) found 
significant positive associations only between avoidant attachment and positive 
symptoms (r=.20; small effect). This association was also replicated in other studies 
(Berry, Barrowclough & Wearden, 2009; r=.27, small effect; Kvrgic et al., 2011; 
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r=.18, small effect). The findings of these key studies highlight significant associations 
only between avoidant attachment dimensions and positive symptom severity. The 
discrepancies amongst the studies may be due to a number or factors; as it is pointed 
out in Carr and colleagues’ (2018) meta-analysis ten different psychosis measures and 
six different attachment measures were used in the clinical research. These measures 
categorise attachment dimensions into different attachment styles, thus nuances 
between different styles may be overlooked.  Moreover, Carr and colleagues (2018) 
identified a publication bias suggesting that data may have overestimated the 
relationship between positive symptoms and attachment style to a small degree. It may 
be helpful to focus on specific symptoms to further elucidate the relationship.  
 
Some studies focused on the relationship between insecure attachment and 
specific positive symptoms. An international study with a large sample of patients with 
psychosis (Korver-Nieberg, Berry, Meijer, de Haan & Ponizovsky, 2015) found that 
insecure attachment was associated with specific positive symptoms of paranoia 
(anxiety; r=.18, small effect; avoidance; r=.17, small effect) and hallucinations 
(anxiety; r=.15, small effect; avoidance; r=.18, small effect). In other studies, only 
attachment avoidance was associated with paranoia (Berry et al., 2006; r=.39, medium 
effect) and hallucinations (Arbuckle, Berry, Taylor & Kennedy, 2012; r=.63, large 
effect). Arbuckle and colleagues (2012) also found associations between attachment 
avoidance and greater duration, frequency, intensity and conviction of voices. 
Ponizovsky, Levoy, Schultz & Radomislensky (2011) found that increased severity of 
delusions was predicted by more preoccupied attachment (r²=.06-.08) and more 
avoidant attachment (r²=.05-.08). The difference in findings may relate to variations 
in the measures used, analysis differences and varied sample sizes (Carr et al., 2018). 
It is also possible that differences between samples, such as variations in the severity 
of a person’s experience of psychosis and the length of time people have been 
experiencing psychosis can contribute to effect size variations (Korver-Nieberg et al., 
2014).  
3.5.3 Attachment and negative symptoms of psychosis  
 
Not all studies investigating the relationship between attachment and psychosis 
focused on negative symptom severity. In a recent meta-analysis, Carr and colleagues 
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(2018) concluded that neither insecure avoidant (k=7, r=.11, p=.13) nor anxiety (k=7, 
r=.11, p=.06) dimensions were significantly associated with negative symptom 
severity, although the small number of studies (k=7; Berry et al., 2008; Boyette, 
Norver-Nieberg, Meijer & de Haan, 2014; Kvrgic et al., 2011; Ponizovsky, Arbitman, 
Baumgarten-Katz & Grinshpoon, 2014; Quijada et al., 2012; Rieben, Huguelet, Lopes, 
Mohr & Brandt, 2014; Ringer et al., 2014) may be affecting this. The meta-analysis 
findings contradict the findings of previous systematic reviews (Gumley et al., 2014; 
Korver-Nieberg et al., 2014). When Carr and colleagues (2018) removed the outliers 
from their study, the relationship between negative symptom severity and anxious 
attachment became significant when Quijada and colleagues’ (2012) study was 
removed (adjusted r=.13, 95% CI=.17-.33, p<.001, I2=37.04). Similarly, when they 
removed Ponizovsky and colleagues’ (2014) case the relationship between negative 
symptoms and avoidant attachment styles became significant (adjusted r=.19, 95% 
CI=.10-.27, p<.001, I2=10.64). Nevertheless, they found no methodological or 
sampling reasons to take these studies out. It is likely that these papers represent a 
genuine heterogeneity in the sample, which is in line with the continuum approach to 
psychosis (van Os & Kapur, 2009; Ryan, 2013 in Carr et al., 2018).  
3.5.4 Attachment and depressive symptoms in psychosis 
 
An even more limited number of studies investigated insecure attachment 
patterns and affective symptoms. Ponizovsky, Vitenberg, Baumgarten-Katz & 
Grinshpoon (2013) found a significant relationship between fearful-avoidant 
attachment style is associated with higher levels of depression (F(3,97)= 10.77, 
p<001). Arbuckle and colleagues (2012) also found that higher attachment avoidance 
was related to greater depression (r=.41; medium effect). However, in their study, 
Berry and colleagues (2009) found associations between depression and both 
attachment anxiety (r=.43, medium effect) and avoidance (r=.27, small effect). Kvrgic 
and colleagues (2011) also found significant associations between depression and both 
anxious (r=.27-.41; small to medium effect) and avoidant attachment (r=.19-.29; small 
effect). Although there are very few studies investigating insecure attachment and 
depression in psychosis, existing studies highlight that both attachment anxiety and 
avoidance associate with depressive symptoms with a small to medium effect size. 
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3.5.5 Attachment and engagement with care 
  
Beyond their association with symptoms of psychosis, insecure attachment 
dimensions were also associated with some difficulties related to engagement with 
services, therapeutic relationships and recovery. Dozier (1990) found that attachment 
avoidance was related to a reduced likelihood to seek help as well as poor use of 
treatment. Contrastingly, attachment security was related to better engagement with 
services (Macbeth et al., 2010) and better compliance with treatment (Dozier et al., 
1990). Insecure attachment has also been related to more interpersonal problems 
(Gumley et al., 2014; Tait, Birchwood & Trower, 2004). Ponizovsky, Nechamkin and 
Rosca (2007) found that people with insecure attachment dimensions were 
hospitalised for longer compared to securely attached individuals. Avoidant 
attachment was also related to poor recovery from psychosis (Thompson, McGorry & 
Harrigan, 2003) where people predominantly employed ‘sealing over’ recovery styles, 
as well as negative self-evaluation (Tait, Birchwood, & Trower, 2004). In a study with 
keyworkers, Arbuckle and colleagues (2012) found that people with more prevalent 
auditory hallucinations are perceived by their key workers as having more avoidant 
attachment patterns. People who had greater delusional experiences reported higher 
avoidance towards their mental health team. In sum, insecure attachment was related 
to difficulties in dealing with psychosis experiences and the involvement of services 
as well as the maintenance of psychosis through non-compliance with treatment and 
the use of unhelpful recovery styles.  
 
Overall, insecure attachment patterns were related to a reduced engagement 
with services and difficulties in recovery from psychosis. Further, both insecure 
attachment dimensions significantly associate to positive symptoms of psychosis in 
clinical samples with a small effect size (Carr et al., 2018). However, the associations 
between insecure attachment dimensions and negative symptoms are not significant 
(Carr et al., 2018). Depressive symptoms on the other hand, were not investigated in 
the meta-analysis conducted by Carr and colleagues (2018), however, existing studies 
found significant small to medium associations with both attachment avoidance and 
anxiety. Although clear conclusions are drawn regarding the nature and size of the 
relationships in the meta-analysis conducted by Carr and colleagues (2018), further 
research is required in order to clarify these relationships and understand the reason 
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for the inconsistencies amongst individual studies. The discrepancies observed in 
individual studies may be the result of variances in the operationalization of 
attachment and psychosis assessments or variances in the samples recruited. Another 
possible explanation for the variations in the individual studies is that attachment styles 
are not directly predictive of psychosis experiences and may involve a more complex, 
mediated explanation (Read & Gumley, 2008). Indeed, it would be difficult to 
conceive of a single pathway model. A third possible explanation would be that 
attachment theory contributes to the development and maintenance of distress 
associated with psychosis experiences and not to the frequency of symptoms (Lovatt 
et al., 2010).  
3.5.6 Attachment as a framework for explaining distress related to psychosis 
experiences 
 
Attachment is a theory of distress regulation (Bowlby, 1980) and early 
interpersonal experiences influence later interpersonal functioning and methods of 
regulating distress through internal working models or cognitive representations about 
the self, the world and others (Penn, Corrigon, Bentall, Racenstein & Newman, 1997). 
Bentall and Fernyhough (2008) propose that insecure attachment may shape negative 
schemas regarding the self and others, conferring vulnerability to psychosis-related 
symptoms through the additional vulnerability brought on by cognitive difficulties. 
Insecurely attached people are therefore more likely to develop a negative perception 
of themselves and find it difficult to manage distress. Further, insecure attachment 
dimensions being associated with distress related to psychosis experiences rather than 
symptom severity may elucidate discrepancies in the findings of existing research. 
Indeed, it remains unclear whether insecure attachment dimensions predispose to the 
development of anomalous experiences, or to the pathogenic appraisals that transform 
them into psychotic symptoms (Lovatt et al., 2010). The majority of existing studies 
investigate the links between insecure attachment and the severity of psychosis 
experiences. However, cognitive models of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001, 2007; 
Morrison, 2001) postulate that adverse early experiences create an enduring cognitive 
vulnerability via negative schematic models, which then lead to the external attribution 
of anomalous experience. Therefore, insecure attachment dimensions may indeed 
relate to negative appraisals of psychosis experiences and distress related to psychosis 
experiences. 
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This has been indirectly investigated in some studies examining specific 
aspects of the association between attachment and psychosis. Previous research 
established that a key difference between help-seeking groups and non-help-seeking 
groups relates to how they appraise and respond to their experiences, and these predict 
whether their experiences relate to distress (Brett et al., 2007; Brett et al., 2014). Peters 
and colleagues (2016) conducted a large-scale study of the psychosocial characteristics 
in individuals with and without a need for care. They identified that the clinical sample 
was more anxious and depressed, reported lower self-esteem, and scored higher in 
negative schemas about the self and others. These characteristics overlap with 
characteristics associated with insecure attachment. On the other hand, non-help 
seeking samples were more likely to perceive themselves as having positive attributes, 
and scored higher in positive schemas about the self and others; they also reported 
high psychological wellbeing. These are parallel to the characteristics found in secure 
attachment. These findings suggest that insecure attachment dimensions are likely to 
relate to negative appraisals and distress related to psychosis experiences while secure 
attachment is likely to act as a protective factor against the development of distress. 
 
Only two research studies directly focused on the relationship between 
attachment theory and distress related to psychosis experiences, and they both solely 
focused on voice hearing. Berry and colleagues (2012) found that distress related to 
voices was associated with attachment anxiety but not attachment avoidance. The 
authors explain that this is surprising considering the established relationship between 
attachment avoidance and psychosis (Carr et al., 2018; Gumley et al., 2014). However, 
they suggest that it may relate to people with avoidant attachment patterns under-
reporting distress related to their symptoms (Berry et al., 2012). The other study 
investigating distress related to voice hearing was conducted by Pilton and colleagues 
(2016). They investigated whether beliefs about voices mediated the relationship 
between insecure attachment and voice-related distress in a clinical sample. They 
found that anxious attachment mediated the relationship between childhood trauma 
(sexual abuse, emotional abuse, physical neglect) and voice related distress. Similarly 
to Berry and colleagues’ (2012) findings, attachment avoidance was not significantly 
associated with distress related to voices. This may relate to a tendency of people with 
avoidant attachment styles to supress or distance themselves from negative affect 
(Pilton et al., 2016).  
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Further research is needed to determine whether insecure attachment 
dimensions do relate to distress related to psychosis experiences beyond voice hearing 
experiences. Distress related to positive, negative and depressive symptoms in 
psychosis need to be investigated. Moreover, a better understanding of people’s 
appraisals and psychological factors contributing to distress related to psychosis can 
provide insight for more appropriate treatments to reduce a person’s need for care. 
Psychological vulnerability factors may mediate the relationship between insecure 
attachment and distress related to psychosis experiences as not every individual who 
has insecure attachment patterns develops psychosis and vice versa (Read & Gumley, 
2008). Similarly, not all people experiencing psychosis are insecurely attached as 
studies reported that between thirteen and twenty-five percent of people experiencing 
psychosis exhibit secure and autonomous attachment patterns (Couture, Lecomte & 
Leclerc, 2007; Dodwell, Thomas & Iqbal, 2012; Ponizovsky et al., 2007, 2013).  
 
3.6 Attachment and Psychosis; a Mediated Relationship?  
 
Read and Gumley (2008) proposed a theoretical model capturing attachment 
style as a responsive adaptation to early environment which then facilitates or hinders 
the development of other key factors. If attachment is insecure, it can lead to problems 
with the development of a number of psychological mechanisms. These then present 
as vulnerability factors to the development of psychosis. Read and Gumley (2008) 
focused on three broad areas; cognitive processes, emotion regulation and 
interpersonal relationships, they suggested that these domains cannot be separated 
(See Figure 3).  
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Note: The two-directional arrows suggest that insecure/disorganized attachment resulting from 
childhood adversity can increase the probability of further abuse and neglect in later life stages.  
 
Figure 3. Read and Gumley’s (2008) model of the role attachment may play in the 
relationship between childhood adversity and psychosis 
 
They concluded that further empirical research is necessary to explore the full 
potential of attachment theory in the context of psychosis, and to better understand the 
factors that mediate this relationship. The mediated model suggested by Read and 
Gumley (2008) is a useful, albeit preliminary, conceptual framework supporting the 
theory that insecure attachment alone is not sufficient to predict psychosis. Their 
model is presented with the development of psychosis experiences in mind.  
 
The current project investigates the role psychological vulnerability factors 
play in the maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences. Therefore, after 
establishing the relationship between insecure attachment and distress related to 
psychosis, two vulnerability factors that have been independently associated to both 
insecure attachment dimensions and distress related to psychosis are investigated as 
mediators. These are emotion regulation (Osborne, Willroth, DeVylder, Mittal & 
Hilimire, 2017; Owens, Haddock & Berry, 2013) and metacognition (Brett et al., 2009; 
Macbeth et al., 2011; Morrison, 2001). The next section will elaborate on both of these 
factors and explore their association to attachment theory, distress related to psychosis 
experiences and each other. 
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3.7 Emotion Regulation  
3.7.1 Definitions of emotion regulation 
 
 Emotion regulation is a multifaceted construct comprising many features 
(Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Thompson (1994) defined the concept as, “the extrinsic and 
intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating and modifying emotional 
reactions, especially their intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one’s goals” 
(pp.27-28). Emotion regulation can be understood as a goal oriented process involving 
factors both intrinsic (or intrapersonal, e.g. temperament) and extrinsic (or 
interpersonal, e.g. environmental and relational) to the individual (Cole, Michel & 
Teti, 1994; Gross & Jazaieri, 2014). It may also incorporate the changing intensity, 
and duration of an emotion (Thompson & Calkins, 1996).  
 
 Independent of the various forms emotion regulation can take, there are three 
key factors for adaptive regulation – awareness, goals and strategies (Gratz & Roemer, 
2004; Gross & Jazaieri, 2014). Awareness of emotions and the context in which they 
occur is important for adaptive emotion regulation (Barrett, Gross, Conner, & 
Benvenuto, 2001). Goals relate to what the person is aiming to achieve by regulating 
their emotions. This includes increasing or decreasing the magnitude or the intensity 
of emotions (Gross & Jazaieri, 2014). Finally, using adequate strategies to achieve the 
goals a person has set are important for adaptive emotion regulation. Arguably then, 
investigating the factors facilitating adaptive emotion regulation are as important as 
the strategies used to regulate emotions. It is important to mention that emotions can 
be adaptive or not, depending on the context, the individual and the emotion (Aldao & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). Attachment theory is useful in understanding the 
development of emotion regulation strategies and identifying the type of strategies that 
are likely to be dominant for different attachment dimensions.  
3.7.2 The development of emotion regulation  
 
The development of effective emotion regulation precedes various key 
developmental skills acquired in childhood (Thompson, 1991). Specifically, since 
emotions have the potential to become overwhelming and hinder the development of 
other processes, adequate regulation and expression of emotions is key for 
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development (Diamond & Aspinwall, 2003). Emotion regulation develops gradually 
and it starts within the context of interpersonal relationships (Diamond & Aspinwall, 
2003). At first, children rely on their carers to regulate their emotions for them and 
then, in time they internalise these behaviours and adopt the strategies they observed 
as their own (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Targer, 2002; Sroufe, 2005). This is strongly 
supported by attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969); internal working models developed 
in childhood act as experience-based predictive guides, signifying the representations 
and expectations people have of their relationships and organising the person’s 
memory of an attachment figure and of themselves in times of need (Main, Kaplan and 
Cassidy, 1985). They shape thoughts, feelings and behaviours about the self and others 
and are understood to shape the nature of affect regulation throughout life 
(Pietromonaco, Barrett and Powers, 2006; Bretherton & Munholland, 1999; Malik, 
Wells & Wittkowski, 2015).  
 
Secure attachment patterns provide the ability to tolerate negative affects 
temporarily in order to deal with challenging situations (Cassidy, 1994). Securely 
attached children learn emotion regulation strategies that are most appropriate to cope 
with experiences of distress in light of their previous positive experiences with 
caregivers. These processes facilitate the accumulative development of a strong sense 
of self-efficacy in relation to the individual’s ability to regulate their own emotions 
without external support, as well as generating a resilient approach to emotion 
regulation (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012). Therefore, securely attached people do not 
need to engage in avoidance, suppression or denial of emotions. An important outcome 
of successful attachment patterns is the acquisition of self-regulation capacities that 
will positively affect later life. In cases where attachment develops as insecure, the 
development of emotion regulation is impeded (Fonagy et al., 2002).  
 
Shaver and Mikulincer (2002, 2007) created an integrative model that focuses 
on the development of attachment patterns and corresponding emotion regulation 
strategies based on attachment research (Figure 4). The model was further refined by 
Mikulincer, Shaver & Pereg (2003) and includes three major components. For the first 
component, threat-related events are monitored and appraised; if there is a threat, the 
primary attachment strategy of seeking proximity to the attachment figure is activated. 
In adulthood, proximity does not have to be tangible where the person can turn to an 
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internalised representation of a supportive other (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). If there 
is an available and attentive attachment figure, emotions can be regulated and the 
distress alleviated. This relates to secure attachment. If such a figure is lacking, the 
viability of proximity seeking is appraised and monitored. In both cases, secondary 
attachment strategies are developed to cope with the attachment insecurity; these are, 
hyperactivation and deactivation (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Attachment anxiety 
has been related to hyperactivation strategies and avoidant attachment with 
deactivation strategies of the attachment system (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). 
 60 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. An adaptation of Shaver and Mikulincer’s integrative model of the 
activation and dynamics of the attachment system (Shaver and Mikulincer, 2007, 
p.31) 
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3.7.2.1 Anxious attachment and hyperactivation  
 
Anxious attachment patterns lead to the perception that it is in an individual’s 
best interest to maintain chronic activation of the attachment system (Collins, Ford, 
Guichard & Allard, 2006). Undesirable emotions are perceived to be somewhat 
compatible with goals of obtaining attention and support from others (Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2007). This is done through the maintenance and amplification of negative 
emotions. Portraying the self as helpless and vulnerable may lead to attachment figures 
being more likely to offer support (Cassidy & Berlin, 1994). People with high levels 
of attachment anxiety have low levels of self-efficacy in relation to self-regulation 
(Shaver & Mikulincer, 2007). This hinders their ability to access and implement 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies. Helplessness is learned through an invasive, 
inconsistent parenthood approach and is maintained through adulthood (Lyons-Ruth 
& Spielman, 2004). The person therefore learns to interpret negative events as out of 
their control. This is fuelled over time through negative internal models of the self that 
become ingrained, and the self is learned as incapable and powerless (Shaver & Clark, 
1994). Hyperactivation is found to strengthen negative feelings about the situation, 
which leads to increased rumination over attachment patterns and activation of internal 
working models, even when there are no external threats (Mikulincer et al., 2003).  
 
3.7.2.2 Avoidant attachment and deactivation  
 
On the other hand, unlike attachment anxiety, attachment avoidance has been 
related to conscious, or unconscious efforts to keep the attachment system deactivated 
(Shaver & Mikulincer, 2007). This is aimed at minimising the potential emotional 
consequences of everyday life situations. As well as the potential for distress, 
frustration may also result from seeking an unavailable attachment figure (Cassidy & 
Kobak, 1988). Studies have established a relationship between deactivation, where 
attachment avoidance is associated with an inattention to potentially distressing 
situations, and a tendency to supress distress when it arises (Caldwell & Shaver, 2012; 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). Emotions can be regulated by deactivation, where one’s 
attention is pre-emptively directed away from emotional input, or existing memories 
and information are supressed post-emptively to minimise emotional distress 
(Caldwell & Shaver, 2012). Some studies have found that avoidant attachment is 
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related to low negative affect as well as impaired emotional clarity and deficiency in 
labelling emotions both for the self and others (Caldwell & Shaver, 2012; Wearden, 
Cook & Vaughan-Jones, 2003).  
 
While suppression behaviours are closely associated with avoidant attachment, 
they are also related to difficulties in using reappraisal effectively (van der Meer, van’t 
Wout & Aleman, 2009). Shaver and Mikulincer (2007) suggested that avoidant 
individuals partake in appraisal techniques similar to securely attached individuals 
when coping with stressful situations, whilst other researchers argued that avoidant 
attachment related to distress-intensifying patterns of appraisal, similar to highly 
anxious people, when they are confronted with severe and unavoidable traumatic 
events (Berant, Mikulincer & Florian, 2001; Mikulincer & Florian, 1998). It can be 
argued that prolonged periods of distress can, in turn, be detrimental to the usual 
defences used and suppression may succumb under extended distress (Mikulincer et 
al., 2000, 2004).  Despite their differences, both hyperactivation and deactivation 
strategies are maladaptive (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002).  
 
People who display high levels of attachment avoidance dimension tend to 
inhibit threat monitoring and minimize the importance of external support (Gumley et 
al., 2014). They also favour self-reliance whilst denying emotional involvement 
(Kobak, Cole, Ferenzgillies, Fleming & Gamble, 1993). The suppression technique 
associated with avoidance hinders the adaptive use of emotions in decision making. It 
interferes with memory and requires substantive cognitive effort (Mikulincer at al., 
2003). Those people who are high in the attachment anxiety dimension, on the other 
hand, see vigilance towards emotional threats continuously increase while emotional 
information is left unregulated by the self in an attempt to attract attention and support 
from potential attachment figures (Wei, Vogel, Ku & Zakalik, 2005). Anxious 
attachment dimension is associated with constant rumination, increased levels of 
negative affect (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2007). Both insecure attachment dimensions 
and their respective maladaptive emotion regulation strategies can persist across a 
lifespan and have been associated with the development and maintenance of 
psychological difficulties (Fonagy et al., 1996; Sarkar & Adshead, 2006).  
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Owens and colleagues (2013) investigated the associations between attachment 
dimensions and dimensions of emotion regulation difficulties in a psychosis sample. 
They explored the value of attachment theory as a framework for understanding the 
ways in which staff-patient relationships relate to different methods of emotion 
regulation in people experiencing psychosis. They found that insecure attachment was 
significantly associated with greater difficulties in regulating emotions. Attachment 
avoidance was significantly related to increased non-acceptance of emotional 
responses, lack of emotional awareness and lack of emotional understanding. 
Attachment anxiety, on the other hand, was significantly associated with difficulties 
engaging in goal-directed behaviour when upset, impulse control difficulties and 
limited access to appropriate emotion regulation strategies. Owens and colleagues 
(2013) found that attachment anxiety predicted emotion regulation over and above the 
variance contributed by psychosis symptoms and negative emotions. As their primary 
aim was to determine the details of the staff-patient relationship, their analysis did not 
put emphasise on the link between emotion regulation and psychosis experiences; they 
did not investigate how emotion regulation difficulties related to psychosis 
experiences. Other research has focused on the relationship between emotion 
regulation difficulties and psychopathology (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema & Schweizer, 
2010).  
3.7.3 Emotion regulation and psychopathology  
 
There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that maladaptive emotion 
regulation strategies have great value in understanding the development and 
maintenance of a range of psychopathologies (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Kring 
& Sloan, 2009; Gross & Muñoz, 1995), for example, higher levels of depression, 
anxiety and somatic symptoms, or disordered personality traits (Shaver & Mikulincer, 
2007; Tiliopoulos & Goodall, 2009). Longitudinal research shows that emotion 
regulation difficulties are not only correlated with mental health problems but also 
predict them (Berking, Wirtz, Svaldi & Hofmann, 2014). A number of mental health 
difficulties are due to problematic patterns of emotions. More specifically, emotion 
dysregulation may either relate to emotion regulation failures, such as not engaging 
with emotion regulation when it would be helpful to or emotion misregulation, when 
the emotion regulation strategy used is inadequate to the situation (Gross, 2013; Gross 
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& Jazaieri, 2014). The literature mainly focuses on emotion misregulation and 
therefore specific strategies are predominantly investigated.  
Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema and Schweizerand (2010) conducted a systematic 
review and meta-analysis. They investigated three widely accepted emotion regulation 
strategies that act as protective factors against psychopathology: reappraisal, problem 
solving and acceptance (Aldao et al., 2010). In contrast, suppression, avoidance and 
rumination are identified as risk factors for mental health difficulties and maladaptive 
behaviours (Aldao et al., 2010). Rumination was the only strategy to relate to 
psychopathology with a large effect. Overall, maladaptive strategies were more 
strongly related to psychopathology than adaptive emotion regulation strategies. Thus, 
the presence of a maladaptive strategy can be more damaging than the absence of an 
adaptive strategy (Aldao et al., 2010). One limitation of these results is that only a 
minority of their effect sizes came from a clinical population and therefore the strength 
of the effects may vary in clinical samples. Furthermore, they only investigated 
emotion regulation strategies and did not measure people’s awareness of their 
emotions and their goals (Gross & Jazaieri, 2014). Unhelpful emotion regulation 
strategies have therefore been identified in psychopathology, including psychosis.  
 
3.7.4 The relevance of studying emotions in psychosis 
 
Increased knowledge of the role of emotion regulation has shifted 
understanding of some psychopathologies, including psychosis, which was 
traditionally perceived as ‘non-affective’ (Henry et al., 2007). It is now accepted that 
emotions are present both prior to the onset of psychosis and during its course, where 
emotional disturbances influence the experience of psychosis (Freeman & Garety, 
2003). A greater understanding of emotional dysfunction in psychosis could in turn 
lead to a greater understanding of factors involved in the development and 
maintenance of psychosis (see Strauss, 1989 and Marwaha et al., 2014). Freeman and 
Garety (2003) propose that the content of a person’s delusions and hallucinations may 
be direct representations of their emotional states. Birchwood also proposed that 
“emotional dysfunction is pervasive in non-affective psychosis” (2003, p. 273). 
Nevertheless, this divide led to only a few studies investigating emotions and emotion 
regulation in psychosis spectrum disorders. 
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Furthermore, people diagnosed with non-affective psychosis also experience 
depression, social anxiety, shame, guilt and hopelessness as a result of their experience 
and through comorbidity such as PTSD (Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick & Trower, 
2000; Cosoff & Hafner, 1998; Drayton, Birchwood & Trower, 1998). Depressed mood 
was identified in 45% of a recently hospitalised sample of people with acute psychosis 
experiences who were not using anti-psychotics at the time (Leff, Tress & Edwards, 
1988). Another important finding that consolidates the role of emotions in psychosis 
is the presence of emotional signs and difficulties found in the early signs of relapse 
in psychosis (Tait, McNay, Gumley & O’Grady, 2002) for example, increased fear, 
anxiety and helplessness and social withdrawal are all emotionally driven 
(McCandless-Glimcher et al., 1986). Vulnerability towards the development of 
psychosis can therefore be understood within a context of attachment-influenced 
emotion regulation systems (Gumley et al., 2014). Within these systems, insecure 
attachment patterns are related to poor strategies for responding to and regulating 
distress (Goodall et al., 2015).  
 
3.7.5 Emotion regulation and psychosis 
 
Livingstone, Harper and Gillanders (2009) conducted an important study 
investigating the emotional experiences and regulation strategies used by people 
experiencing psychosis and compared them to people with experiences of mood and 
anxiety disorders as well as to a non-clinical sample. The two clinical groups employed 
significantly more dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies than the non-clinical 
group. Similarly, they found clinical groups used internal-dysfunctional strategies (e.g. 
dwelling on thoughts and feelings) significantly more than non-clinical groups, as well 
as making less use of internal-functional emotion regulation strategies (e.g. reviewing 
their thoughts or beliefs). In summary, clinical groups used higher levels of maladaptive 
emotion regulation strategies and lower levels of adaptive emotion regulation strategies 
than the non-clinical group. These results are key in highlighting the presence of 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies in psychosis. However, they did have a small 
sample size that may not be representative of the population.  
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These findings were corroborated by van der Meer and colleagues (2009) who 
reported similar results in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. The group with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia was much more likely to supress the emotionally valenced 
stimulus, even after depression was accounted for. O’Driscoll, Laing and Mason (2014) 
concluded from their meta-analysis that, people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
showed a greater use of maladaptive emotion dysregulation and less use of adaptive 
strategies, when compared to non-clinical groups. More specifically, Kimhy and 
colleagues (2012) also found that people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia reported 
higher levels of suppression and lower levels of reappraisal when compared to controls. 
However, these findings are not universal as some studies found no difference between 
patients and control participants for the use of reappraisal and suppression (Badcock, 
Paulik & Maybery, 2011; Henry, Rendell, Green, McDonald & O’donnell, 2008; Perry, 
Henry & Grishman, 2011).  
 
Investigating other emotion regulation strategies, Rowland and colleagues (2013) 
found that the schizophrenia group were more likely to use catastrophizing and 
rumination, and were also more likely to blame others. In a later study, self-blame and 
catastrophizing were found to be consistent predictors for symptomatology in 
schizophrenia (Rowland et al., 2013). Jansen, Gispen-de Wied & Khan (2000) looked 
at different strategies and found that individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia scored 
significantly higher on the use of escape, avoidance and passive coping strategies 
compared to non-clinical controls.  
 
Difference in the use of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies can relate to 
participant symptom profiles and different emotion regulation scales used. There is, 
nevertheless, reliable evidence that individual differences in self-reported frequency of 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies are associated with community-based 
functional outcome and symptoms (Horan, Lee, Greenn, Roberts & Penn, 2013; Kimhy 
et al., 2012). Further research focusing more widely on emotion regulation, beyond 
strategies, is necessary to gain an understanding of emotion regulation in psychosis 
(Gross & Jazaieri, 2014). The type of measures most studies used do not determine 
whether people had an awareness of their emotions and clear goals for their regulation, 
when the absence of either component can hinder the activation of emotion regulation. 
 67 
Moreover, these studies did not associate emotion regulation strategies to types of 
experiences, specifically, positive and negative symptoms of psychosis.  
 
3.7.6 Emotion regulation and distress related to psychosis experiences 
 
Cognitive models of psychosis focus on the importance of abnormal attention (e.g. 
worry and rumination) and appraisals or reappraisals in the onset and 
maintenance of psychosis experiences and the distress associated with it (Bentall, 
2003; Fowler, 2000; Morrison & Wells, 2007). Appraisals of situations control 
the onset of the emotional response, thus, they constitute part of the emotion 
generation process. Contrastingly, reappraisals contribute to the offset of 
emotional responses and are therefore classified as a form of emotion regulation 
(Koole, 2009). It is thus possible for the distress associated with psychosis 
experiences to be linked to negative emotional states and maladaptive emotion 
regulation (Badcock, Paulik & Maybery, 2011; Morrison & Wells, 2007).  
  
Osborne and colleagues (2017) investigated the associations between emotion 
regulation and distress from psychotic-like experiences, albeit in a non-clinical 
sample. They found that greater difficulties with emotion regulation were significantly 
associated with the frequency of positive and negative symptoms of psychosis. 
Distress related to psychotic-like experiences (positive and negative) was significantly 
and positively related to emotion regulation difficulties and lesser use of acceptance 
strategies. These findings need to be replicated in a clinical sample. The authors looked 
at difficulties in emotion regulation dimensions as a total score and therefore the details 
of each domain were not investigated.  
 
Westermann and Lincoln (2011) conducted a study to gain insight into the 
association of specific domains of emotion regulation and persecutory delusion in a 
non-clinical sample. They conducted canonical correlational analysis to explore 
multivariate associations between emotion regulation difficulties (measured with the 
DERS, Gratz & Roemer, 2004) and persecutory delusions and psychosis dimensions. 
Their findings demonstrate that increased emotion regulation difficulties are 
significantly associated with increased frequency of symptoms, increased levels of 
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conviction, distress related to persecutory thoughts and higher general 
psychopathology. More specifically, increased frequency of positive symptoms was 
significantly associated with increased impulse control difficulties. Further, only the 
non-acceptance of emotional responses significantly related to distress associated with 
paranoid thoughts. The authors suggested that in order to assess their emotions and the 
distress they experience in relation to their experiences, participants need to have a 
certain level of awareness and clarity of their emotions. Therefore, people’s ability to 
report their distress would be dependent on an existing level of emotional skills. 
Indeed, the authors found that the fewer difficulties people had with emotional clarity, 
the higher their reported distress was. Overall, the relevance of emotion regulation 
does not seem to be specific to paranoid ideation as almost no emotion regulation 
difficulties remained significant after controlling for general psychopathology. Their 
sample was affected by high attrition rates, with a predominance of female participants 
and highly educated people. Whilst their findings provide a first attempt at linking 
these emotion regulation dimensions with psychosis and distress related to psychosis, 
further research needs to be conducted in a clinical sample.  
 Badcock and colleagues (2011) hypothesised that emotion regulation 
difficulties, specifically maladaptive attentional deployment (i.e., excessive worrying 
or rumination) would be linked to the distress associated with voice hearing. They 
assessed multiple forms of emotion regulation in people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia who were hearing voices and in healthy control groups. They found that 
in the clinical group, suppression was associated with disruption of life and higher 
levels of rumination were associated with higher levels of distress related to 
hallucinations as well as depression. However, rumination was not significantly 
associated with the severity of voices (i.e. frequency, duration and loudness). This 
suggests that different mechanisms are involved in the maintenance of symptoms and 
the distress associated with symptoms. Interestingly, worry was not significantly 
associated with distress. The authors themselves noted that these findings do not 
preclude the possibility that worry influences hearing voices when assessed with 
different measures. Indeed, Morrison and Wells (2007) investigated the contribution 
of worry to distress associated with hallucinations. They found that hallucinatory 
distress was associated with meta-worry. Both rumination and worry are key 
components of metacognition and are associated with the maintenance of negative 
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thoughts, thus these findings suggest that metacognition, and metacognitive 
components are also implicated in the distress related to hallucination experiences 
(Morrison & Wells, 2003).  
 
Studies presented above suggest that for someone to report being distressed 
about their experiences of psychosis in the first place, they need to have baseline level 
of awareness and clarity about their emotions (Westermann & Lincoln, 2011). 
Preliminary research does propose that there is an association between emotion 
regulation and distress related to psychosis experiences (Osborne et al., 2017; 
Westermann & Lincoln, 2011) however, more research is needed to elucidate the 
details of this relationship. Further, as suggested in Read and Gumley’s (2008) 
theoretical model, whilst emotion regulation may mediate the relationship between 
insecure attachment and psychosis, cognitive processes are also key and cannot be 
separated. Combining emotion regulation and metacognition components when 
investigating distress related to psychosis experiences can provide a well-rounded 
understanding of the components contributing to its maintenance. Metacognition is an 
important cognitive vulnerability that has been associated with attachment theory 
(Macbeth et al., 2014) and distress related to psychosis (Hill, Varese, Jackson & 
Linden, 2012).  
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3.8 Metacognition 
3.8.1 Defining metacognition  
 
 Metacognition is defined as the “stable knowledge or beliefs about one’s own 
cognitive system, and knowledge about factors that affect the functioning of the 
system” (Wells & Matthews, 1994, p.302). The concept of metacognition originated 
in the education literature (Flavell, 1979) but has since evolved to encompass a 
spectrum of psychological functions. It has been applied to depression and anxiety 
(Wells & Matthews, 1994) and more recently to psychosis (Morrison & Wells, 2000, 
2007). Metacognition can be understood as a set of meta-processes through which 
people monitor, control and appraise the products and processes of awareness (Wells, 
2009). It delineates how people construct integrative and holistic representations of 
their own and others’ behaviour in terms of mental states and use this ability to solve 
problems and cope with experiences that cause distress (Lysaker et al., 2013; Semerari 
et al., 2003).  
 
 In the literature, a number of terms related to metacognition are used 
interchangeably, although, they have slightly different remits; these are, mentalization, 
theory of mind, reflective functioning and social cognition (Penn, Sanna & Roberts, 
2008).  Theory of mind (ToM) relates to one’s ability to recognise mental states in 
oneself and others, and to understand that others may perceive the world differently 
(Brüne, 2005). Mentalization derived from the theory of mind literature and it relates 
to the ability to have understanding and insight into mental states such as beliefs, 
emotions, and intentions of oneself and others (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Brüne, 
2005). Social cognition is a broad construct that relates to processes of social 
interpretation (Brothers, 1990). These concepts are studied separately, mainly due to 
how they are measured. ToM is often measured experimentally, metacognition and 
mentalization through personal narrative and self-reports, and social cognition is 
measured with a wide array of methods. Regarding the development of cognitive 
functions, focus has predominantly been given to the development of mentalization in 
relation to attachment relationships.  
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3.8.2 The development of metacognition  
 
 Early developmental difficulties associated with insecure attachment can also 
have a cognitive impact, preventing the development of a coherent, stable sense of 
‘self’ (Bowlby, 1982). This, in turn, leads to the internalisation of a threatening or 
unreliable sense of ‘other’ (Platts, Tyson & Mason, 2002). Fonagy and colleagues 
(2002) proposed that we are born without the knowledge of emotional states or how 
to regulate them. However, we are all born with the capacity to mentalize. 
Metacognition is an aspect of mentalization, focusing on the cognitive features of 
one’s mental states (Wells, 2001). Ultimately, they both relate to one’s capacity to 
reflect on experiences (Fonagy et al., 2002).  
 
 Deficits in mentalizing may be due to genetic factors hindering intersubjective 
exchanges throughout childhood (Liotti & Gumley, 2008). It is also likely that skills 
of mentalizing, like emotion regulation, develop through the interaction with a primary 
caregiver (Fonagy et al., 2002). The development of functional mentalization skills 
can be disturbed by negative interpersonal experiences including difficulties in early 
attachment (Korver-Nieberg et al., 2014; Liotti & Gumley, 2008). The emotional state 
of the infant needs to be reflected back to them by the caregiver through ‘affect 
mirroring’ which serves to organise the child’s experience (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
Fonagy and colleagues (1991, 1996) investigated the association between adverse 
early experiences, impairments in early functioning, and the onset of mental health 
difficulties. They proposed that the inhibition of mentalising function at a young age 
may have a protective purpose, by defending the person from the potentially 
threatening content of others’ intentions. However, an established absence of reflective 
capacity in adulthood may have catastrophic effects by increasing exposure to 
interpersonal disconnection and distress, and becoming a core feature of 
psychopathology (Fonagy et al., 1996).  
 
Main (1991) also investigated the development of metacognition; she related 
secure attachment patterns with the ability to draw upon metacognitive knowledge. 
Metacognitive knowledge relates to the ability to reflect on one’s thoughts and have 
an awareness of its source and validity. Without this knowledge people cannot 
understand that they, and others, may have false beliefs. In turn, this may impact how 
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people relate to others. The memories and expectations from people’s internal working 
models, guide a person’s interaction with others (Bowlby, 1983). An insecure 
attachment pattern with a maladaptive IWM may therefore affect a person’s memories 
and expectations, which, in turn, can affect an individual’s ability to interact with 
others because they lack an adaptive internal working model enabling them to reflect 
their thoughts and form positive relationships with others (Main, 1991). Insecure 
attachment therefore contributes to the development of maladaptive metacognitive 
strategies for managing distress (Aydin et al., 2016).  
 
Furthermore, Aydin and colleagues (2016) investigated the developmental 
sources of impaired metacognition in people diagnosed with schizophrenia; they 
specifically focused on childhood trauma, insecure attachment and adverse caregiver 
attitudes. The clinical group had greater levels of all three of these factors compared 
to healthy control. Specifically, reports of childhood emotional abuse, anxious 
attachment and overprotection by caregivers were significantly related to 
metacognitive capacity. They also found that people with anxious attachment styles 
tended to have poorer abilities to recognize and think about the mental states of others. 
In addition, they had difficulty in forming complex mental states and representations 
about the self and others in general. Whilst the cross-sectional nature of their work 
precludes drawing causal conclusions, the authors suggest that, consistent with other 
work on attachment, mentalization and metacognition (Fonagy et al., 2002; Harder & 
Daniel, 2014; Main, 1991), the development of insecure attachment styles may result 
in a decreased ability to form a complex and integrated sense of self and others. 
Macbeth et al. (2014) found that associations between mentalization and attachment 
showed that individuals with secure attachment patterns display significantly higher 
reflective function than individuals with avoidant attachment. While secure attachment 
may act as a protective factor, childhood adversity and insecure attachment patterns 
relate to difficulties in metacognitive skills, which in turn have been related to 
psychological difficulties.  
 
 
 
 73 
3.8.3 The role of metacognitive beliefs in psychological disorders  
 
 The Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model (Wells & Matthews, 
1994) is an information processing model that outlines factors involved in the 
aetiology and maintenance of psychological disorders, through maladaptive cognitive 
and attentional mechanisms such as rumination, heightened self-focused attention, and 
threat monitoring (Hill et al., 2012). Specifically, the model outlines factors that 
modulate and control thinking (i.e. metacognitive processes), and contributes to the 
maintenance of affective dysregulation, by determining what is perceived to be 
distressing or dangerous, what a person’s desired cognitive ‘goal-state’ is, and the 
strategies one employs to regulate distress (Wells, 2000). The model was first 
developed for anxiety and emotional disorders, where emotional dysfunction is 
central, however, recent research suggest that the S-REF model is a generic model that 
explains the development and maintenance of any psychological difficulty.  
 
 Metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive control strategies are the key 
constructs of the S-REF model (Wells, 2000). Metacognitive knowledge relates to the 
beliefs people hold of their own cognition. It can be explicit or implicit and includes 
the plans and the goals guiding cognitive processes (Wells & Matthews, 1994), such 
as attention allocation, application of memory and use of heuristics. Metacognitive 
knowledge is often referred to and operationalized as metacognitive beliefs; i.e. 
people’s assumptions outlining the perceived importance and consequences of specific 
thoughts (Wells & Matthews, 1994). The S-REF includes both positive and negative 
metacognitive beliefs. Positive metacognitive beliefs reflect the usefulness of 
strategies such as worry and rumination, and promote the implementation of unhelpful 
coping responses (Wells, 2009). Negative metacognitive beliefs, on the other hand, are 
associated with beliefs of the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts and affect how 
thoughts and thought processes are appraised. The other key construct is metacognitive 
control strategies. They relate to responses people use in order to control the activities 
of their cognitive system. Whilst these are used to enhance memory in everyday life, 
in psychological difficulties, control strategies are more likely directed towards 
controlling the stream of consciousness; e.g. worrying or ruminating to solve problems 
and trying to reappraise experiences to modify emotional responses (Koole, 2009; 
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Morrison & Wells, 2007). These are operationalized as thought control strategies 
(Wells & Matthews, 1994).   
 
 In most cases, appraisals are dealt with through appropriate coping strategies and 
periods of intense emotion and distress are brief. However, this is often not the case in 
psychological difficulties, where maladaptive cognitive and attentional mechanisms 
such as ruminative processing, heightened self-focused attention and threat monitoring 
are associated with a non-specific Cognitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS). When a 
person becomes distressed, it is assumed that the CAS interferes to stop the needed 
cognitive adjustments. Therefore, the situation is not re-assessed, the strategies are not 
changed and the goals are not re-established, all of which prevents the person from 
returning to normal functioning (Wells & Matthews, 1994).   
 
 In line with these assumptions, support for the role of unhelpful metacognitive 
beliefs and psychological difficulties have been found in a range of mental health 
disorders, including depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001), generalized anxiety 
disorder (Wells & Carter, 2001) and post-traumatic stress symptoms (Roussis & Wells, 
2006). More recently, research focused on the relationship between metacognitive 
beliefs and psychosis (e.g. Lysaker et al., 2005; Morrison & Wells, 2003; Sellers, 
Varese, Wells & Morrison, 2017).  
 
3.8.4 Metacognition and psychosis  
 
A recent literature review and meta-analysis shows that patients with psychosis 
spectrum disorders report higher levels of unhelpful metacognitive coping strategies 
(e.g. attentional biases, worry, rumination, thought control) when compared to healthy 
controls and comparable levels to clinical groups with affective disorders (Sellers et 
al., 2017). People with a diagnosis of psychosis had significantly more elevated 
unhelpful metacognitive beliefs than non-clinical control groups (Morrison & Baker, 
2000; Morrison & Wells, 2003; Morrison, French & Wells, 2007; Lobban, Haddock, 
Kinderman & Wells, 2002). On the continuum of psychosis, a number of studies found 
that people who are prone to psychosis have an increased number of both positive and 
negative metacognitive beliefs (Larøi & Van der Linden, 2005; Morrison, Wells & 
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Nothard, 2000) as well as low cognitive confidence (García-Montes, Cangas, Pérez-
Álvarez, Fidalgo & Gutiérrez, 2006). Samples identified as ‘at-risk’ of psychosis 
found that at-risk mental states and subsequent transition to first episode psychosis 
(Barbato et al., 2013; Morrison et al., 2002) were related to greater endorsement of 
negative metacognitive beliefs. Moreover, unhelpful metacognitive beliefs also 
discriminated between different courses of illness where higher levels of difficulty 
related to a more severe course of psychosis (Austin et al., 2015).  
3.8.4.1 Metacognition and positive symptoms  
 
Sellers, Varese, Wells and Morrison (2017) conducted a meta-analysis of 
metacognitive beliefs in psychosis. They found that subscales of the MCQ were 
significantly more elevated in psychosis samples when compared to non-psychiatric 
controls; negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thought and 
cognitive confidence demonstrated large effect sizes, positive beliefs showed 
moderate effect and cognitive self-confidence had a small effect size (Sellers et al., 
2017). The authors selected studies that employed both the MCQ-30 (Wells and 
Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) and the MCQ-60 (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). The 
latter does not include the subscale need for control therefore this was not included in 
their analysis and no conclusions can be drawn on its association to psychosis 
experiences.  
Studies using the MCQ consistently found associations between unhelpful 
metacognitive beliefs and positive symptoms (Sellers et al., 2017). However, the 
findings are not consistent for the association between metacognitive beliefs and 
positive symptoms of psychosis using the metacognitive assessment scale and its 
abbreviated version (respectively MAS; Semerari et al., 2003 and the MAS-A; Lysaker 
et al., 2005); since some studies found no associations (Macbeth et al., 2014; Nicolò 
et al., 2012; Vohs et al., 2014) and others found few correlations (Lysaker et al., 2005; 
McLeod, Gumley, MacBeth, Schwannauer, Lysaker, 2014a). McLeod and colleagues 
(2014a) found that metacognition at baseline also predicted positive symptoms at six 
and twelve-month follow-up. Studies also found the association between 
metacognition difficulties and the development and maintenance of hallucinations 
(Baker & Morrison, 1998; Morrison et al., 2004), delusional beliefs (Freeman et al., 
2002; Morrison et al., 2004b) and paranoia (Campbell & Morrison, 2007).  
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3.8.4.2 Metacognition and negative symptoms  
 
A number of studies investigated the association between metacognition and 
negative symptoms of psychosis in clinical samples (Hamm et al., 2012; Lysaker et 
al., 2005; Macbeth et al., 2014; Nicolò et al., 2012; Rabin, Avidan, Rozencwaig & 
Shalev, 2014; Trauelsen et al., 2016; Vohs et al., 2014). Lysaker and colleagues (2005) 
found an association between emotional withdrawal and difficulties in understanding 
one’s own mind, the minds of others, and people’s ability to deploy this information 
to solve social problems. Nicolò and colleagues (2012) replicated this study and found 
that emotional withdrawal was significantly negatively correlated with understanding 
but not with the other dimensions of metacognition. Whilst other negative symptoms 
(affective blunting and volitional disturbance) were also negatively associated with 
understanding one’s own mind, however, these associations did not reach significance. 
This may be due to the small sample size of the study. Other studies also found 
associations between negative symptoms and understanding one’s own mind (Lysaker, 
Dimaggio, Buck, Carcione & Nicolò, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2012) and difficulties with 
understanding the minds of others (Macbeth et al., 2014; Mitchell et al., 2012) as well 
as problems with mastery (Mitchell et al., 2012).  
Hamm and colleagues (2012) investigated metacognition and emotion 
recognition in a schizophrenia spectrum disorder sample at two time points across six 
months. They found that metacognition significantly predicted the variance in negative 
symptoms at the follow-up, and the relationship remained significant after controlling 
for initial levels of negative symptoms. As the sample had been experiencing psychosis 
for a long time, it is possible that the deficits observed are a consequence of the 
chronicity of their experiences. However, Macbeth and colleagues’ (2015) study 
suggest this may not be the case, as they found associations between negative 
symptoms and deficits in the understanding of one’s own mind and others’ mental 
states extending across cognitive, emotional, integrative and decentration components 
of metacognition. McLeod, Gumley, MacBeth, Schwannauer and Lysaker (2014a) 
replicated and extended previous longitudinal research by looking at baseline, six 
months and twelve months. They found that when symptom severity, gender, duration 
of untreated psychosis and premorbid academic and social adjustment were controlled 
for, metacognition accounted for 62% of the variance in negative symptom scores at 
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six months and 38% at twelve months. In summary, difficulties in forming integrated 
representations of the self and others contributes to the maintenance of negative 
symptoms from early stages of psychosis experiences (McLeod, Gumley & 
Schwannauer., 2014b).  
Overall, maladaptive metacognitive beliefs are elevated in psychosis samples. 
These support the S-REF model developed by Wells and Matthews (1994). Moreover, 
it is likely that metacognitive difficulties provide a generic vulnerability factor for 
mental health difficulties transdiagnostically (Varese & Bentall, 2011). Metacognitive 
beliefs may represent a vulnerability factor in a wide range of emotional and 
psychological difficulties without having a causal relationship with one symptom in 
particular (Varese & Bentall, 2011; Morrison & Wells, 2003). Instead unhelpful 
metacognitive beliefs may predict the distress associated with psychosis experiences 
(Brett et al., 2009; Sellers et al., 2017). 
3.8.5 Metacognitive beliefs and distress associated with psychosis  
 
In his cognitive model of psychosis, Morrison (2001) focused on voice hearing 
and suggested that positive metacognitive beliefs about psychosis experiences are 
associated with the occurrence of hallucinations, and that negative metacognitive 
beliefs about psychosis experiences are associated with the distress in responding to 
them. Similarly, Garety and colleagues (2001) also emphasised the role of unhelpful 
metacognitive beliefs in their cognitive model, focusing on delusions. Thus, the 
emergence of negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts in 
relation to psychosis experiences may lead to the person being distressed about their 
experiences and therefore lead to help-seeking behaviour, which ultimately may lead 
to patient status (Morrison, Wells & Nothard, 2000). Further, negative metacognitive 
beliefs are likely to contribute to the maintenance of psychosis experiences (Barbato 
et al., 2013).  
Freeman and Garety (1999) suggest that an individual’s appraisal of a delusion 
is related to the amount of distress they experience. They found that the levels of 
distress a person experiences may increase as a result of how controllable the person 
feels their thoughts are. ‘Meta-worry’ (i.e. worry about worry) was found in people 
with persecutory delusions in relation to the control of their delusion-relevant thoughts 
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(Freeman & Garety, 1999). The authors concluded that the distress caused by a 
delusion is not solely a reaction to an unpleasant psychotic experience. Instead, the 
delusion causes most distress when the person perceives it to be uncontrollable. In 
another study, Freeman, Pugh and Garety (2008) found that the incidence of paranoia 
and the maintenance of delusions is related to ‘catastrophising worry styles’. This is 
consistent with the S-REF model (Wells & Matthews, 1994) which suggests that 
metacognitive beliefs about psychological experiences are related to the vulnerability 
of psychological disorders. In light of these findings, it can be argued that it is likely 
for negative metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability and perceived danger of 
psychosis experiences increases the level of distress the person associates with their 
experiences.  
Indeed, later research associated metacognitive beliefs with increased distress 
related to psychosis experiences (Brett et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2012). Brett, Johns and 
Peters (2009) set out to investigate whether maladaptive metacognitive beliefs are 
associated with the occurrence of psychotic-like anomalies or resultant distress, and if 
metacognitive beliefs related specifically to first rank symptoms or all psychosis 
experiences. Their sample included two clinical groups, one diagnosed with a 
psychosis disorder and the other meeting the criteria for an ‘at-risk mental state’ 
(ARMS), a non-clinical group reporting similar anomalous experiences, and a group 
of healthy volunteers without any anomalous experiences. As expected, the two 
clinical groups had higher metacognition scores than the non-clinical groups. Of all 
MCQ subscales, only negative beliefs about thoughts significantly predicted distress 
related to psychosis experiences. Whilst negative beliefs about thoughts in general 
clearly differentiated the diagnosed and at-risk groups from the control and 
undiagnosed groups, negative beliefs about uncontrollability of thoughts were not 
specifically elevated in these groups. This is in line with Morrison and colleagues’ 
(2007) findings and supports the argument that metacognition may be related to 
distress associated with psychosis experiences. Further, they did not find a significant 
difference between positive and negative metacognitive beliefs in ARMS and the 
diagnosed group. Therefore, Morrison and colleagues’ (2007) suggestion that the 
combination of positive and negative beliefs leading to the development of distressing 
symptoms was not supported. Brett and colleagues’ (2009) findings also suggest that 
metacognitive beliefs are not associated with specific psychosis experiences. When 
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controlling for other subscales, only higher negative beliefs about thoughts 
significantly predicted greater distress. This relationship remained significant when 
depression was controlled for. This study provides support for metacognitive beliefs, 
specifically negative beliefs about the thoughts, being associated with distress related 
to psychopathology.  
A later study by Hill and colleagues (2012) hypothesised that metacognitive 
beliefs are implicated in the development of distress associated with auditory verbal 
hallucinations rather than their aetiology. They recruited three groups: clinical voice 
hearers with a psychiatric diagnosis, non-clinical voice hearers and a control group 
with no history of voices. The clinical group scored higher than the other groups, and 
‘need for control’ significantly predicted voice related distress. Whilst this effect 
remained significant after controlling for anxiety, when the authors controlled for 
group (clinical vs. non-clinical), distress was significantly predicted by group only. 
The patterns of these result suggest that metacognitive beliefs relate to distress 
associated with psychosis and need for care (Hill et al., 2012).  
In their conclusion, Hill and colleagues (2012) call into question whether Brett 
and colleagues’ (2009) results might be artefactual since they did not control for group 
differences. Whilst this is possible, the group differences may exist because of 
differences in levels of distress in the first place. If high levels of distress lead to help-
seeking (Underwood, Kumari & Peters, 2016) then it is likely that people with higher 
levels of distress will be in the clinical group and groups will be dependent on distress 
levels. The studies also differed in their focus: while Brett and colleagues (2009) 
assessed Schneiderian first-rank symptoms, anomalies of perception, cognition and 
affect (using the AANEX inventory, Brett et al., 2007), Hill and colleagues (2012) 
only focused on voices. This may elucidate why need for control was a significant 
predictor in Hill and colleagues' (2012) study and negative beliefs was a predictor in 
Brett and colleagues’ (2009) study. It would be helpful to determine which 
metacognitive subscales relate to distress associated with positive and negative 
symptoms of psychosis. In stating that, the comparative nature (clinical vs. non-
clinical) of these studies led to the exclusion of negative symptoms, therefore, further 
research is needed to determine how unhelpful metacognitive beliefs relate to distress 
associated with negative symptoms of psychosis. Even though other studies (Barbato 
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et al., 2013; van Oosterhout, Krabbendam, Smeets & van der Gaag, 2013) state 
investigating the relationship between metacognition and distress related to psychosis 
experiences, these studies were not reviewed as they investigate distress as anxiety and 
depression and do not focus on the distress directly related to psychosis experiences. 
3.9 Emotion Regulation and Metacognition as Related Mechanisms  
 
Insecure attachment patterns have an effect on affective, cognitive and 
behavioural components of a person’s functioning (Berry, Wearden & Barrowclough, 
2007c). As per the information presented in this literature review, attachment patterns 
play a role in the development of both emotion regulation and metacognition (see Main, 
1991 and Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Furthermore, both emotion regulation and 
metacognition have been identified as vulnerability factors for the development and 
maintenance of psychosis (Read & Gumley, 2008) and distress related to psychosis 
(Brett et al., 2009; Osborne et al., 2017). Often, these two factors are investigated 
individually. However, it is suggested that they both influence and affect each other 
(Badcock et al., 2011; Wells, 2000). Emotion regulation and metacognition have 
previously been investigated together to examine alcohol use (e.g. Dragan, 2015; Spada 
et al., 2013) and PTSD (e.g. Mazloom, Yaghubi & Mohammadkhani, 2016) but they 
have not yet been investigated together in a psychosis sample. Therefore, it may be 
helpful to investigate them in parallel in trying to understand their role in the 
relationship between attachment and distress related to psychosis.  
 
In describing the process model of emotion regulation, Gross and Thompson 
(2007) state that cognitive changes come into play during the appraisal stage within the 
emotion regulation cycle. So cognitive changes can influence how a situation is 
appraised and the regulation decision is made (Koole, 2009). In this context, cognitive 
change refers to efforts to revise the meaning of the situation in an attempt to influence 
one’s emotions (Gross & Jazaieri, 2014). Thus, unhelpful metacognitive beliefs are 
likely to influence how emotions are regulated when people are appraising their 
experiences of psychosis, possibly contributing to emotion dysregulation (Sellers et al., 
2017).  
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 In turn, the role of emotions in metacognition has also been relatively neglected 
both in clinical and academic research (Manser, Cooper & Trefusis, 2012). 
Metacognitive beliefs, thoughts and emotions are a central aspect of metacognitive 
theory and play an important role in the maintenance of psychological disorders and 
distress (Wells & Matthews, 1994). Wells (2000) suggests that such beliefs can 
influence the use of unhelpful strategies which may interfere with the individual’s 
effort to return to a ‘non-disordered’ functioning. Moreover, according to the S-REF 
model (Wells & Matthews, 1994), the CAS (cognitive attentional syndrome) is a style 
of managing both thoughts and emotions: it involves extended thinking (e.g. worry 
and rumination) and maladaptive coping strategies such as suppression. It is 
problematic because it allows negative thoughts and emotions to persist, causing 
failure to modify dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and resolve self-discrepancies 
(Wells, 2000). Thus, difficulties in emotion regulation can be seen as a manifestation 
of the consequences of CAS, and reflect underlying dysfunctional metacognition.  
 
 Collectively, difficulties in emotion regulation and unhelpful metacognitive 
beliefs are likely to influence each other and contribute to the maintenance of distress 
related to psychosis experiences together. It is therefore important to investigate them 
together in exploring their role in the relationship between insecure attachment and 
distress related to psychosis.      
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Chapter 4: A Mixed Methods Project 
4.1 Overall Aim of the Project 
 
 Distress associated with psychosis experiences is related to negative outcomes 
(Brett et al., 2014). Existing research suggests that the distress people experience 
results from maladaptive appraisals (Brett et al., 2007). However, the role 
psychological vulnerability factors play in the maintenance of this distress is unknown. 
Moreover, people’s experiential accounts of their appraisals of psychosis experiences 
have also been neglected in the literature. A mixed methods project was therefore 
designed in order to conduct a well-rounded investigation and gain better 
understanding of distress associated with psychosis experiences.  
 
 Specifically, the current project examined psychological vulnerability factors 
and appraisals of psychosis experiences contributing to the maintenance of distress 
related to psychosis experiences in a clinical sample. 
4.2 Rationale for Mixed Methods: Epistemological Justifications  
 
 Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) define the central premise of mixed methods 
as, “the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination provides a better 
understanding of research problems than either approach alone” (2007, p.5). The 
power of mixed methods research lies in the combination of insights. It provides access 
to the strengths that offset the weaknesses of both qualitative and quantitative research 
and it permits an enriched understanding of the investigated research area (Bryman, 
2006; Creswell, 2003). Authors suggest that the difference between the two 
approaches decreased and the previously supported ‘purist’ dichotomy was abandoned 
for new combined methods studies (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). In this project, 
mixed methods enabled a more complete investigation of distress associated with 
psychosis experiences. 
 
 Quantitative research is employed to collect information on specific variables 
focusing on larger numbers that qualitative data lacks (Yardley, 2000). The 
quantitative self-report data presents a clear understanding of the direction and strength 
of the associations between variables. Quantifiable data is useful for generalisations 
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and predictions. Despite these strengths, quantitative research is not very good at 
explaining behaviours and perceptions (Brannen, 1992). Moreover, quantitative 
findings can be detached from the real-world contexts (Moghaddam, Walker & Harre, 
2003). Qualitative research on the other hand, involves a detailed exploration and in 
depth focus on the studied topic, focusing on experiences unique to each participant 
within the context in which their experiences are grounded (Creswell, 2011). The 
depth and nuance of people’s appraisals of their psychosis experiences will be 
investigated by qualitative data allowing respondents to elaborate on their beliefs and 
perceptions, contextualising their lived experiences into wider social and temporal 
subjectivities, exploring how the experiential nature of the phenomenon may have 
varied over time and across individuals. Despite these strengths, qualitative data is 
inappropriate to generalise and make predictions (Plano Clark, Huddleston, Churchull, 
Green & Garrett, 2008).  
 
 Pragmatism is appealing for mixed methods research in that it rejects the 
objective-subjective dualism, allowing for both to be explored (Creswell, 2011; 
Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). When looking at research through a pragmatic lens the 
aim of research is not to obtain access to an independent truth abstracted from human 
experience but rather to generate in depth, rich understandings that will be useful in a 
wider context (Bishop, 2015). Because research is designed to answer posed questions, 
research designs and methods cannot be right or wrong but can have different levels 
of ‘appropriateness’ (Willig, 2013). Consequently, knowledge is obtained through 
different channels that can be a combination of both text and numbers. Nevertheless, 
a number of philosophical aspects of mixed methods designs have been criticised. This 
separation comes from quantitative approaches being traditionally associated with 
positivist epistemologies and qualitative approaches being associated with 
constructivist or interpretive epistemologies (Bishop, 2015). Pragmatism is a 
framework that can embrace both quantitative and qualitative research (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2015), it does so by acknowledging the epistemological differences between 
the different approaches. Yet, these forms of research are not seen as incompatible and 
a shared aim for research is supported. A pragmatic stance emphasises that imagination 
and interpretation can be found in all human enquiry, values and intentions are 
included whilst being grounded in empirical, embodied experience (Yardley & 
Bishop, 2008). The choice of methods was therefore dictated by the research questions 
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and purpose rather than paradigmatic commitments (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010).  
4.3 Research Questions 
 
Study 1:  
Quantitative research question: 
1) How are psychological vulnerability factors (insecure attachment, emotion 
regulation and metacognition) associated with distress related to psychosis 
experiences?  
Study 2:  
Qualitative research question:  
2) What are people’s appraisals of their psychosis experiences in relation to the 
distress they experience?  
 
 The frameworks of two different paradigms were used in a single project to 
address different research questions (Creswell, 2003). A mixed methods research 
question (also called a ‘hybrid’ or ‘integrated’ research question; Creswell, 2007, p. 
208) was also devised in an attempt to bring together the two methods employed in 
this project. This was guided by the concept of crystallization (Ellingson, 2008 in 
Fitzpartrick, 2016). Crystallization originates from the qualitative research literature 
and relates to the use of multiple methods in order to provoke new insights and 
questions about the phenomenon being examined (Fitzpartrick, 2016). Thus, this 
mixed methods research question is not aimed at finding one ‘truth’, rather, it is there 
to problematize and provoke further discussion and investigation through the 
convergence of both sources of data. Because the concept of ‘distress related to 
psychosis experiences’ is in its infancy and is complex and multifaceted, this approach 
to problematizing quantitative and qualitative data convergence seemed to be a good 
start for highlighting the importance and potential of studying distress related to 
psychosis. This mixed methods question was derived from the format for triangulation 
convergence mixed methods designs proposed by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, 
Table 5.2 in Fitzpatrick, 2016):  
 
3) In what ways do the self-report and interview findings align with one another 
to further understanding of distress related to psychosis? 
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As these questions are purposefully broad and complex, the comparison and 
contrast of findings from equally weighted quantitative and qualitative portions of the 
study was considered the best way to learn about the phenomenon. Mixed methods 
literature is growing in the social sciences and there is a number of ways for methods 
to be mixed in order to be most appropriate for the particularities of each research. In 
deciding how this project will be designed and conducted, Plano Clark and colleagues 
(2008) and Onwugbuzie and Combs’s (2015) guidelines and suggestions were 
considered. 
 
4.4 Mixed Methods Project Design 
 
Mixed methods researchers argue for the importance of considering timing and 
weighing of the various methods used in mixed methods research (Onwugbuzie & 
Combs, 2015; Plano Clark et al., 2008). For this project, the quantitative and the 
qualitative components of the study were collected simultaneously, in parallel. This 
was decided a priori in relation to the time constraints of the PhD. Both methods were 
given equal weight throughout the project, as they complete each other in providing a 
well-rounded understanding of distress associated with psychosis experiences. It was 
also decided, in the design phase, that the analysis strands did not interact until the 
interpretation stage.  
 
The qualitative analysis was conducted first, in order to limit the researcher being 
influenced by the quantitative findings of the project in analysing the qualitative 
findings. Once the qualitative analysis was completed, the quantitative analysis began. 
Quantitative and qualitative findings were then integrated at the interpretation stage 
(O’Cathain, Murphy & Nicholl, 2010). Integration is an intentional process by which 
quantitative and qualitative approaches are brought together and become 
interdependent in addressing a common research question (Guetterman, Fetters & 
Creswell, 2015). Fetters and Freshwater (2015) argued that the true benefits of mixed 
methods are achieved through meaningful integration and the produce of the whole is 
greater than the individual quantitative and qualitative parts. An interpretive 
integration occurs with an explanation generated from the empirical work, with 
knowledge obtained from different methods blending into a coherent account (Moran-
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Ellis et al., 2006). Joint display integration at the interpretation and reporting level 
(Fetters, Curry & Creswell, 2013) was deemed to be the most appropriate way to mix 
the two studies of this project. Therefore, integration took place after individual studies 
were discussed in order to ensure that the studies achieved their full potential prior to 
integration, not to lose any of their individual contribution during integration. Details 
of how joint display integration was conducted will be presented in chapter 9.  
 
The specific research design used in this project is called triangulation, as 
described by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) (see Figure 5 for a visual representation) 
however, more recently, the term triangulation has been used loosely (Bazeley, 2018). 
Problematically, triangulation has been referred to as a tool to ensure reliability in 
results or validation of conclusions by having more than one method produce the same 
result (Greene, 2007). This is not the purpose of mixed methods in this project. Instead, 
mixed methods are used as different components contributing to better supported 
outcomes and stronger inferences than using one method alone, towards a more 
rounded understanding, and thus providing a more comprehensive whole (Bazeley, 
2018). Having said that, the word ‘triangulation’ and the literature employing it (e.g. 
Vaughan Dickson, Lee & Riegel., 2011) was useful in shaping this project and will be 
used to describe the processes used in this project, carrying a parallel meaning to 
‘complementary analysis’ (Bazeley, 2018). 
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Chapter 5. Study 1 - Psychological Vulnerability Factors Contributing to the 
Maintenance of Distress Related to Psychosis Experiences Within an Attachment 
Framework: Background and Methods  
5.1 Background to the Study   
 
Psychosis is an umbrella term referring to experiences altering a person’s 
thoughts, feelings and behaviours. Historically, the focus on psychosis has been firmly 
associated with schizophrenia which has perpetuated a ‘biological disease’ entity 
(Guloksuz & van Os, 2017). More recently, a more holistic understanding of psychosis 
has been developing with focus on biopsychosocial approaches to its aetiology (Peters 
et al., 2016). Beyond the onset, psychological vulnerability factors have also been 
related to the course and outcomes of psychosis experiences.  
 
Recent research suggests that psychosis sits on a continuum with normality 
(Claridge, 1994; van Os et al., 2009; Linscott & van Os, 2013). A number of studies 
have compared clinical (help-seeking, need-for-care) samples with non-clinical (non-
help-seeking) samples to explore risk and protective factors for psychosis (Brett et al., 
2007; Boumans et al., 2016; Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012; Peters et al., 1999a; Lovatt 
et al., 2010). They consistently found that the samples did not differ in the types of 
psychosis experiences but the groups were differentiated by the meaning they gave to 
their experiences and their emotional and behavioural responses to those experiences 
(Peters et al., 2016). For instance, Brett and colleagues (2007) identified that clinical 
samples had more negative appraisals of their experiences. Maladaptive appraisals were 
attributed to external causes (Garety et al., 2001, 2007), were of personal significance 
(Mawson, Cohen & Berry, 2010) and characterised experiences as uncontrollable 
(Garety et al., 2007; Morrison & Peterson, 2003). These appraisals can in turn lead to 
distress associated with psychosis experiences and to help- seeking (Underwood et al., 
2016). In the literature, the term distress has been used interchangeably with a large 
number of concepts including emotional distress, such as anxiety and depression 
comorbid with psychosis (e.g. Birchwood, 2003) or referring to self-esteem, anger, 
stress and tension (e.g. Brockman, Kiernan, Brakoulias & Murrell, 2014), making it 
difficult to operationalise. This project, in line with cognitive models of psychosis, 
focuses on state-distress related to psychosis experiences, measured in connection with 
people’s psychosis experiences (e.g. Brett et al., 2014; Mawson, Cohen & Berry, 2010; 
 90 
Underwood et al., 2016). It is the distress related to the psychosis experiences 
themselves, quantified in relation to people’s experiences, that is the purpose of 
investigation in this research. Gaining a better understanding of distress experienced in 
psychosis can have important benefits in identifying the factors that lead to help-
seeking as well as the maintenance of psychosis experiences. Despite recruiting people 
who have a diagnosis of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (e.g. Brett et al., 2015) the 
studies investigating appraisals do not focus on negative symptoms of psychosis. This 
is likely because these studies compare experiences with non-clinical groups and 
negative symptoms are likely to be absent in those samples (Peters et al., 2016). Thus, 
this project will elucidate the psychological factors involved in the maintenance of 
distress associated with positive, negative and depressive psychosis experiences.  
 
Cognitive models of psychosis propose that anomalous experiences become 
problematic, depending on the appraisal of the experience and the subsequent 
emotional response (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; Freeman, 2007). They propose that 
individuals’ beliefs about their thought processes and internal experiences, and their 
beliefs about themselves, others and events in the world, determine the appraisals they 
will make of their anomalous experiences (Brett et al., 2009; Garety et al., 2001, 2007; 
Morrison, 2001). Early life experiences underpin the development and internalisation 
of representational models of the self and personal capabilities and the world, creating 
a template for regulating distress and interpersonal functioning throughout the life cycle 
(Bowlby, 1982). Attachment theory can therefore help to develop an understanding of 
distress associated with psychosis experiences.  
 
The attachment system is a safety-seeking mechanism designed to be activated in 
response to environmental threats (Bowlby, 1969). Attachment theory is established as 
a framework for understanding psychosis as it integrates cognitive and emotional 
findings on psychosis (Berry et al., 2006; Macbeth, 2008; Mallinckrodt, 2000; 
Ponizovsky et al., 2007). Research suggests that insecure attachment dimensions relate 
to poorer outcomes in psychosis (Gumley, Taylor, Schwannauer & MacBeth, 2014: 
Korver-Nieberg, Berry, Meijer & de Haan, 2014). Further, a number of studies 
investigated the associations between insecure attachment patterns and positive and 
negative psychosis symptoms (Berry et al., 2006; Kvrgic et al., 2011; Ponizovsky et al., 
2007; van Dam, Korver-Nieberg, Velthorst, Meijer & de Haan, 2014). Most relevant to 
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the current study, a number of studies have used the Psychosis Attachment Measure 
(PAM; Berry et al., 2008) with clinical samples (Arbuckle et al., 2012; Berry et al., 
2007c, 2009, 2011; Kvrgic et al., 2011). They found that more psychiatric symptoms 
were related to higher avoidance (Berry, Barrowclough & Wearden, 2008, 2009). More 
specifically, attachment avoidance was significantly and moderately associated with 
positive and negative symptoms (Berry et al., 2008; Carr et al., 2018; Gumley et al., 
2015; Korver-Nieberg et al., 2014). The relationship between anxious attachment styles 
and symptoms severity is more equivocal in clinical populations (Korver-Nieberg et 
al., 2014), however in a recent meta-analysis, Carr and colleagues (2018) found 
consistent small and significant associations between attachment anxiety and avoidance 
and positive symptoms in clinical samples but significant associations were not found 
between anxious attachment and negative symptoms in clinical populations (Carr et al., 
2018). These relationships are also expected to be found in this study.   
 
It is possible that attachment patterns are more directly related to the distress 
associated with psychosis experiences rather than its severity. There are no studies to 
this researcher’s knowledge that explicitly explore the link between attachment patterns 
and distress related to positive, negative and depressive psychosis experiences. Berry, 
Wearden and Barrowclough (2012) investigated attachment patterns related to voice 
hearing in a clinical sample and they found that attachment anxiety was related to 
greater severity of voices and greater distress related to voices. However, they did not 
find significant associations between distress related to voices and avoidant attachment. 
Both insecure attachment dimensions will be explored in relation to distress associated 
with positive, negative and depressive symptoms.   
 
Read and Gumley (2008) theorised that the relationship between attachment and 
psychosis is likely to be mediated by emotional, cognitive and interpersonal processes. 
The development of insecure attachment dimensions is likely to lead to the emergence 
of difficulties in emotion regulation (Owens, Haddock & Berry, 2013; Shaver & 
Mikulincer, 2007), and these difficulties may therefore play a role in the development 
and maintenance of distress associated with psychosis experiences. Osborne (et al., 
2017) investigated difficulties in emotion regulation and psychotic-like experiences in 
the general population. They found that higher levels of emotion dysregulation were 
associated with higher levels of distress from positive and negative psychotic-like 
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experiences. They did not investigate specific dimensions of emotion regulation nor did 
they investigate distress related to depressive symptoms. Further research is necessary 
to determine the role of emotion regulation difficulties in the maintenance of distress 
related to experiences of psychosis.  
 
Insecure attachment styles are related to metacognitive difficulties in forming 
complex representations about the self and others (Aydin et al., 2016). In addition, 
metacognition relates to processes of appraisal, monitoring or control of cognition 
(Wells, 2000). Morrison (2001) proposed that negative beliefs about the self, others and 
the world are developed in response to trauma, and that they are predicted to mediate 
the distress experienced in relation to psychosis. Previous research found that 
metacognition has a role in symptom maintenance, help-seeking and distress related to 
experiences, rather than representing an etiological component of symptoms (Brett et 
al., 2015; Morrison et al., 2007; Sellers et al., 2017). It is however unclear which 
specific metacognitive beliefs relate to distress. Brett and colleagues (2009) 
investigated metacognition in four samples (two clinical and two non-clinical groups) 
and identified a significant association between distress about anomalous experiences 
and negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thought. Hill and 
colleagues (2012) on the other hand, found that need for control was the only predictor 
of voice related distress. When they controlled for group differences (clinical voice-
hearers with diagnosis, non-clinical voice-hearers with no psychiatric history, control 
group), however, this factor was no longer significant. In both cases, the sample sizes 
were small and the authors were focused on comparing psychosis groups with non-
clinical groups. In addition, one of the studies focused on psychotic-like experiences in 
general and the other only focused on voice hearing. Therefore, identifying similarities 
and differences between the factors constituted the main focus and a more detailed 
exploration of distress specific to positive and negative psychosis symptoms did not 
take place. For the current study, identifying how psychological factors influence 
distress constitutes the primary aim. Therefore, the role emotion regulation difficulties 
and unhelpful metacognitive beliefs play in the distress associated to positive, negative 
and depressive symptoms of psychosis will be investigated. 
 
In the literature, emotion regulation and metacognition are often investigated 
individually, thus, the role emotion regulation plays in metacognition and vice versa 
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are often neglected (Manser et al., 2012). The focus on metacognition in association 
with mental health difficulties gained prominence following the development of the 
Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model developed by Wells and Matthews 
(1994). The S-REF model states that disorders are linked to a style of thinking that 
interferes with the down-regulation of unwanted emotional experiences (Wells & 
Matthews, 1996). It can be argued that since metacognition fulfils an executive function 
regarding cognitive processes involved in appraisal, control and monitoring, it also 
plays a contributory role in emotion regulation (Wells, 2000). From this perspective, 
the role of unhelpful metacognitive beliefs is key to the development and persistence 
of emotion dysregulation (Sellers et al., 2017). In turn, it is also likely that emotion 
dysregulation increases negative thinking styles and helps perpetuate negative 
appraisals. The cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS) is a style of managing thoughts 
and emotions (Wells, 2000). It involves extended thinking (such as worry), threat 
monitoring and maladaptive coping strategies such as rumination and thought 
suppression. The CAS prolongs and intensifies negative emotional experiences as it is 
responsible for ineffective cognitive-emotional self-regulation (Wells & Matthews, 
1996). Emotion dysregulation can be seen as a manifestation or a consequence of the 
CAS and reflect underlying metacognitive difficulties.  
 
Thus, emotion regulation and metacognition influence each other and will be 
investigated in parallel in order to explore the relationship between insecure attachment 
dimensions and distress related to psychosis (see figure 6). Mediators in parallel 
mediation can be correlated but cannot causally influence each other (Hayes, 2013). It 
is impossible to know if emotion regulation or metacognition lead to each other, thus 
serial mediation is not appropriate. With parallel mediation each proposed mediator can 
be tested while accounting for the shared variance between them (Hayes, 2013). 
Understanding the role of metacognition and emotion regulation in the maintenance of 
distress associated with psychosis experiences will allow for the development of 
interventions in order to reduce people’s need for care.  
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  Figure 6. The multiple mediation model investigated in Study 1 
Overall, Study 1 has two primary aims: 1) to investigate associations between 
insecure attachment, emotion regulation difficulties, metacognitive beliefs and levels 
of distress related to psychosis experiences; and 2) to explore whether unhelpful 
metacognitive beliefs and emotion regulation difficulties dimensions have a mediating 
role within the relationship between insecure attachment and psychosis related distress. 
In order to achieve these aims, a self-report cross sectional quantitative study was 
designed.  
 
It is hypothesised and postulated that:  
 
1) Attachment dimensions and distress related to psychosis: 
a. As an extension of Berry, Wearden and Barrowclough’s (2012) 
finding that attachment anxiety is significantly associated with distress 
related to voice hearing: It is hypothesised that attachment anxiety will 
significantly predict increased distress related to positive symptoms of 
psychosis . 
b. Both insecure attachment dimensions will significantly predict 
increased distress related to depressive symptoms in psychosis. 
 
Research question a: As an extension of Carr and colleagues’ (2018) meta-analysis 
findings: It is expected that there will be no significant associations between insecure 
attachment dimensions and distress related to negative symptoms. 
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2) Emotion regulation and metacognition will predict distress related to positive, 
negative and depressive psychosis symptoms; More specifically (in relation to 
Brett et al., 2009 and Hill et al., 2012 findings), it was hypothesised that negative 
beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts and need for control 
will predict distress related to positive symptoms of psychosis. 
 
Research question b: The relationship between emotion regulation and metacognition 
subscales and distress related to negative symptoms and distress related to depressive 
symptoms will be explored as this relationship has not been investigated previously. 
 
3) Difficulties in emotion regulation and unhelpful metacognitive beliefs will 
mediate the relationship between insecure attachment dimensions and distress 
related to positive, negative and depressive psychosis symptoms. 
 
5.2 Participants 
 
 Participants were recruited from the community. Inclusion criteria were: 1) Meet 
the ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) criteria for Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective or Schizotypal 
disorders, Bipolar disorders with psychotic features or psychosis not otherwise 
specified and/or the DSM-V criteria for psychosis or ICD-10 equivalent (APA, 2013; 
WHO, 1993); 2) Participants had to have the capacity to consent; 3) Speak English 
(literacy was not an exclusion criterion as the researcher read the questions aloud if 
the participants requested it). The exclusion criteria were; 1) Individuals who have a 
learning disability (as stipulated by the ICD-10 or the DSM-V); 2) Participants unable 
to consent; 3) Anyone under the age of 16; 4) Participants diagnosed with ‘organic 
psychosis’.  
 
 Sixty people constituted the quantitative sample. Thirty-nine (65%) were male. 
The mean age at the time of data collection was 49.82 (SD= 10.82). The majority of 
the sample (n=44) reported they were single (73.3%). Fifty-eight (96.7%) people were 
white British alongside one Asian and one ‘other’. On average, people in this sample 
have been experiencing mental health difficulties for 28.45 (SD=12.73) years. 
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5.3 Measures 
 
It has previously been argued in the literature that clinical samples diagnosed 
with psychosis, may be unable to complete self-report measures about their 
psychological experience in a valid and reliable way. This argument was based on the 
perception that people experiencing psychosis have cognitive difficulties 
(Neuchterlein et al., 2004), and systematically lack insight (Drake et al., 2004). These 
assumptions have been challenged with numerous research using self-report measures 
in a psychosis population (e.g. Gumley et al., 2013; Huppert, Smith and Apfeldorf, 
2002; Preston & Harrison, 2003). More specifically, self-report measures employed in 
this study have been successfully used in previous studies to measure attachment 
(Berry et al., 2008), emotion regulation (Livingstone et al., 2006) and metacognition 
(Morrison & Wells, 2003) in psychosis populations. It is therefore appropriate to 
employ the following self-report measures for this study. 
5.3.1 Psychosis Attachment Measure (PAM; Berry, Barrowclough & Wearden, 
2008) 
 
Adult attachment style was assessed by the Psychosis Attachment Measure 
(PAM). The self-rated measure is constituted of 16 items, with eight items assessing 
insecure attachment avoidance (e.g. “I usually discuss my problems and concerns with 
other people.”) and eight items assessing insecure attachment anxiety (e.g. “If other 
people disapprove of something, I get very upset.”) in the context of current close 
relationships in adulthood (Berry et al., 2008). Participants are asked to state how 
much the statements are like them on a four-point Likert scale ranging from ‘not at all’ 
to ‘very much’. Total scores are calculated for each dimension by averaging individual 
item scores, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of anxiety and avoidance and 
low scores reflecting attachment security. Berry et al. (2008) administered the measure 
to a sample of outpatients experiencing psychosis and found good levels of internal 
reliability and good to acceptable test-retest reliability for the two subscales; 
attachment anxiety (Cronbach’s α = .82, ICC = .71) and attachment avoidance 
(Cronbach’s α = .76, ICC = .56). 
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5.3.2 Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ-30; Cartwright-Hatton and Wells, 
1997)  
 
 The Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ) is a multi-dimensional measure of 
beliefs about worry and intrusive thoughts. It was first constructed with 65-item, the 
authors found that this limited its application, and the questionnaire was further 
developed to create a 30-item version, rated on a four-point Likert scale (Wells & 
Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). The MCQ-30 consists of five factors; (1) positive beliefs 
about worry, (2) negative beliefs about worry concerning uncontrollability and danger, 
(3) cognitive confidence, (4) negative beliefs about thoughts concerning the need to 
control thoughts, and (5) cognitive self-consciousness. These subscales measure three 
domains of metacognition: metacognitive monitoring, positive and negative 
metacognitive beliefs and cognitive confidence (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). 
Scores for each of the five subscales are calculated by summing the responses from 
the six items that comprise that factor. Construct and convergent validity of the scale 
have been reported to be sound in previous research (alphas ranging between α=.72 to 
α=.93; in Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).  
5.3.3 Difficulties in emotion regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) 
 
 The DERS (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is a 36-item self-report questionnaire 
designed to assess multiple aspects of emotion regulation difficulties. Individuals are 
asked to rate how often a statement applies to them ranging on a five-point Likert 
scale. For example, “I pay attention to how I feel” to be rated from “almost never” to 
“almost always”. Higher scores in any of the subscales are indicative of emotion 
regulation difficulties. The measure yields a total score as well as scores on six 
subscales derived through factor analysis. The subscales are; lack of emotional 
awareness, it measures difficulties in attention to and awareness of emotions; non-
acceptance of emotional responses, measuring negative secondary reactions to 
distress/negative emotions; difficulties in engaging in goal directed behaviour, 
measuring difficulties in task completion and concentrating during negative emotion 
states; limited access to emotion regulation strategies, measuring beliefs about whether 
there is anything one can do to regulate emotions when one becomes distressed; 
impulse control difficulties, measuring problems related to maintaining behavioural 
control in response to negative emotions; lack of emotional clarity, measuring how 
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much individuals are aware of and clear about their emotional states. The DERS has 
demonstrated high internal consistency with alpha’s ranging between .8 and .89 for 
the subscales and .93 for the total score (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) and had significant 
relationships to measures of psychological symptoms (Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, 
Tull, Rucker, & Mennin, 2006; Tull, Barrett, McMillan, & Roemer, 2007; Tull & 
Roemer, 2007).  
5.3.4 Community Assessment Psychic Experiences-42 (CAPE-42; Stefanis et al., 
2002) 
 
 The CAPE (Stefanis et al., 2002) is made up of 42 items that evaluate the Positive 
(20 items) and Negative (14 items) dimensions of lifetime psychotic symptoms and 
Depressive symptoms (8 items). It was developed from combining questions from the 
PDI-21 and PDI-40 (Peters, Joseph & Garety 1999b). The purpose of the CAPE is to 
measure lifetime psychotic experiences in the affective and non-affective domains 
(Mark & Toulopoulou, 2015). The CAPE is viewed as a measure based on the fully 
dimensional model of psychosis (Derosse & Karlsgodt, 2015). Both the PDIs have 
been used in clinical population (Ganji, Zakaryaei, Bagheri, Shayan & Varaee, 2013), 
the CAPE was previously employed in a comparative study between outpatients and 
non-patient groups (Hanssen et al., 2003; Derosse & Karlsgodt, 2015). The CAPE is a 
two-dimensional scale; it measures frequency of psychosis experiences as well as 
distress associated with these experiences. The frequency of the experience is 
measured on a four-point scale from ‘never’ to ‘nearly always’. If the participant 
chooses the response options ‘Sometimes’, ‘Often’ or ‘Nearly always’, they are asked 
to indicate on a four-point Likert scale ‘how distressed they are by this experience’ 
ranging from ‘not distressed’ to ‘very distressed’ determining the degree of distress. 
The frequency of occurrence of experiences is likely to be strongly associated with 
level of distress, portraying a linear dose-response pattern of association (Stefanis et 
al., 2002). The questions are styled in a ‘do you ever feel/think’ fashion to capture the 
continuous experiences throughout lifetime. The CAPE provides an overall score, a 
total score per dimension as well as a distress score. It investigates positive, negative 
and depressive symptoms. The CAPE-42 scores have demonstrated adequate 
psychometric qualities of internal consistency, temporal stability as well as different 
evidences of validity in research conducted with the general and clinical populations 
(Brenner et al., 2007; Verdoux & van Os, 2002; Pearce et al., 2017; Stefanis, et al., 
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2002; Thewissen et al., 2008) and discriminative validity between non-clinical, 
clinical diagnosed with schizophrenia and clinical with affective and anxiety disorders 
(Hanssen et al., 2003). For example, the levels of internal consistency for all three 
dimensions of the CAPE-42 were superior to .77 (Brenner et al., 2007), Cronbach’s 
alpha for the total score was .89 (Obiols et al., 2008 in Fonseca-Pedrero, Paino, Lemos-
Giráldez & Muñiz, 2012). Further, the CAPE has been cross-validated showing to 
highly correlate with interview-based assessments of psychosis (Konings, Bak, 
Hanssen, van Os & Krabbendam, 2006).  
 
5.4 Procedure 
5.4.1 Ethical approval 
 
This project was carried out in accordance with the Good Practice Guidelines 
for the Conduct of Psychological Research within the NHS (BPS, 2005). The project 
received review and ethical approval from NHS Lothian Research Ethics Committees 
(REC No:15-SS-0069 and R&D No:2015/0211), and received managerial approval 
from local Research and Development Departments in Lothian (see Appendix 1, 2 and 
4 for approval letters). Furthermore, the researcher was given an Honorary Assistant 
Psychologist contract with NHS Lothian to ease access and contact (see Appendix 3). 
As part of the ethical approval, the researcher agreed to send participants’ GPs letters 
informing them of their patient’s participation in the study (see Appendix 14). 
University ethics were obtained for recruitment in the third sector (third sector ethics 
approval, Appendix 5).  
5.4.2 Recruitment of participants 
 
Recruitment took place between July 2015 and 30th of October 2016. The first 
base of recruitment was the Midlothian Joint mental health centre (see Table 1 for 
recruitment details). To assist with recruitment, all mental health professionals the 
researcher met were given a professionals’ information sheet (see Appendix 8) and a 
recruitment flowchart (Appendix 9). Community mental health team (CMHT) staff or 
charity staff approached participants (see Appendix 6 and 7 for Participant information 
sheets) they deemed to fit the criteria, the researcher only contacted participants after 
receipt of a completed reply slip (Appendix 10) stating interest.  
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Table 1. Details of recruitment 
Location Sector  Service N 
West Lothian mental health advocacy project 3rd sector Day centre 18 
West Lothian community mental health NHS CMHT 11 
Bonnyrigg community mental health NHS CMHT 11 
Craigroyston community mental health NHS CMHT 9 
West Lothian hearing voices group NHS Community 
Group 
5 
Royal Edinburgh Hospital patient council 3rd sector Patient council 2 
SAMH hearing voices group 3rd sector Charity Group 1 
Caps advocacy 3rd sector MH support 1 
Support in mind Scotland  3rd sector MH support 1 
Barony contact point 3rd sector MH support 1 
 
5.4.3 Capacity to consent  
 
 Consent forms were designed for each study (Appendix 12 and 13). The 
researcher went through each point of the consent form with the participant to make 
sure they were all clear and that the participant agreed with each point individually. 
Participants’ capacity to consent was judged by experienced staff who knew them. If 
on the day of data collection staff or the researcher observed that the participant did 
not have the capacity to consent, the appointment was rescheduled or cancelled. If 
participants showed signs of distress, tiredness, or unwillingness to continue, data 
collection was halted. This only happened once when the participant was too distressed 
and did not want to continue data collection at which point their key worker came in 
to talk to them. The meeting was not rescheduled as the person was not well enough 
to participate in research. They only completed the demographics sheet and part of one 
questionnaire, therefore, their data was not included in the analysis.  
5.4.4 NHS records 
 
All participants agreed as part of their consent forms to their medical records 
being accessed to obtain information on their diagnosis and last admission to hospital. 
Participant records were accessed for diagnosis information. This was done for a few 
reasons; although it is acknowledged that CMHT workers will have a good 
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understanding of their clients’ diagnosis, diagnoses may vary across time. In which 
case, the most recent diagnosis was taken. Participants are also likely to be aware of 
their diagnoses, nevertheless, it can be inappropriate and potentially alienating to 
request that participants provide details of their own diagnosis. Participants may not 
be aware of their diagnosis or in disagreement with it. Paper patient files were accessed 
in CMHTs that store them, if paper copies were not available, patient records were 
accessed using TRAK, an NHS database. On one occasion, the researcher learned on 
TRAK that one participant had organic psychosis after completion of the self-report 
study, this suggests that their experiences have a physiological cause above and 
beyond psycho-social vulnerabilities, their data was therefore excluded from the final 
analysis. 
5.4.5 Confidentiality and anonymity  
 
All information disclosed by participants and NHS staff before, during or after 
data collection was treated as strictly confidential. At no point did the researcher feel 
participants to be a threat to themselves or others, hence, no information was disclosed. 
All computerised information obtained from participants were anonymised with the 
use of participant numbers and pseudonyms. In line with the UK Data protection 1998 
requirements, all information was kept in separate secure locations and password 
protected USB and computers.  
 
5.4.6 Administering the questionnaires 
 
Once informed consent was gained, participants completed the demographic 
information sheet (Appendix 17) and four self-report questionnaires (Appendix 18-
21), this took approximately 45 minutes (see Appendix 22 for the duration of tasks). 
The order the questionnaires were presented in were alternated to reduce the effect of 
fatigue on one particular questionnaire (Lavrakas, 2008). The researcher told the 
participants they can take a break whenever they feel the need. The researcher offered 
to read the questions aloud making the process more interactive and conversational as 
well as reducing potential missing data and other biases (Lavrakas, 2008). Most 
participants preferred for the researcher to read the questions. On some rare occasions, 
in West Lothian participants did not come to the centres (Bathgate house, Strathbrock) 
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so they completed the questionnaires at home, where their community psychiatric 
nurse read out the questions. Once all self-report measures were completed, the 
participants were asked how they found the process, and whether they had any 
concerns or questions about the researcher or the questions. The researcher answered 
all questions to their satisfaction and gave all participants a debriefing sheet (see 
Appendix 23).  
 
5.5 Power Analysis   
 
Statistical power is the probability of detecting an effect where it exists and 
minimising Type II statistical error (incorrectly rejecting research hypothesis; Clark-
Carter, 2010). A power analysis was conducted to estimate sample size needed for the 
study. For significance, an alpha of 0.05 is recommended in behavioural sciences to 
reduce Type I errors (mistakenly rejecting null hypothesis; Cohen, 1992). The 
likelihood of committing Type II errors is beta, with the power of a test equal to 1-b 
(Clark-Carter, 2010). In the literature, it has been suggested that the bootstrap method 
is applicable to samples of 20-80 cases (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Based on the power 
calculations suggested by Fritz and Mackinnon (2007), the bias-corrected bootstrap 
analysis requires 54 participants. This is based on estimates of effect sizes of the a and 
b mediation pathways from studies using similar variables (e.g. Darrell-Berry et al., 
2017; Pilton et al., 2017; Robson & Mason, 2014). Recruitment was concluded at 
N=60 to manage time constrains attached to the completion of the thesis as well as 
difficulties in engaging other services to assist with recruitment.  
 
5.6 Analytical Strategy 
 
Data were analysed using SPSS for Windows (version 23). All variables met 
parametric assumptions, and descriptive statistics produced for demographic and 
clinical information. Pearson’s product moment correlations were then conducted to 
investigate the univariate relationships between study variables. To test hypothesis 1 
postulating that insecure attachment dimensions would predict variance in distress 
related to psychosis scores, simple regressions analyses were performed. Next, to 
address research question b, investigating whether emotion regulation and 
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metacognition will predict distress related to psychosis experiences, simple 
regressions were conducted to determine if total scores predicted distress related to 
psychosis. If total scores significantly predicted distress, multiple regression analyses 
were performed to investigate the subscales.  
 
Preliminary analyses were carried out for the regression models to ensure that 
the data did not violate the assumptions of multicollinearity, independent errors, non-
zero variances, normality, homoscedasticity and linearity. This was the first time these 
variables were investigated in relation to distress associated with psychosis 
experiences, thus an optimal order to enter the variables into regression models did not 
exist.  To further investigate the associations when total scores were significant, a 
multiple regression analysis was conducted, incorporating all MCQ subscales 
simultaneously, to assess the association of each subscale, when holding constant, the 
effects of the other subscales. Simultaneous forced entry was therefore deemed most 
appropriate in this context. This was repeated for all outcome variables individually 
(distress related to positive, negative and depressive symptoms). This was also 
repeated with DERS subscales. As suggested by Cohen (1988), for regression analysis, 
an effect size of R2 = .02 was considered small, R2 = .15 medium and R2 = .35 was 
deemed to be a large effect size, these effect sizes will be used for all regression 
models. The subscales that significantly predicted (at p<.05 level) the outcome were 
then taken forward to mediation models.  
 
To address hypothesis 3, that emotion regulation difficulties and metacognitive 
difficulties mediate the relationship between insecure attachment dimensions and 
distress related to psychosis experiences, mediation analyses were conducted. 
Mediation analysis employs linear regression to determine whether a specific initial 
predictor (the independent variable) influences an outcome (the dependant variable) 
indirectly through an alternative factor (the mediator) (Field, 2013). Specifically, in 
this study, the mediation roles of those DERS and MCQ subscales identified in 
regression models are investigated in the relationships between insecure attachment 
(avoidance and anxiety) and distress related to psychosis experiences (positive, 
negative and depressive).  
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Multicollinearity was investigated prior to the mediation models to make sure 
it does not affect the estimation of the variables’ partial relationships with the outcome 
variable (Hayes, 2013). The PROCESS macro is used to conduct the mediation and 
test the total, direct and indirect (via MCQ and DERS subscales) associations between 
attachment and distress (Hayes, 2018). Previously, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
procedural approach to identifying mediation and moderation effects has been used, 
with more recent research suggesting that this method does not quantify the indirect 
effect efficiently, instead, it relies on null hypothesis testing to determine those indirect 
effects (Mackinnon, Lockwood & Williams, 2004; Field, 2013; Hayes, 2013). While 
the bootstrapping method does not assume that standard errors are normally distributed 
and it does not compromise statistical power with multiple tests (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004). Furthermore, bootstrapping allows for greater confidence of results with small 
samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The confidence interval (CI) for the indirect effect 
was a BCa bootstrapped CI based on 10,000 samples. If the 95% confidence interval 
does not include zero, then the effect is said to be significant at p<.05 (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004). In this study, to reduce the probability of Type 1 errors, significance 
was set at p<.01, using 99% confidence intervals. Thus, the mediation effects were 
considered significant when the confidence interval did not include zero (Hayes, 
2013). Mediation was deemed present if a statistically significant indirect effect of a 
mediator variable was found in the relationship between attachment dimension and 
distress associated with psychosis experiences. To determine the effect sizes of 
indirect effects, Preacher and Kelly (2011) suggest that completely standardised 
indirect effect beta values (abcs) can be used, therefore, Cohen’s effect size standards 
are squared; abcs=.01 for a small effect, abcs=.09 medium and abcs=.25 large effect. 
These standards are applicable to all mediation analyses conducted in this chapter. 
Multiple mediation models were conducted only if significant mediators were 
identified for both emotion regulation and metacognition.   
 
Traditionally, it is suggested that when the predictor and outcome variables are 
not significantly associated mediation and moderation analyses should not be 
conducted (Baron & Kenny, 1986). More recently however, this step is no longer 
perceived to be a precondition for mediation; there are a few reasons for this (Zhao, 
Lynch & Chen, 2010). First, the effect of the mediator on the outcome measure may 
depend on the values of the independent variable (Kraemer, Wilson, Fairburn & Agras, 
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2002). Second, the effect of the independent variable on the outcome may be 
dependent on multiple competing mechanisms that may cancel out the effect (Cerin & 
MacKinnon, 2008). Third, low statistical power may be the reason for the independent 
variable and the outcome to not be associated (Cerin & MacKinnon, 2008). Therefore, 
following theoretical justifications, and focusing on mediating effects even in the 
absence of a significant relationship between the predictor and outcome variables are 
recommended (Cerin & MacKinnon, 2008; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala & Petty, 2011). 
Recent literature provides further support for this suggestion, where focusing on 
indirect effects and their magnitude are recommended, regardless of a total effect 
(Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon, Krull & Lockwood, 2000; Rucker et al., 2011; Shrout & 
Bolger, 2002; Zhao et al., 2010). Therefore, mediation models will be conducted even 
in the absence of a total effect.   
 106 
6. Study 1: Results 
 
6.1 Data Screening and Preparation  
 
Data was entered into SPSS IBM Statistics 23 for analysis. Prior to analysis, 
the PAM, the DERS, the CAPE-42 and the MCQ-30 subscales and total scores were 
examined to establish whether these variables met assumptions for parametric 
analysis. Homoscedasticity and linearity were also investigated, Normal Q-Q Plots and 
several scatterplots were examined and indicated consistency of spread through the 
distributions for all variables. Normal-theory significance tests were used to evaluate 
each variable. Skewness was used to determine how the data differed compared to a 
normal distribution and whether the data can be described as normally distributed or 
not (Field, 2013). All the data was screened for outliers; Tabachnick and Fidell (2013 
p.77), suggest looking at the Z-scores to determine whether there are outliers, stating 
that scores ±3.29 are to be considered outliers (also see Ghasemi & Zahediasl. 2012). 
Z-scores were calculated for all the data and no outliers were identified, the sample 
therefore remained at N=60. However, as per the CAPE questionnaire’s design, people 
were not asked if they were distressed when they reported not having a specific 
psychosis experience, thus the sample size varies (from N= 57 to 60) for the distress 
variables. Cohen’s (1988) criteria for Pearson’s correlation coefficient effect size were 
used to determine the strengths of the effects (i.e. small, r = .1; medium, r = .3; large, 
r = .5). Associations were considered significant when the p-value was below .05. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 shows that the majority of scales had good internal consistency, with the 
exception of the attachment avoidance dimension. The Cronbach’s alpha for this 
subscale was .49. In the literature the avoidance alpha is reported at .60 at its lowest 
(Owens et al., 2013) and .78 at its highest (Berry et al., 2009). Tavakol and Dennick 
(2011) suggest that if a poor alpha is due to poor correlation between items then those 
items should be discarded, items that have correlations approaching zero should be 
deleted. Further, the inter-reliability table attested to the three reverse items being the 
cause for the low reliability scores (see Appendix 25 for more details), as they are very 
close to zero and negatively correlated with other items of the same subscale. It is 
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possible that participants did not realise the items were reversed. Three items were thus 
removed, leaving a five item scale instead of eight. Reliability test was repeated and 
Cronbach’s alpha for this five item subscale was .61.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for all study variables (N=60) 
 
 
   Alpha Min Max Mean SD Skew  Kurtosis 
 PAM 
Anxiety .74 0 3 1.19 .65 .30  -.15 
Avoidance  .61 0 3 1.43 .66 .27 -.01 
 MCQ        
Positive beliefs about worry .85 6 23 11.85 4.97 .50 -.88 
Negative beliefs about thoughts of 
danger and uncontrollability 
.90 6 24 14.25 5.83 .10 -1.3 
Cognitive confidence regarding 
attention and memory 
.87 6 24 13.38 5.10 .56 -.74 
The need to control thoughts .68 6 22 13.18 4.03 .23 -.87 
Cognitive self-consciousness .81 6 24 15.87 4.95 -.22 -1 
Total Metacognition skills score    .82 39 106 68.53 19.01 .33 -.87 
  DERS 
Non-acceptance of emotional 
responses 
.88 6 27 13.65 6.23 .72 -.59 
Difficulties engaging in goal 
directed behaviour 
.83 5 25 15.33 5.60 .04 -.88 
Impulse control difficulties .82 6 28 12 4.96 1.3 2 
Lack of emotional awareness .71 6 26 17.12 5.09 -.27 -.47 
Limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies 
.88 8 38 19.02 8.04 .42 -.80 
Lack of emotional clarity .71 5 22 10.72 3.89 .66 .34 
Total Difficulties in ER score .80 30 131 87.87 24.43 .38 -.20 
  CAPE 
Positive symptoms weighted 
frequency 
.89 1 3.05 1.69 .51 .84 .23 
Positive dimension distress   .05 3.25 1.15 .80 .63 -.54 
Depressive symptoms weighted 
frequency 
.85 1 3.38 1.99 .62 .72 -.3 
Depressive dimension distress   .13 3.75 1.81 .97 .21 -.96 
Negative symptoms weighted 
frequency 
.80 1 2.93 1.88 .46 .04 -.33 
Negative dimension distress   .07 3.43 1.35 .71 .55 .30 
Sum of all dimensions  42 120 75.95 18.01 .43 -.22 
Sum of distress scores all 
dimensions 
 4 110 54.78 28.93 .22 -.93 
Symptoms frequency weighted      
total 
.78 3 8.75 5.56 1.33 .40 -.31 
Distress weighted total  .20 8.34 4.20 2.15 .14 -.94 
Note. The revised avoidance subscale contains 5 items instead of 8. Positive symptom distress 
N= 57, Depressive symptom distress N=58, Negative symptom distress N= 57 
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6.2.1 Measures’ internal consistency and norms 
 
The norms of all scales were comparable to previous psychosis studies. For the 
Psychosis Attachment Measure (PAM; Berry et al., 2008), Cronbach’s alpha for the 
five item avoidant scale was .61 (Min=0, max=3, m= 1.43, SD=.66). Average scores 
for anxiety (m= 1.19, SD=.65) and avoidance (m= 1.43, SD=.66) were in line with what 
was expected from previous clinical samples (m=1.03, SD=.56 and m=1.32, SD=.56, 
respectively; Kvrig et al., 2011). Owens (2010, unpublished thesis; Owens, Haddock 
& Berry, 2013) used the DERS in a clinical sample, the mean total scores are 
comparable to the current study’s (m= 87.87, SD=24.43, Owens m=87.69, SD=25.76). 
In relation to the metacognitions questionnaire (MCQ 30; Wells & Cartwright-Hutton, 
2004), the mean scores obtained in this study were comparable to the subscale mean 
and standard deviations reported in Hill and colleagues (2012) study. The CAPE scores 
on the other hand were higher in this study when compared to the GROUP clinical 
participants (N=1119; Place, Michon, Hulsbosch & Kroon, 2014 in Boumans et al., 
2016). In their study, positive symptoms frequency (m=.67, SD=.49), distress related 
to positive symptoms (m=1.26, SD=.69) and negative symptom frequency (m=1.02, 
SD=.53) and distress (m=1.25, SD=.62), depressive symptom frequency (m=1, 
SD=.58) and distress (m=1.45 SD=.68) see table 2 for means of the variables in the 
current study. No comparison tests were conducted to determine whether or not the 
differences between the current study findings and previous studies. 
 
6.2.2 Correcting for multiple comparisons   
Bonferroni’s corrections are often used for multiple comparisons but this is a 
very conservative method (Pike, 2010). The Bonferroni correction controls for type I 
errors at the expense of meaningfully increasing the possibility of type II errors and 
not recognising a true effect as significant (Verhoeven, Simonsen & McIntyre, 2005). 
One way of dealing with this is to control for the proportion of significant results that 
are in fact type I errors – ‘false discoveries’ – designed to control the expected 
proportion of incorrectly rejecting null hypotheses. It adjusts the p-value based on a 
total number of tests performed to control for ‘familywise errors’ (Gelman, Hill & 
Yajima, 2012). In line with general convention, Table 3 presents significant 
correlations after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Nevertheless, as this 
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may increase the likelihood of Type II errors, false discovery rates were also 
investigated. 
 Controlling for the ‘false discovery rate’ (FDR; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995), 
is less conservative than familywise errors when it comes to Type I errors but it is more 
powerful in detecting real effects. In practice, the FDR takes the most significant 
association and corrects it at ‘Bonferroni level’, meaning at the original alpha level 
divided by the number of tests conducted. The second most significant association is 
corrected at twice this level and so on for all variables considered. When one variable 
does not reach the significance level set, these are considered ‘false discoveries’ and 
are assumed to be noise. The Benjamini and Hochberg procedure (1995) has been 
predominantly used in research including a very large number of comparisons, or in 
situations where effects are less likely to be truly zero (Bender & Lange, 2001; Gelman 
et al., 2012), nevertheless, in their seminal paper to describe the method, the authors 
used examples with 11 to 15 comparisons. It is therefore considered appropriate to use 
the FDR adjustment in this study with 21 comparisons. Thus, if false discovery rate 
corrections were applied to the p-values obtained for this study’s associations, only 
non-acceptance of emotional responses and distress associated with negative 
symptoms would not be significant at the adjusted level (r=.26, adjusted p=.08). 
Adjusted p-values are arbitrary as they are not estimates of the probability (p) of 
anything (McDonald, 2014). In light of this, unadjusted (‘raw’) p-values are presented 
in the rest of this chapter.  
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Table 3. Associations between study variables (Bonferroni correction)  
    2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 PAM .44 .40 .39 .41 .43 .36 .52* .34 .25 .04 -.08 .34 .02 .25 .14 .16 .44  .27 .40 .21 
2   1 .58* .62* .63* .57* .28 .70* .64* .55* .32 -.06 .63*  .34  .60*  .22 .31 .50*  .49*  .26 .24 
3 MCQ 
 
1 .39 .40 .60* .35 .71* .43 .37 .22 -.32 .32 .09 .32 .15 .11 .30 .24 -.02 -.05 
4 
   
1 .62* .60* .51* .85* .59* .61*  .46*  .02 .70*  .60*  .70* .44  .49*  .55*  .59*  .32 .35  
5 
    
1 .55* .30 .76* .37 .49 .35 .09 .54*  .35  .54*  .41  .40 .53*  .40 .53*  .32 
6 
     
1 .41 .83* .51* .37 .26 -.07 .49*  .47*  .49*  .44  .47*  .49*  .49*  .21 .21 
7 
      
1 .68* .20 .26 .15 -.34  .23 .05 .23 .34  .26 .38  .37  .12 .12 
8 
       
1 .56* .56* .38  -.16 .61*  .41  .61*  .47  .46  .59*  .55*  .31 .25 
9 DERS               1 .63* .62*  -.08 .85*  .48*  .85*  .30 .30 .60*  .63*  .20 .26 
10 
         
1 .47*  -.18 .73*  .34  .73* .24 .19 .57*  .53*  .39 .37  
11 
          
1 .18 .67*  .48*  .80*  .40 .45  .48*  .58*  .23 .34 
12 
           
1 .23 .36  .23 .0 .21 .04 .16 .15 .33 
13 
            
1 .49*  .90*  .41  .45  .71*  .77*  .42  .53*  
14 
             
1 .69*  .31 .42  .43  .57*  .22 .41  
15 
              
1 .40  .47  .69*  .78*  .39  .53*  
16 CAPE                             1 .82* .60*  .49*  .43  .12 
17 
                
1 .55*  .62*  .48*  .38  
18 
                 
1 .81*  .61*  .37  
19 
                  
1 .45  .63*  
20 
                   
1 .64*  
21 
                    
1 
Note *Significant results after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (1) Attachment avoidance, (2) Attachment anxiety, (3) Positive beliefs about worry, (4) 
Negative beliefs about uncontrollability/danger of worry, (5) Cognitive confidence, (6) Need for control, (7) Cognitive self-consciousness, (8) Total metacognitive 
score, (9) Non-accept of emotional responses, (10) Difficulties engaging in goal directed behaviour, (11) Impulse control difficulties, (12) Lack of emotional awareness, 
(13) Limited access to ER strategies, (14) Lack of emotional clarity, (15) Total difficulties in ER, (16) Positive symptoms of psychosis weighted frequency, (17) Positive 
dimension distress score, (18) Depressive symptoms of psychosis weighted frequency, (19) Depressive dimension distress score, (20) Negative symptoms of psychosis 
weighted frequency, (21) Negative dimension distress score 
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6.3 Relationships Among Study Variables   
6.3.1 Measures’ inter-correlations and norms 
 
Table 4 shows Pearson’s correlations coefficients between all study variables. 
Attachment anxiety dimension and the 5-item avoidance subscales (PAM; Berry et al., 
2008) were positively inter-correlated with a medium effect (r=.44, p<.001), higher 
than previous research based on the 8-item scale (r=.34, p<.05; Darrell-Berry et al., 
2017, r=.30, p<.01, Kvrgic et al., 2011).  
 
 The difficulties in emotion regulation (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) subscales 
were significantly inter-correlated (r ranged from .34-.69). There was a high correlation 
between limited access to emotion regulation strategies and non-acceptance of 
emotional responses with a large effect size (r=.79, p<.001). Recent psychometric 
analyses of the DERS suggested the removal of the lack of emotional awareness 
subscale, on the basis that it is comprised only of reverse coded items and associates 
poorly with the other latent factors, therefore measuring a different construct (Bardeen, 
Fergus & Orcutt, 2012; Fairholme et al., 2013; Osborne et al., 2017). In this study the 
lack of emotional awareness subscale was only significantly correlated with the lack 
of emotional clarity subscale (r=.36, p<.01) and no other DERS subscales. Both 
Bardeen (et al., 2012) and Osborne (et al., 2017) recommend excluding the awareness 
items when calculating the total DERS score. Nevertheless, the internal consistency for 
total DERS including the lack of emotional awareness subscale was satisfactory 
(α=.80) therefore the lack of emotional awareness subscale was retained in the total 
score.  
 
 The metacognition questionnaire subscales were all inter-correlated in line with 
previous studies (Hill et al., 2012; Wells & Cartwright-Hutton, 2004). In their study, 
Hill and colleagues (2012) did not find a significant association between cognitive 
confidence and cognitive self-consciousness (r=.29, p>.05) this relationship was 
significant in the current study (r=.30, p=.02).  
 
Stefanis and colleagues (2002) validated the CAPE with a non-clinical sample, 
they found that the symptom frequency and distress scores were strongly associated; 
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specifically, positive symptom frequency was strongly associated with distress (r=.67, 
p<.05), so were negative symptom frequency and negative distress scores (r=.73, 
p<.05) and depressive symptom frequency and depressive distress scores (r=.74, 
p<.05). In this study, the associations were stronger between symptom frequency and 
distress associated with the same symptom with positive (r=.82, p<.001), negative 
(r=.64, p<.001) and depressive (r=.81, p<.001). The associations have linear dose-
response patterns in both studies. It is possible that given that the sample of the current 
study is clinical, the participants experience higher levels of distress and frequency.  
 
6.3.2 Relationships between attachment dimensions and symptom frequency 
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were used to explore relationships between 
attachment dimensions and the CAPE variables. Both attachment dimensions (anxiety 
and avoidance) were associated with negative and depressive symptoms frequency, 
however neither attachment dimension were associated with positive symptom 
frequency (as shown in table 4). Attachment anxiety was significantly associated with 
negative symptom frequency (r=.26, p=.048; small effect) and depressive symptom 
frequency (r=.50, p<.001; large effect). Attachment avoidance was associated with 
negative symptom frequency (r=.41, p=.001; medium effect) and depressive symptom 
frequency (r=.44, p<.001; medium effect). Positive symptom frequency did not have a 
significant association with either attachment anxiety (r=.22, p=.09) or avoidance 
(r=.14, p=.29). 
 
6.3.3 Relationships between attachment dimensions and symptom-related 
distress 
 
Attachment anxiety was significantly associated with distress related to 
positive symptoms (r=.31, p=.02; medium effect), and distress related to depressive 
symptom (r=.49, p<.001; medium effect). Attachment avoidance was only significantly 
associated with distress related to depressive symptoms (r=.27, p=.04; small effect). 
There were no significant relationship between attachment dimensions and distress 
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related to negative symptoms scores (anxiety, r=.24, p=.08; avoidance, r=.21, p=.12). 
See table 4 for all associations between attachment dimensions and psychosis scores. 
 
Table 4. Associations between insecure attachment dimensions and psychosis 
dimensions (N=60) 
   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Attachment avoidance .44** .14 .16 .41** .21 .44** .27* 
2 Attachment anxiety    - .22 .31* .26* .24 .50** .49** 
3 Positive symptoms 
frequency 
   - .82** .43** .12 .60** .49** 
4 Positive symptoms 
distress (N=57) 
  
 
- .48** .38** .55** .62** 
5 Negative symptoms 
frequency  
   - .64** .61** .45** 
6 Negative symptoms 
distress (N=57) 
    - .37** .63** 
7 Depressive symptom 
frequency 
     - .81** 
8 Depressive symptom 
distress (N=58) 
      - 
 **p< 0.01, *p<.05        
 
6.3.4 Relationships between attachment dimensions, metacognition and distress 
related to psychosis  
 
Pearson’s correlations were conducted to investigate the relationships between 
all the study variables (see Table 5). All MCQ subscales were positively associated 
with attachment dimensions, the strongest correlation was between the total 
metacognitive beliefs score and attachment anxiety (r=.70, p<.001; large effect). This 
indicates that anxiously attached people have increased metacognitive difficulties and 
vice versa. 
 
Further, the need for control subscale was significantly associated with distress 
related to positive symptom distress (r=.47, p<.001; medium effect) and distress 
related to depressive symptoms (r=.49, p<.001; medium effect) but not with distress 
related to negative symptoms (r=.21, p=.13). Significant associations were established 
between all metacognition subscales and distress related to positive symptoms except 
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for positive beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thought (r=.11, p=.42) 
and cognitive self-consciousness (r=.26, p=.05). Distress associated with negative 
symptoms scores were only significantly associated with negative beliefs about the 
uncontrollability and danger of thought scores (r=.35, p=.01; medium effect) and 
cognitive confidence (r=.32, p=.01; medium effect). Distress related to depressive 
symptoms was significantly associated with all metacognition subscales except for 
positive beliefs (r=.24, p=.07). All associations are reported in table 5. 
 
6.3.5 Relationships between attachment dimensions, emotion regulation and 
distress related to psychosis 
 
All DERS subscales were significantly associated with attachment anxiety, 
positive associations ranged from r=.32 (Impulse control difficulties) to r=.64 (Non-
acceptance of emotional responses), except for lack of emotional awareness (r=-.06, 
p=.63). This indicates that attachment anxiety is associated with increased difficulties 
in emotion regulation. Attachment avoidance however was significantly associated 
only with limited access to emotion regulation strategies (r=.34, p=.01; medium 
effect) and non-acceptance of emotions (r=.34, p=.01; medium effect).  
 
All DERS subscales were significantly positively associated with distress 
related to positive symptoms, except for difficulties in engaging in goal directed 
behaviour (r=.19, p=.17) and lack of emotional awareness (r=.21, p=.12). There were 
positive significant association between all emotion regulation dimensions and 
distress associated with negative symptoms. This indicates that increased emotion 
regulation difficulties are associated with greater distress related to negative 
symptoms. Finally, all DERS subscales were significantly associated with distress 
related to depressive symptoms except for lack of emotional awareness (r=.16, p=.25).
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Table 5. Associations between study variables 
    2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 PAM .44** .40** .39** .41** .43** .36** .52** .34** .25 .04 -.08 .34** .02 .25 .14 .16 .44**  .27* .40**  .21 
2   1 .58** .62** .63** .57** .28* .70** .64** .55** .32* -.06 .63**  .34**  .60**  .22 .31* .50**  .49**  .26* .24 
3 MCQ 
 
1 .39** .40** .60** .35** .71** .43** .37** .22 -.32* .32**  .09 .32* .15 .11 .3* .24 -.02 -.05 
4 
   
1 .62** .60** .51** .85** .59** .61**  .46**  .02 .70**  .60**  .70** .44**  .49**  .55**  .59**  .32* .35**  
5 
    
1 .55** .30* .76** .37** .49** .35**  .09 .54**  .35**  .54**  .41**  .40**  .53**  .40**  .53**  .32* 
6 
     
1 .41** .83** .51** .37** .26* -.07 .49**  .47**  .49**  .44**  .47**  .49**  .49**  .21 .21 
7 
      
1 .68** .20 .26* .15 -.34**  .23 .05 .23 .34**  .26 .38**  .37**  .12 .12 
8 
       
1 .56** .56** .38**  -.16 .61**  .41**  .61**  .47**  .46**  .59**  .55**  .31* .25 
9 DERS               1 .63** .62**  -.08 .85**  .48**  .85**  .30* .30* .60**  .63**  .20 .26 
10 
         
1 .47**  -.18 .73**  .34**  .73**  .24 .19 .57**  .53**  .39**  .37**  
11 
          
1 .18 .67**  .48**  .80**  .40** .45**  .48**  .58**  .23 .34* 
12 
           
1 .23 .36**  .23 .0 .21 .04 .16 .15 .33* 
13 
            
1 .49**  .90**  .41**  .45**  .71**  .77**  .42**  .53**  
14 
             
1 .69**  .31* .42**  .43**  .57**  .22 .41**  
15 
              
1 .40**  .47**  .69**  .78**  .39**  .53**  
16 CAPE                             1 .82** .60**  .49**  .43**  .12 
17 
                
1 .55**  .62**  .48**  .38**  
18 
                 
1 .81**  .61**  .37**  
19 
                  
1 .45**  .63**  
20 
                   
1 .64**  
21 
                    
1 
Note **p< 0.01, *p<.05 (1) Attachment avoidance, (2) Attachment anxiety, (3) Positive beliefs about worry, (4) Negative beliefs about uncontrollability/danger of worry, (5) Cognitive confidence, (6) Need for control, (7) 
Cognitive self-consciousness, (8) Total metacognitive score, (9) Non-accept of emotional responses, (10) Difficulties engaging in goal directed behaviour, (11) Impulse control difficulties, (12) Lack of emotional awareness, 
(13) Limited access to ER strategies, (14) Lack of emotional clarity, (15) Total difficulties in ER, (16) Positive symptoms of psychosis weighted frequency, (17) Positive dimension distress score, (18) Depressive symptoms 
of psychosis weighted frequency, (19) Depressive dimension distress score, (20) Negative symptoms of psychosis weighted frequency, (21) Negative dimension distress score 
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6.4 Attachment Dimensions as Predictors of Distress Related to Psychosis 
Experience 
 
Attachment anxiety significantly predicted distress related to positive 
symptoms (F(1,55)=5.71, p=.02, adjusted R2 = .08, b= .31, CIs [.12, .67], p=.02), and 
distress related to depressive symptoms (F(1,56)=17.45, p<.001, adjusted R2 = .22, b= 
.49, CIs [.39, 1.1] p<.001). No relationship was found for distress related to negative 
symptoms (F(1,55)=3.25, b= .24, CIs [-.02, .57], p=.08). Attachment avoidance on the 
other hand, significantly predicted distress related to depressive symptoms in 
psychosis (F(1,56)=4.39, p=.041, adjusted R2 = .07, b= .27, CIs [.04, .75], p=.04) but 
not distress related to positive symptoms (F(1,55)=1.42, b= .16, CIs [-.16, .57], p=.24) 
nor distress related to negative symptoms (F(1,55)=2.54, b= .21, CIs [-.02, .45], 
p=.12). Hypothesis 1a was accepted as attachment anxiety significantly predicted 
distress related to positive symptoms and attachment avoidance did not. Hypothesis 
1b was also accepted as both insecure attachment dimensions significantly predicted 
increased distress related to depressive symptoms in psychosis.  
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6.5 Investigation of Distress Related to Positive Symptoms  
6.5.1 Metacognition as a predictor of distress related to positive symptoms  
 
A linear regression was run to investigate the effect of metacognition 
difficulties on distress related to positive symptoms. Both the histogram and the normal 
P-P plot of standardised residuals suggested normally distributed errors, and a 
scatterplot of standardized predicted values confirmed that the data were 
homoscedastic and linear. Multicollinearity in regression models was assessed by 
looking at the variance inflation factor (VIF) values did not exceed 5 (Heiberger & 
Holland, 2015) and all tolerance statistics were above 0.1 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). 
There were no studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3 standard deviations and 
no values for Cook’s distance above 1. Histograms and the normal P-P plots of 
standardised residuals suggested normally distributed errors, a scatterplot of 
standardised predicted values confirmed that the data were homoscedastic and linear. 
The analysis of standardised residuals revealed no outliers (Std. residual min. = -1.4 
and Std. residual max = 2.39). Overall, the data did not violate the regression model 
assumptions. The linear regression model statistically significantly predicted distress 
related to positive symptoms, F(55,1)=14.64, p<.001, adjusted R2=.2 a medium effect 
size, b=.46, p<.001, CI [.00, .03]. The subscales of the metacognition questionnaire 
are therefore investigated in more detail.  
6.5.2 Metacognition subscale scores as predictors of distress related to positive 
symptoms  
 
To test hypothesis 2a, all MCQ subscales were simultaneously tested to 
determine which subscales predict distress related to positive symptoms when holding 
constant the effects of other subscales. The data did not violate the assumptions of 
multicollinearity, independent errors, non-zero variances, normality, homoscedasticity 
and linearity. Analysis of standardised residuals revealed no outliers (Std. residual min 
= -2 and Std. residual max = 2.4). The assumption of independent errors was also met 
(Durbin-Watson test value was 2.11).  
 
The multiple regression model statistically significantly predicted distress 
related to positive symptoms, F(5,51)=5.11, p=.001, adjusted R2 = .27 a medium effect 
size. The only significant predictor was need for control (b= .39, p=.03). This suggests 
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that a higher need to control thoughts predicted greater distress associated with positive 
symptoms. Regression coefficients and confidence intervals can be found in Table 6. 
Only need for control will therefore be carried on to the mediation analysis. This lends 
partial support to for hypothesis 2a as need for control was a significant predictor of 
distress related to positive symptoms but negative beliefs about the danger and 
uncontrollability of thoughts was not.  
 
 Table 6. Summary of multiple regression analysis predicting distress associated with 
positive symptoms scores with metacognition difficulties (N=57) 
                                                                                          95% CI for B  
Unstandardised 
Beta (B) 
       b  SE LB UB 
Positive beliefs   -.04 -.27 .02 -.09 .00 
Negative beliefs .03 .24 .02 -.02 .08 
Cognitive confidence .02 .14 .02 -.03 .07 
Need for control .08 .39* .04 .01 .15 
Cognitive self-confidence .01 .04 .02 -.04 .05 
**p< 0.01, *p<.05      
 
6.5.3 Need for control as a mediating variable between attachment dimensions 
and distress related to positive symptoms 
 
A simple mediation analysis was conducted to test if the relationship between 
attachment anxiety (predictor) and distress related to positive symptoms (outcome) is 
mediated by need for control (see Figure 7). It was found that attachment anxiety had 
an indirect effect on distress related to positive symptoms through need for control; 
b=.30, SE=.14 BCa 99% CI [.05, .74] (abcs=.25, large effect). The direct pathway from 
attachment anxiety to distress related to positive symptoms was not significant (b= .07, 
SE=.17 BCa 99% CI [-.39, .54]).  
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Figure 7. Simple mediation analysis investigating the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and distress related to positive symptoms 
through need for control 
 
Another simple mediation analysis was conducted to test if the relationship 
between attachment avoidance (predictor) and distress related to positive symptoms 
(outcome) is mediated by need for control (see Figure 8). Attachment avoidance did 
not significantly predict distress related to positive (or negative) symptoms, however, 
in line with recent research (see 5.6 for more detail) indirect effects are focused on. It 
was found that attachment avoidance had an indirect effect on distress related to 
positive symptoms through need for control; b=.24, SE=.1 BCa 99% CI [.01, .52] 
(abcs=.20, medium effect). The direct pathway from attachment avoidance to distress 
related to positive symptoms was not significant (b= -.06, SE=.16 BCa 99% CI [-.48, 
.45]).  
 
 
Figure 8. Simple mediation analysis investigating the relationship between 
attachment avoidance and distress related to positive symptoms through 
need for control 
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6.5.4 Difficulties in emotion regulation as a predictor of distress related to 
positive symptoms  
 
A linear regression was run to understand the effect of emotion regulation 
difficulties on distress related to positive symptoms. All DERS subscales were 
simultaneously entered in a linear regression to explore which subscales predict 
distress related to negative symptoms when holding constant the effects of other 
subscales. The data did not violate the assumptions of multicollinearity, independent 
errors, non-zero variances, normality, homoscedasticity and linearity. The analysis of 
standardised residuals revealed no outliers (Std. residual min. = -1.67 and Std. residual 
max = 2.26). The linear regression model statistically significantly predicted distress 
related to positive symptoms, F(55,1)=13.48, p=.001, adjusted R2=.18 a medium effect 
size, b=.44, p=.001, CI [.01, .02]. The subscales of the difficulties in emotion 
regulation questionnaire are therefore investigated in more detail.  
6.5.5 Difficulties in emotion regulation subscale scores as predictors of distress 
related to positive symptoms  
 
All DERS subscales were simultaneously tested in a linear regression to 
determine which subscales predict distress related to positive symptoms when holding 
constant the effects of other subscales. The data did not violate the assumptions of 
multicollinearity, independent errors, non-zero variances, normality, homoscedasticity 
and linearity. Analysis of standardised residuals revealed no outliers (Std. residual min 
= -1.77 and Std. residual max = 2.4). The assumption of independence was also met 
(Durbin-Watson test value was 2.13).  
 
The multiple regression model statistically significantly predicted distress 
related to positive symptoms, F(6,50)=3.81, p<.001, adjusted R2 = .23 a small effect 
size. Only limited access to emotion regulation significantly predicted distress related 
positive symptoms (b= .48, p=.04). Regression coefficients and confidence intervals 
can be found in Table 7. Limited access to emotion regulation strategies will therefore 
be carried on to mediation models. 
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Table 7. Summary of multiple regression analysis predicting distress scores related 
to positive symptoms with emotion regulation subscales (N=57) 
                                                                          95% CI for B 
  Unstandardised 
Beta (B) 
b SE LB UB 
Non-acceptance -.02 -.18 .03 -.08 .03 
Goals   -.02 -.15 .02 -.07 .03 
Impulse control .04 .22 .03 -.02 .09 
Awareness .01 .06 .02 -.04 .05 
Limited access to strategies  .04 .44* .02 .0 .09 
Clarity  .04 .21 .03 -.02 .11 
**p< 0.01, *p<.05 
 
6.5.6 Limited access to emotion regulation strategies as a mediating variable 
between attachment dimensions and distress related to positive symptoms 
 
A simple mediation analysis was conducted to test if the relationship between 
attachment anxiety (predictor) and distress related to positive symptoms (outcome) is 
mediated by limited access to emotion regulation strategies. It was found that there 
was no indirect effect of attachment anxiety on distress related to positive symptoms 
via limited access to emotion regulation strategies; b=.32, SE=.14 Bca 99% CI [-.00, 
.74].  
 
Another simple mediation analysis was conducted to test if the relationship 
between attachment avoidance (predictor) and distress related to positive symptoms 
(outcome) is mediated by limited access to emotion regulation strategies. It was found 
that there was no indirect effect of attachment avoidance on distress related to positive 
symptoms via limited access to emotion regulation strategies; b=.18, SE=.07 Bca 99% 
CI [-.07, .36]. Limited access to emotion regulation strategies was therefore not tested 
alongside need for control in a multiple mediation model. 
 
This section investigated distress related to positive symptoms of psychosis. 
Total metacognition scores significantly predicted distress related to positive 
symptoms, thus, subscales were investigated. Need for control was the only predictor 
of distress related to positive symptoms, it was therefore carried into mediation 
models. It was found that bot attachment avoidance and anxiety had an indirect effect 
 
 
123 
on distress related to positive symptoms through need for control. Total emotion 
regulation scores also predicted distress related to psychosis symptoms, thus the DERS 
subscales were also investigated in more detail. Limited access to emotion regulation 
strategies was the only significant predictor of distress related to positive symptoms 
of psychosis. However, when limited access to emotion regulation strategies was 
carried onto mediation models it was not a significant mediator. No multiple mediation 
models were conducted. 
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6.6 Investigation of Distress Related to Negative Symptoms  
 
6.6.1 Metacognition as a predictor of distress related to negative symptoms  
 
A linear regression was run to understand the effect of metacognition 
difficulties on distress related to negative symptoms. The data did not violate the 
assumptions of multicollinearity, independent errors, non-zero variances, normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity. The analysis of standardised residuals revealed no 
outliers (Std. residual min. = -.94 and Std. residual max = 2.9). It was found that linear 
regression model did not significantly predict distress related to negative symptoms, 
F(55,1)=3.76, b=.25 p=.06. The investigation of the relationship between 
metacognitive difficulties and distress related to negative symptoms was not taken 
further.  
6.6.2 Difficulties in regulating emotions as a predictor of distress related to 
negative symptoms  
 
A linear regression was run to understand the effect of emotion regulation 
difficulties on distress related to negative symptoms. The data did not violate the 
assumptions of multicollinearity, independent errors, non-zero variances, normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity. The analysis of standardised residuals revealed no 
outliers (Std. residual min. = -2 and Std. residual max = 2.7). The linear regression 
model statistically significantly predicted distress related to negative symptoms, 
F(55,1)=16.26, p<.001, adjusted R2=.21 a medium effect size, b=.48, p<.001, CI [.01, 
.02]. The subscales of the difficulties in emotion regulation questionnaire will 
therefore be investigated in more detail.  
6.6.3 Difficulties in regulating emotions subscale scores as predictors of distress 
related to negative symptoms  
 
All DERS subscales were simultaneously tested to determine which subscales 
predict distress related to negative symptoms when holding constant the effects of 
other subscales. The data did not violate the assumptions of multicollinearity, 
independent errors, non-zero variances, normality, homoscedasticity and linearity. 
Analysis of standardised residuals revealed no outliers (Std. residual min = -2 and Std. 
residual max = 2.46). The assumption of independence was also met, with a Durbin-
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Watson test value of 1.91. There were no studentized deleted residuals greater than ±3 
standard deviations no values for Cook’s distance above 1. Overall, the data did not 
violate any assumptions and was therefore suitable for regression analysis.  
 
The multiple regression model significantly predicted distress associated with 
negative symptoms, F(6,50)=5.51, p<.001, adjusted R2 = .39 a medium to large effect 
size. This lends support to the subscales of emotion regulation difficulties as a 
significant predictor of negative distress associated with psychosis. Three variables 
significantly contributed to the model; non-acceptance of emotional responses (b=-
.40, p=.03), limited access to emotion regulation strategies (b=.72, p<.001) and lack 
of awareness (b=.30, p=.02). These variables will be investigated in the mediation 
analyses. Regression coefficients and confidence intervals can be found in table 8. 
 
Table 8. Summary of multiple regression analysis predicting distress related to 
negative symptoms with emotion regulation subscales (N=57) 
                                                                                 95% CI for B  
Unstandardised 
Beta (B) 
  b         SE LB UB 
Non-acceptance -.05 -.40* .02 -.09 -.00 
Goals   .02 .17 .02 -.02 .06 
Impulse control -.01 -.09 .02 -.06 .03 
Awareness .04 .30* .02 .01 .08 
Limited access to strategies  .06 .72** .02 .03 .1 
Clarity  .02 .13 .03 -.03 .07 
**p< 0.01, *p<.05      
6.6.4 Emotion regulation difficulties as mediating variables between attachment 
dimensions and distress related to negative symptoms 
 
Investigating three subscales in one mediation model would have strained the 
power of the analysis given the sample size of the study. Thus, three simple mediation 
analysis were undertaken to test for the pattern of relations between attachment anxiety 
and distress related to negative symptoms through awareness, non-acceptance and 
limited access to emotion regulation strategies. It was found that attachment anxiety 
had an indirect effect on distress related to negative symptoms through limited access 
to emotion regulation strategies; b=.42, SE=.13 Bca 99% CI [.13, .82] (abcs=.30, large 
effect) (see figure 9) but not through awareness (b=-.02 SE=.06 Bca 99% CI [-.22, 
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.17]), nor non-acceptance (b=.12, SE=.13 Bca 99% CI [-.22, .5]). The direct pathway 
from attachment anxiety to distress related to negative symptoms was not significant 
(b= .26, SE=.14 Bca 99% CI [-.12, .64]).  
 
 
Figure 9. Simple mediation analysis investigating the relationship between 
attachment anxiety and distress related to negative symptoms through 
limited access to emotion regulation strategies 
 
Simple mediation models were also conducted to test for the pattern of 
relations between attachment avoidance and distress related to negative symptoms 
through awareness, non-acceptance and limited access to emotion regulation 
strategies.  It was found that there was no indirect effect of attachment avoidance on 
distress related to negative symptoms via limited access to emotion regulation 
strategies; b=.19, SE=.13 Bca 99% CI [-.06, .55], non-acceptance; b=.08, SE=.07 Bca 
99% CI [-.08, .34], nor awareness b=-.03, SE=.07 Bca 99% CI [-.28, .12]. 
 
In sum, metacognition did not significantly predict distress related to negative 
symptoms in psychosis. Attachment anxiety was significantly and indirectly associated 
with distress related to negative symptoms through limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies. Attachment avoidance was not a significant direct or indirect 
predictor of distress related to negative symptoms.   
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6.7 Investigation of Distress Related to Depressive Symptoms 
 
6.7.1 Metacognition as a predictor of distress related to depressive symptoms  
 
A linear regression was run to understand the effect of metacognition 
difficulties on distress related to depressive symptoms. The data did not violate the 
assumptions of multicollinearity, independent errors, non-zero variances, normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity. The analysis of standardised residuals revealed no 
outliers (Std. residual min. = -2.12 and Std. residual max = 1.89). The linear regression 
model statistically significantly predicted distress related to depressive symptoms, 
F(56,1)=24.24, p<.001, adjusted R2=.29 a medium effect size, b=.55, p<.001, CI [.02, 
.04]. The subscales of the metacognition questionnaire will therefore be investigated 
in more detail.  
6.7.2 Metacognition subscale scores as predictors of distress related to 
depressive symptoms  
 
A multiple regression with all MCQ subscales was carried out to determine the 
predictive value of each subscale when holding constant the effect of the other 
subscales (see Table 9). The data did not violate the assumptions of multicollinearity, 
independent errors, non-zero variances, normality, homoscedasticity and linearity. 
Analysis of standardised residuals revealed no outliers (Std. residual min = -1.9 and 
Std. residual max = 1.7). The assumption of independence was also met, with a 
Durbin-Watson test value of 2.17. Overall, the data did not violate any assumptions 
and was therefore suitable for regression analysis.  
 
The multiple regression model significantly predicted distress related to 
psychosis symptoms, F(5,52)=6.15, p<.001, adjusted R2 = .31 a medium to large effect 
size. Regression coefficients and confidence intervals can be found in table 8. The only 
variable that significantly contributed to the model was negative beliefs about the 
uncontrollability and danger of thoughts (b=.41, p=.02). This variable is carried on to 
the mediation models. 
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Table 9. Summary of multiple regression analysis predicting distress related to 
depressive symptoms scores with metacognition difficulties (N=58) 
                                                                               95% CI for B  
Unstandardised 
Beta (B) 
b SE LB UB 
Positive beliefs   -.02 -.09 .03 -.07 .04 
Negative beliefs .07    .41* .03 .01 .13 
Cognitive confidence .01 .04 .03 -.05 .06 
Need for control .05 .22 .04 -.03 .13 
Cognitive self-confidence .02 .09 .03 -.03 .07 
**p< 0.01, *p<.05      
 
6.7.3 Negative beliefs as a mediating variable between attachment dimensions 
and distress related to depressive symptoms 
 
A simple mediation analysis was conducted to test if the relationship between 
attachment anxiety (predictor) and distress related to depressive symptoms (outcome) 
is mediated by negative beliefs (see Figure 10). It was found that attachment anxiety 
had an indirect effect on distress related to depressive symptoms through negative 
beliefs; b=.41, SE=.15 Bca 99% CI [.08, .88]. (abcs=.28, large effect). The direct 
pathway from attachment anxiety to distress related to depressive symptoms was not 
significant (b=.31, SE=.2 Bca 99% CI [-.22, .84]).  
 
 
Another simple mediation analysis was conducted to test if the relationship 
between attachment avoidance (predictor) and distress related to depressive symptoms 
(outcome) is mediated by negative beliefs (see Figure 11). It was found that attachment 
Figure 10. Simple mediation analysis investigating the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and distress related to depressive 
symptoms through negative beliefs  
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avoidance had an indirect effect on distress related to depressive symptoms through 
negative beliefs; b=.32, SE=.11 Bca 99% CI [.05, .66] (abcs=.22, medium effect). The 
direct pathway from attachment avoidance to distress related to depressive symptoms 
was not significant (b= .07, SE=.19 Bca 99% CI [-.38, .53]).  
 
 
Figure 11. Simple mediation analysis investigating the relationship 
between attachment avoidance and distress related to depressive 
symptoms through negative beliefs 
 
6.7.4 Difficulties in regulating emotions as a predictor of distress related to 
depressive symptoms  
 
A linear regression was run to understand the effect of emotion regulation 
difficulties on distress related to depressive symptoms. The data did not violate the 
assumptions of multicollinearity, independent errors, non-zero variances, normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity. The analysis of standardised residuals revealed no 
outliers (Std. residual min. = -2.27 and Std. residual max = 2.06). The linear regression 
model statistically significantly predicted distress related to depressive symptoms, 
F(56,1)=82, p<.001, adjusted R2=.59 a medium effect size, b=.77, p<.001, CI [.02, 
.04]. The subscales of the difficulties in emotion regulation questionnaire will 
therefore be investigated in more detail.  
 
6.7.5 Difficulties in regulating emotions subscale scores as predictors of distress 
related to depressive symptoms  
 
A multiple regression model was carried out incorporating all DERS subscales, 
to test the predictive value of each subscales, when holding constant the effect of the 
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other subscales. The data did not violate the assumptions of multicollinearity, 
independent errors, non-zero variances, normality, homoscedasticity and linearity. 
Analysis of standardised residuals revealed no outliers (Std. residual min = -1.96 and 
Std. residual max = 2.1). The assumption of independence was also met, with a Durbin-
Watson test value of 1.93. Overall, the data did not violate any assumptions and was 
therefore suitable for regression analysis.  
 
The multiple regression model significantly predicted distress associated with 
depressive symptoms, F(6,51)=55.68, p<.001, adjusted R2 = .61 a large effect size. 
Regression coefficients and confidence intervals can be found in table 10. This lends 
support to emotion regulation difficulties as a significant predictor of distress 
associated with depressive symptoms of psychosis. One variable significantly 
contributed to the model, limited access to emotion regulation strategies (b=.60, 
p<.001). This variable will be investigated in the mediation analyses. 
 
Table 10. Summary of multiple regression analysis predicting distress scores related 
to depressive symptoms with emotion regulation subscales (N=58) 
                                                                                    95% CI for B  
Unstandardised 
Beta (B) 
b SE LB UB 
Non-acceptance .00 .01 .02 -.04 .05 
Goals   .01 .05 .02 -.04 .05 
Impulse control .01 .04 .02 -.04 .06 
Awareness .02 .08 .02 -.02 .05 
Limited access to strategies  .07     .60** .02 .04 .11 
Clarity  .05 .21 .03 -.00 .11 
**p< 0.01, *p<.05      
 
6.7.6 Limited access to emotion regulation strategies as a mediating variable 
between attachment dimensions and distress related to depressive 
symptoms 
 
A simple mediation analysis was conducted to test if the relationship between 
attachment anxiety (predictor) and distress related to depressive symptoms (outcome) 
is mediated by limited access to emotion regulation strategies (see figure 12). It was 
found that attachment anxiety had an indirect effect on distress related to depressive 
symptoms through limited access to emotion regulation strategies; b=.7, SE=.15 BCa 
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99% CI [.35, 1.13] (abcs=47, large effect). The direct pathway from attachment anxiety 
to distress related to depressive symptoms was not significant (b= .02, SE=.16 BCa 
99% CI [-.41, .45]).  
 
Figure 12. Simple mediation analysis investigating the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and distress related to depressive symptoms 
through limited access to emotion regulation strategies 
 
Another simple mediation analysis was conducted to test if the relationship 
between attachment avoidance (predictor) and distress related to depressive symptoms 
(outcome) is mediated by limited access to emotion regulation strategies. It was found 
that limited access to emotion regulation strategies did not act as a mediator; b=.38, 
SE=.16, BCa 99% CI [-.12, .77]. 
 
6.7.7 Emotion regulation and metacognition as mediating variables between 
anxious attachment dimension and distress related to depressive 
symptoms  
 
One parallel mediation model was conducted to test the mediating role of negative 
metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts (negative 
beliefs) and limited access to emotion regulation strategies (limited strategies) between 
attachment anxiety and distress related to depressive symptoms (see figure 13). Results 
demonstrated that attachment anxiety had an indirect effect on distress related to 
depressive symptoms through limited access to emotion regulation strategies (b= .63, 
SE=.15 BCa 99% CI [.3, 1.1], abcs=.43, large effect) but negative beliefs about the 
uncontrollability and danger of thoughts did not act as a mediator (b= .14, SE=.12 BCa 
99% CI [-.2, .46]).  
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Figure 13. Parallel mediation analysis investigating the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and distress related to depressive symptoms 
through negative beliefs and limited strategies 
 
This section investigated distress related to depressive symptoms in psychosis. 
Total metacognition scores significantly predicted distress related to depressive 
symptoms, thus, subscales were investigated. Negative beliefs about the 
uncontrollability and danger of thoughts was the only predictor of distress related to 
depressive symptoms, it was therefore carried into mediation models. Negative beliefs 
about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts mediated the relationship between 
both attachment anxiety and avoidance and distress related to depressive symptoms of 
psychosis. Total emotion regulation scores also predicted distress related to 
depressive symptoms, thus the DERS subscales were also investigated in more detail. 
Limited access to emotion regulation strategies was the only significant predictor of 
distress related to depressive symptoms of psychosis. Limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies mediated the relationship between both attachment anxiety and 
distress related to depressive symptoms of psychosis. A multiple mediation model was 
conducted to investigate negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of 
thoughts and limited access to emotion regulation strategies as mediators in the 
relationship between attachment anxiety and distress related to depressive symptoms. 
It was found that attachment anxiety had an indirect effect on distress related to 
depressive symptoms through limited access to emotion regulation strategies. 
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6.8 Study 1 Discussion 
 
6.8.1 Hypothesis testing and summary of findings 
 
The current study aimed to investigate the associations between insecure 
attachment, emotion regulation difficulties, metacognitive beliefs and levels of distress 
related to psychosis experiences. The second aim of the study was to examine the role 
of emotion regulation and metacognition as potential mediators between attachment 
dimensions and distress related to psychosis experiences. To our knowledge, the current 
study is the first to investigate the role psychological factors (emotion regulation and 
metacognition) play in the maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences 
within an attachment framework in a clinical sample. 
 
A novel contribution of this study was investigating if attachment dimensions 
predict distress with psychosis experiences. This had not been directly investigated in 
relation to groups of symptoms before. Berry and colleagues (2012) associated 
attachment anxiety with distress related to voice hearing and Pilton and colleagues 
(2016) investigated the relationship between beliefs about voices and relationships as 
mediating variables between insecure attachment and voice-related distress. Consistent 
with previous research (Berry et al., 2012; Pilton et al., 2016), in this study, attachment 
anxiety predicted distress related to positive symptoms and attachment avoidance did 
not. Attachment anxiety may play an important part in the development and 
maintenance of distress associated with positive and depressive symptoms of 
psychosis; anxious attachment relates to difficulties in emotion regulation, specifically 
hyperactivation of emotions, this can lead people to feel overwhelmed by negative 
affect (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010). These findings lend support to the view that 
attachment theory, and specifically attachment anxiety, is a valuable tool for 
understanding the mechanisms underlying distress related to psychosis experiences for 
both positive and depressive symptoms (Peters et al., 2016; Read & Gumley, 2008). 
This should be investigated further in the future in order to facilitate better 
understanding and provide more effective support to insecurely attached people 
experiencing distress related to their psychosis experiences. Similarly, in line with 
previous research (e.g. Berry et al., 2009; Kvrgic et al., 2012; Ponizovsky et al., 2011), 
it was expected that insecure attachment dimensions would predict distress related to 
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depressive symptoms. Indeed, both attachment dimensions significantly predicted 
increased distress related to depressive symptoms in psychosis. Carr and colleagues 
(2018) found no significant association between insecure attachment dimensions and 
negative psychosis symptoms, a research question was therefore postulated to explore 
the association between attachment dimensions and distress related to negative 
symptoms. The results suggested that neither attachment dimensions predicted distress 
related to negative symptoms in psychosis.  
 
For the second hypothesis investigating whether emotion regulation and 
metacognition predict distress related to psychosis experiences, a specific hypothesis 
(2a) was formulated postulating that negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and 
danger of thoughts (Brett et al., 2009) and need for control (Hill et al., 2012) would 
predict distress related to positive symptoms. This hypothesis was partially accepted as 
need for control significantly predicted distress related to positive symptoms. A 
research question (b) was posed to explore the relationship between emotion regulation 
and distress related to psychosis, as previous research focused on total scores (Osborne 
et al., 2017). It was found that limited access to emotion regulation strategies 
significantly predicted distress related to positive symptoms. Similarly the relationship 
between metacognitive difficulties and emotion regulation difficulties and distress 
related negative and depressive symptoms were also explored. It was found that 
metacognitive difficulties did not predict distress related to negative symptoms. Three 
specific domains of emotion regulation difficulties did predict distress related to 
negative symptoms, these are non-acceptance of emotional responses, lack of 
emotional awareness and limited access to emotion regulation strategies. Similarly, it 
was expected that emotion regulation and metacognitive difficulties would predict 
distress related to depressive symptoms in psychosis. It was found that negative beliefs 
about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts and limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies predicted distress related to depressive symptoms.  
 
The third hypothesis predicted that metacognition and difficulties in emotion 
regulation domains would mediate the relationship between attachment dimensions 
and distress related to psychosis experiences. It was found that the relationship between 
anxious attachment and distress related to positive symptoms in psychosis was 
mediated by people’s need for control. The relationship between attachment anxiety 
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and distress related to negative symptoms was mediated by limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies. In relation to distress associated with depressive symptoms, 
simple mediation models suggested that negative beliefs about the uncontrollability 
and danger of thoughts mediated the relationship between attachment dimension 
(anxiety and avoidance) and distress related to depressive symptoms. Moreover, 
limited access to emotion regulation strategies mediated the relationship between 
anxious attachment and distress related to depressive symptoms. A parallel mediation 
model was conducted to determine whether these mediators remained significant when 
the variance of the other was controlled for. It was found that limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies mediated the relationship between attachment anxiety and 
distress related to depressive symptoms, and negative beliefs about the 
uncontrollability and danger of thoughts was no longer a significant mediator.  
 
6.8.2 Attachment dimensions and distress related to psychosis experiences 
 
Attachment avoidance did not significantly predict distress related to positive 
or negative symptoms, it only predicted distress associated with depressive symptoms. 
In the past, attachment avoidance has been linked to a tendency to supress, deactivate 
or distance oneself from negative affect (Pilton et al., 2016). This functions to inhibit 
emotional states that may lead to the activation of the attachment system through 
cognitive disengagement, denial and repression (Feeney, 1998; Lopez, Mauricio, 
Gormley, Simko & Berger, 2001; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; Mikulincer & Shaver, 
2010; Shapiro & Levendosky, 1999). Following this logic, it is possible that the 
participants in this study may be supressing the distress associated with their psychosis 
experiences. Avoidant coping strategies, such as ‘sealing over’ and the ‘minimisation 
of symptoms’, have previously been related to poorer outcomes in psychosis, and a 
lower rate of symptom reporting and engagement with services (Dozier, 1990; Owens 
et al., 2013; Tait, Birchwood & Trower, 2003). If people supress their emotions and 
are less likely to report their psychosis symptoms, it follows that they will also be less 
likely to report the distress associated with their symptoms (Berry et al., 2012). 
Together, these factors may explain the absence of significant indirect effects in the 
mediation models between attachment avoidance and distress related to positive and 
depressive psychosis experiences. 
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Neither anxious nor avoidant attachment dimensions significantly predicted 
distress related to negative symptoms. The relevant literature is characterised by 
inconsistent findings of associations between attachment dimensions and negative 
symptoms. For instance, Berry and colleagues (2008) did find a significant association 
between attachment avoidance and negative symptoms, however, the same relationship 
was absent in similar work (Bortolon, Capdevielle, Boulenger, Gely-Nargeot & 
Raffard, 2013; Korver-Nieberg et al., 2015). This may be a product of variations in 
negative symptom subtypes. Some people may be experiencing negative symptoms as 
predominant (or primary) symptoms of psychosis (McLeod et al., 2014b), or negative 
symptoms can be present alongside positive symptoms, thus distinguished as 
prominent (or secondary) (Carpenter et al., 1988; Kirkpatrick, Buchanan, Ross & 
Carpenter, 2001). This distinction is important when investigating distress associated 
with psychosis experiences as different psychological processes may be mediating the 
same observed behaviour (Carpenter, Regier & Tandon, 2014). Secondary negative 
symptoms will diminish in accordance with a decrease in positive symptoms, however 
primary negative symptoms will be unrelated to positive symptoms (McLeod et al., 
2014b). Further, specific negative symptom clusters can exert a differential effect on 
outcomes (McLeod et al., 2014b). This is often overlooked as self-report measures 
investigating negative symptom do not differentiate between the subtypes of negative 
symptoms. In order to gain a better understanding of distress related to negative 
symptoms of psychosis, research should focus on measuring negative symptom 
subtypes.  
6.8.3 Psychological vulnerability factors and distress related to psychosis 
experiences within an attachment framework 
 
The second aim of the present study was to investigate how emotion regulation 
difficulties and unhelpful metacognitive beliefs influenced the relationship between 
attachment dimensions and distress related to psychosis experiences. In their cognitive 
model of psychosis, Garety and colleagues (2001) suggest that early adverse 
experiences can create enduring cognitive and emotional vulnerability factors 
characterised by negative schematic models of the world, the self and others. To 
empirically test this suggestion, specific domains of emotion regulation difficulties 
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(DERS) and metacognition difficulties (MCQ) that significantly predicted the outcome 
variables were investigated in simple mediation models.   
 
People’s need for control over their thoughts mediated the relationship between 
insecure attachment dimensions and distress related to positive symptoms. This is a 
noteworthy finding; it suggests that the distress insecurely attached people feel in 
relation to their positive symptoms is maintained by the lack of control they experience 
about their beliefs and experiences. Hill and colleagues (2012) found a significant 
association between the need for control subscale and distress related to voice hearing. 
Freeman and Garety (1999) also highlight the role of controllability in determining 
outcomes, where delusional distress depends on whether the person worries about not 
being able to control thoughts about their beliefs. Therefore, the role lack of control 
plays in people’s experiences of psychosis is not limited to their voice hearing 
experiences and delusions, but relates to positive symptoms more widely. In 
accordance with the present results, Brett and colleagues (2012) demonstrated 
‘perceived controllability’ as an experience-related predictor of distress. They also 
suggested that psychosis may be more distressing for people who expect control and 
consistency. When viewed through an attachment framework, people who have 
anxious attachment styles are likely to have negative images of themselves and the 
world (Berry et al., 2008). They may therefore feel inadequate and unequipped to deal 
with their psychosis experiences. Moreover, when these insecurities are combined with 
metacognitive difficulties such as lacking control over one’s thoughts, this can in turn 
lead to further distress associated with positive symptoms. The analysis of the 
qualitative data for study 2 of this project was completed first and people’s perceived 
lack of control was identified as an overarching appraisal people made in relation to 
their psychosis experiences. People described not being in control of their self and their 
life. Qualitative accounts of loss of control is explored in more detail in chapters 8 and 
9. 
 
People’s sense of not being able to select appropriate emotion regulation 
strategies mediated the relationship between attachment anxiety and distress related to 
negative and depressive symptoms. Previous research has established that people 
experiencing psychosis employ ineffective emotion regulation strategies when 
expressing, processing and experiencing emotions (Khoury & Lecomte, 2012; 
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Livingstone et al., 2009; O’Driscoll et al., 2014; van der Meer et al., 2009). Further, 
emotional disturbances are known to influence the experience of psychosis (Freeman 
& Garety, 2003) and can be identified as a sign of relapse (Tait et al., 2002). This 
finding suggests that people’s inability to make flexible use of situationally appropriate 
emotion regulation strategies to modulate emotional responses can contribute to the 
maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences in people with anxious 
attachment dimensions. This is meaningful in a number of ways; first, it can be 
assumed through the association between attachment anxiety and emotion regulation 
difficulties that people are likely to use hyperactivation strategies (Mikulincer et al., 
2003). This is likely to increase people’s ability to make situationally inappropriate 
judgements and lead to the maintenance of increased levels of distress related to 
negative symptoms. Second, arguably anxiously attached people have exaggerated 
appraisals of the threats conveyed in psychosis experiences, heightened by an inability 
to find adequate regulation strategies (Mikulincer & Florian, 1998). This will further 
heighten and perpetuate the experience of distress related to negative symptoms. 
 
Negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts was 
identified as a mediator in the relationship between attachment dimensions and distress 
related to depressive symptoms. This metacognitive dimension was also identified as a 
predictor of increased distress related to psychotic-like experiences in Brett and 
colleagues’ (2009) study comparing non-clinical and clinical groups. Although the S-
REF model was not specifically targeted at explaining processes in psychosis, it does 
predict that metacognitive beliefs are associated with and implicated in the 
development and maintenance of emotional disorders, including depression (e.g. 
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001). It is suggested in line with the mechanisms of the S-
REF model that psychological disorders are maintained when the processing and 
coping activities operating in distressed states interfere with the cognitive adjustments 
necessary to return to normal functioning (Wells, 2000). When negative beliefs about 
a person’s ability to control their thoughts are heightened, they are unlikely to employ 
appraisals and coping strategies that would lead to interrupting S-REF activity. 
Negative beliefs (such as ‘worrying is uncontrollable’) also lead to the activation of the 
Cognitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS) that prolongs negative emotional states or 
distress (Wells & Matthews, 1996), individuals then engage in sustained negative 
processing in response to psychosis symptoms (Wells, 2007). As such, it is possible 
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that negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thought is related to 
distress associated with depressive symptoms, independent of psychosis symptoms and 
their appraisals (Brett et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2012). 
 
It is argued, albeit cautiously, that this study illustrates that specific domains of 
metacognition and emotion regulation are important factors that figure into the way 
people appraise and relate to their experiences of psychosis. This study suggests that 
people with a need for control on the one hand and limited access to emotion regulation 
strategies on the other, will hold negative appraisals about their experiences. As a 
consequence, this interplay may lead to increased distress related to psychosis 
experiences in anxiously attached people.  
 
6.8.4 Limitations  
 
The results of the current study need to be considered in light of a number of 
limitations. First, as this study has adopted a cross-sectional design, it cannot draw any 
causal claims or conclusions. Moreover, using self-report measures may have limited 
the investigators ability to detect subtle associations between insecure attachment and 
distress.  
 
Second, as was previously mentioned, the researcher encountered reliability 
issues with the avoidance subscale of the PAM (Berry et al., 2008). To move beyond 
this, three items were removed from the scale. This may have altered how the 
attachment avoidance variable related to the other variables in the study. This could 
have contributed to the lack of relationship between attachment avoidance and distress 
related to psychosis experiences.  
 
Third, the frequency of psychosis symptoms is not controlled for when distress 
is measured. It could be argued that people who have more frequent symptoms are 
more likely to be more distressed. Controlling for the frequency of symptoms was 
considered, however, the design of the CAPE does not allow for that distinction. 
Moreover, the researcher contacted Jim van Os who suggested that frequency and 
distress are strongly and fundamentally associated and thus cannot be investigated 
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separately (see Appendix 24 for the email). It would be beneficial for future studies to 
control for symptom frequency, this could be done by using separate measures for 
symptoms frequency and distress.  
 
Lastly, although the sample size of the study parallels previous research 
investigating psychosis in a clinical population (e.g. Macbeth et al., 2014; Pilton et al., 
2016), it is modest and therefore may limit the explanatory power of the study. Despite 
this, a number of predicted effects were obtained, this suggest that the sample had 
enough power to detect larger or more consistent effect. Moreover, multiple analysis 
of the data may have increased the chance of encountering type I errors. Benjamini-
Hochberg (1995) calculations were completed to account for this in a rigorous manner, 
and to minimise the possibility of unreliability. No differences were observed in the 
adjusted and unadjusted results. Similarly, the mediation analyses employed a 
bootstrapping methodology to provide more robust results.  
6.8.5 Future research 
 
This study has produced a number of novel findings upon which future research 
can expand. This is the first study to explore the relationship between insecure 
attachment style and distress related to psychosis experiences.  
 
Firstly, future research should build on the findings of this study with 
longitudinal investigations looking at the causal role of attachment dimensions on 
distress related to psychosis experiences. Moreover, recruiting people at different 
levels of the continuum can be helpful in monitoring the progression of distress. For 
instance, recruiting people at risk of psychosis can be helpful in determining whether 
distress related to psychosis experiences plays a role whether people come in contact 
with mental health services in the first place. This can be facilitated by designing a 
recruitment process independent from community mental health teams, or by focusing 
on early intervention in psychosis services. This can also increase the possibility of 
recruiting people with very avoidant attachment dimensions as they are less likely to 
come into contact with mental health services (Gumley et al., 2014; Owens et al., 
2013). A wider recruitment pool can also benefit towards recruiting a more diverse 
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sample in order to achieve a higher proportion of female participants and ethnic 
groups.  
 
Secondly, the presence of the researcher during the completion of the self-
report measures may have contributed to participants’ responses being moderated. 
Future research should be designed for participants to complete the measures in their 
own time and on their own. This could also help limit the likelihood of participants 
under-reporting their experiences of distress to moderate mental health services’ 
involvement.  
 
Third, experimental studies can be designed to manipulate emotion regulation 
abilities and metacognition skills in order to assess subsequent distress related to 
psychosis experiences. This can also be done in non-clinical populations to identify 
the similarities and differences in people’s emotional and cognitive difficulties.  
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Chapter 7. Study 2 – An Investigation of People’s Appraisals of Their Psychosis 
Experiences in Relation to the Distress they Experiences: Background and 
Methods 
7.1. Background and Rationale for the Study 
 
The qualitative study of this project set out to gain a nuanced and in-depth 
understanding of people’s appraisals of their experiences of psychosis. Cognitive 
models of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001, 2007; Morrison, 2001) highlight the 
importance of appraisals to the development and maintenance of psychosis 
experiences. Often people who have psychosis experiences will be distressed by them 
and seek help. However, there is also evidence to suggest many do not experience 
distress (Verdoux & van Os, 2002). Therefore, psychosis experiences are not 
inherently distressing in themselves, and in order to understand how they come to be 
distressing; people’s appraisals of psychosis and the social contexts within which their 
experiences take place need to be investigated.  
  
Quantitative studies conducted by Brett and colleagues (2007, 2009) compared 
diagnosed and undiagnosed groups reporting psychotic-like experiences. They found 
that clinical populations were more likely to attribute their experiences to ‘external 
factors’ or to be ‘caused by other people’. Non-clinical groups, on the other hand, had 
more ‘psychological’, ‘spiritual’ and ‘normalising’ appraisals of their experiences, 
they also felt better understood by others. Lovatt and colleagues (2010) used the same 
measure to replicate the results and further focused on the role of trauma and social 
support. There were no group differences in traumatic life events; however both groups 
had higher trauma levels than the general population. This suggests that psychological 
vulnerability factors, such as trauma, may relate to distress associated with psychosis 
experiences rather than psychosis experiences. The breadth of these studies (Brett et 
al., 2007, 2009, 2014; Lovatt et al., 2010) is limited by their use of an inventory (i.e. 
AANEX; Brett et al., 2007). This meant that people's experiences, appraisals and 
responses were recorded into pre-defined categories of the self-report measure, it is, 
therefore, possible that information regarding the appraisals, feelings and idiographic 
meanings surrounding psychosis experiences, and the wider context in which they 
occur may have been lost. Without these components, it can be difficult to gain a 
holistic understanding of people’s appraisals and responses that predict distress related 
to psychosis experiences.  
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Heriot-Maitland, Knight and Peters (2012) conducted a qualitative study to 
explore the nature and context of ‘out-of-the-ordinary' experiences, focusing on factors 
involved in triggering people's experiences. They recruited one clinical and one non-
clinical group and made inter-group comparisons using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA). Participants in both groups reported periods of high 
stress leading to the onset of their experiences, and these were often accompanied by 
isolation and deep contemplation about the meaning and direction of their lives 
(Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012). Further, their participants explained that the initial ‘out-
of-the-ordinary' experience provided some emotional fulfilment. In relation to group 
differences, non-clinical participants seemed better able to incorporate their 
experiences into their personal and social worlds. Clinical groups had been more 
subjected to being invalidated or their experiences pathologised and they also had 
fewer people who could validate their experiences. Moreover, non-clinical groups 
perceived their experiences to be desirable and transient. They were also more likely 
to consider multiple appraisal options compared to clinical groups who did not. Heriot-
Maitland and colleagues' (2012) work is very important in providing more nuance to 
the context, and factors constituting the similarities and differences between clinical 
and non-clinical groups and their experiences. However, the comparative nature of 
their work limits the depth that can be achieved for each theme. Further, since they 
investigated factors triggering people's experiences, temporal proximity to the onset 
of psychosis was important. Thus, they recruited people who started experiencing 
psychosis within five years of the study being conducted. This is important because 
appraisals vary over time (Brett et al., 2007). It is therefore possible that for people 
who have been experiencing psychosis for a long time, the appraisals contributing to 
the maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences will be different. 
  
To address the gap in the literature and extend understanding of people’s 
appraisals of their psychosis experiences, a qualitative study was conducted with 
people who have been experiencing psychosis for more than five years. This was done 
to provide an in-depth, nuanced and idiographic approach of people's appraisals. 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was deemed the most appropriate 
research method due to its focus on people’s experiences. Details of IPA and the study 
methods are presented to the reader in the next chapter. Information on the participants, 
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the procedure of the study and efforts to ensure the quality and rigour of the research 
are also detailed. The findings of Study 2 are presented in Chapter 8.  
 
7.2 Methodological Considerations 
 
 A number of methodologies are available to the qualitative researcher, it is 
therefore important to consider their variations and similarities in order to determine 
the most adequate methods to study particular research questions. Before deciding on 
IPA (Smith, 1996) for the current research, Discourse Analysis (DA, Parker, 1992), 
thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and Grounded theory (Chew & May, 1997) 
were considered. 
 
 Discourse analysis (DA) is similar to IPA as they both attribute importance to 
how participants use language to describe experiences, alongside involving a close 
reading and analysis of the data (Potter, 1996). A prime distinction between IPA and 
DA is that DA examines the role of language in describing the person’s experience, in 
that sense, language is not only descriptive but also functional (Langdridge, 2007). In 
IPA, the focus is on how people ascribe meaning to their experiences in their 
interactions with the environment, through their subjective construction of reality 
(Smith, Jarman & Osborn, 1999). IPA was chosen over DA because it gives more 
attention to cognition as it aims to elucidate information on the process of thinking. 
DA does not account for mental processes and their influence on one’s behaviours. In 
seeking further understanding of people’s experiences and perceptions of psychosis it 
is important to focus not only on the way people talk about their experiences but also 
to investigate how they think about their thoughts. Since it is not possible to access 
someone’s thoughts, IPA is rather on a search for an interpretation of one’s thoughts 
(Smith et al., 1999). IPA uses verbal reports to look at a participant’s thinking 
processes and how people make sense of their experience (Smith, 2011; Smith, Jarman 
& Osborn, 1999). The exploration of participants’ cognition is crucial in understanding 
distress associated with psychosis experiences.  
 
 Thematic analysis is another method that was considered during the design of 
the study. It is used to search for repeated or significant patterns of meaning across 
participants, although it can also capture differences and divergences in data. On the 
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other hand, IPA focuses on unique characteristics of individual participants and on 
patterns of meaning across participants (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009). These 
considerations are more appropriate to the study at hand as there are significant 
individual differences in psychosis experiences and people’s perceptions of their 
experiences (Read, 2004).  
 
 The final method considered for the present study was grounded theory. It aims 
to generate theories that are grounded in rich and detailed data from descriptions 
provided by participants themselves. Both IPA and grounded theory aim to create a 
cognitive map that showcases a person’s view of the world (Willig, 2013). Grounded 
theory does that through the study of basic social processes, while IPA aims to gain 
insight into the individual’s psychological worlds (Smith et al., 2009). Grounded 
theory looks for processes that aim to identify and explicate social processes that 
account for phenomena, IPA aims to gain better understanding of the quality and 
texture of individual experiences; it is interested in the nature or the ‘essence of 
phenomena’ (Willig, 2013, p.295) which is more appropriate for the aim of this study. 
A phenomenological design of enquiry is clearly aligned with the aim of this study as 
it focuses on the content of consciousness and lived experiences of a phenomenon as 
described by participants. Its goal is to articulate the underlying lived structure of a 
meaningful experience on the level of conceptual experience (Osborne, 1990).  
 
7.3 Overview of IPA  
 
  A phenomenological design of enquiry is clearly aligned with the aim of this 
study as it focuses on the content of consciousness and lived experiences of a 
phenomenon as described by participants. Its goal is to articulate the underlying lived 
structure of a meaningful experience on the level of conceptual experience (Osborne, 
1990). Phenomenology is a philosophical movement that began with Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938), it elaborates on the experience of being human, particularly in terms of 
things that matter to people constituting their lived world (Smith et al., 2009). 
Phenomenological philosophy provides a rich source about how to look into and 
understand lived experiences and “attempts to describe in detail the content and 
structure of the person’s consciousness, to grasp the qualitative diversity of their 
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experiences and to explicate their essential meanings” (Kvale, 1996, p.53). How 
people perceive objects and events is therefore important. Heidegger further developed 
Husserl’s thoughts, into existential philosophy and hermeneutics (Willig, 2013). 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis is a version of phenomenological analysis 
that accepts that it is impossible to gain direct access to one’s life worlds. IPA 
recognises that while exploring the participant’s experience from their perspective, 
such exploration must implicate the researcher’s view of the world and the nature of 
the interaction between researcher and participant. Therefore, the analysis produced is 
always an interpretation of the person’s experience whilst maintaining a critical and 
reflective stance (Smith et al., 2009).  
 Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was first described by Jonathan 
Smith in 1996 to allow rigorous explorations of idiographic subjective experiences. It 
has now become increasingly popular, often chosen to evaluate people’s experiences 
and preconceptions (e.g. Dickson, Knussen & Flowers, 2008; Rhodes & Smith, 2010; 
Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012). The primary aim of IPA is to investigate how individuals 
make sense of their experiences (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2014), described by its 
founders as: “Complex understandings of ‘experience’ invokes a lived process, an 
unfurling of perspectives and meanings, which are unique to the person’s embodied 
and situated relationship to the world” (Smith et al., 2009, p.21). 
 
 It has been suggested that IPA is suitable to research of a complex and personal 
nature (Kay & Kingston, 2002). It can therefore be of valuable contribution to the 
psychosis literature, as there is already a literature forming around the use of IPA in 
psychosis research. Previous IPA research with people experiencing psychosis focused 
on exploring subjects such as stigma (Knight, Wykes & Hayward, 2003), first episode 
service (O’toole et al., 2004), delusional content (Rhodes & Jakes, 2004 and Rhodes, 
Jakes & Robinson, 2005), the experience of paranoia (Campbell & Morrison, 2007), 
recovery (Pitt, Kilbride, Nothard, Welford & Morrison, 2007), and group CBT 
amongst young service users (Newton, Larkin, Melhuish & Wykes, 2007). Thus, IPA 
is appropriate for studying individuals’ experience of psychosis. People’s experiences 
are complex, difficult processes and meanings derived from personal experiences are 
highly salient. Therefore, the use of IPA provides an in depth account of lived 
experiences that quantitative data cannot access. Van Manen explains (1990, p. 180, 
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cited in Giorgi and Giorgi 2008, p. 168): ‘The (phenomenological) ‘facts’ of lived 
experience are always meaningfully (hermeneutically) experienced. Moreover, even 
the ‘facts’ of lived experience need to be captured in language and this is inevitably an 
interpretative process.’ 
 
 Therefore, the researcher has an active role in the analytical process engaging in 
double hermeneutics where the researcher makes meaning of the participants meaning 
making (Smith & Osborne, 2008). IPA is focused on increasing understanding of what 
it is like from the perspective of the participant. The aim being to construct a rich and 
detailed image of the case under investigation using a case by case, idiographic 
approach (Willig, 2013). IPA’s idiographic approach is important in capturing 
personal appraisals people make of their experiences of psychosis and individual 
differences that may appear. While displaying a theoretical commitment to the 
interviewee’s cognitive, linguistic, affective and physical being and assuming a chain 
of connection between a person’s talk, their thinking and emotional state (Smith & 
Osborn, 2008). To do so, the principles of phenomenology, idiography and 
hermeneutics were taken into account at every step from the design of the project to 
its analysis.  
7.4 Aim 
This study sought to investigate people’s appraisals of their experiences of 
psychosis in relation to the distress they experience. 
7.5 Context and the Meaning of ‘Distress’ 
 
Recent research suggests that the frequency of psychotic-like symptoms of 
non-clinical samples are comparable to clinical samples (Boumans et al., 2016). They 
found that what differentiates clinical and non-clinical groups is how they appraise and 
respond to their experiences and how distressed they are by them (Brett et al., 2007; 
Peters et al., 2016). All the participants in the current study had psychosis spectrum 
disorder diagnosis for more than five years prior to the interview, all had been or were 
still in contact with mental health services and the large majority of participants were 
regularly meeting with their CPN. The participants of this study would therefore be 
considered as a group in ‘need for care’ (Brett et al., 2014). It can be assumed that 
people who have received a diagnosis a number of years ago are still in contact with 
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mental health services because they have maintained negative appraisals of their 
experiences and the distress associated with them.  
 
Distress can mean different things to different people. In the literature, research 
focuses on ‘mental distress’ (Cardano, 2010; Jacob, 2013) which relates to feeling 
unwell, it can also relate to psychosis itself (Tan, Gould, Combes & Lehmann, 2014). 
As well as ‘emotional distress’ (e.g. Espinosa, Valiente, Rigabert & Song, 2016; 
Freeman et al., 2002) relating to anxiety and depression. Neither definition elucidates 
people’s emotional experiences associated with their psychosis experiences. 
Variations in definitions of distress suggest that it can be better understood as a 
complex combination of a range of experiences, and it would be an oversimplification 
to assume a single experiential definition. In order to appreciate this variation, it was 
deemed more helpful to adopt an in-depth and idiographic approach in investigating 
people’s appraisals of psychosis. The researcher did not employ the term ‘distress’ 
unless the participants did. Therefore, instead of focusing on ‘distress’, emotions and 
feelings surrounding the experience of psychosis were foregrounded in order to 
elucidate people’s idiographic accounts to their appraisals of their psychosis 
experiences. Understanding people’s negative appraisals provides in depth 
information on what contributes to the development and maintenance of distress 
related to psychosis experiences (Brett et al., 2014).  
7.6 Participants  
 
In line with IPA guidelines, the researcher set out to sample purposively (Reid, 
Flowers & Larkin, 2005). The research was designed to engage with people who have 
psychosis experiences and are willing to talk about their experiences. All inclusion 
criteria described for Study 1 are relevant for this study also (see 5.2). Upon 
completion of the self-report measures (Study 1, see chapters 5 and 6) participants 
were asked if they would be interested in participating to a follow-up interview that 
will be audio recorded. Participants were given a reply slip (see Appendix 11) only if 
they showed interest in being interviewed. Similar to the first study, the return of the 
reply slip allowed the researcher to contact the participants for the follow-up interview 
for which a meeting date was set.  
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Nine men and one woman participated, the mean age was 48.9 (range 33-75). 
All participants had medical diagnoses of a schizophrenia spectrum disorder; 
schizophrenia (3), schizoaffective disorder (1), paranoid schizophrenia (5), delusional 
disorder (1). Nine participants were White British one Asian. One was in employment. 
Two participants were referred by a clinical psychologist and therefore were in therapy 
at the time of the interview. Two participants were referred from a charity and were 
no longer involved in active Community Care, all other participants were involved 
with their Community Mental Health Teams. Overall, people who were interviewed 
were not in crisis but most had ongoing contact with Community Mental Health 
Services. The two participants (Alan and Patrick) who were no longer in contact with 
mental health services and the differences in their perception and portrayal of their 
experiences were taken into account; when variations in their appraisals were 
identified, these are highlighted in the results. All participants had capacity to consent. 
Participants are referred to by pseudonyms the researcher chose. Please see Table 10 
below for more details on the sample. 
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Table 11. Details of the sample characteristics 
Interview No 
(Participant no) 
Date Pseudonym*  Ethnicity  Latest diagnosis  Last 
admission 
Gender Age Duration of 
interview 
1 (3) 14/10/15 James White Scottish Schizophrenia  1996 Male 52 53:54 
2 (4) 11/11 Josh White Scottish Paranoid schizophrenia  2015 Male 44 50:13 
3 (1) 25/11 Luke White Scottish Paranoid schizophrenia 2004 Male 47 59:21 
4 (12) 12/12 Alan White Scottish Schizophrenia 1990 Male 75 57:23 
5 (14) 07/01/16 Patrick White Scottish Paranoid schizophrenia  2002 Male 44 43:17 
6 (15) 22/04 Phillip White British Schizoaffective disorder 2014 Male 53 51:13 
7 (18) 12/05 Amal Asian Delusional disorder 2013 Female 39 65:19 
8 (26) 26/06 Hamish White Scottish Schizophrenia  2010 Male 54 50:03 
9 (20) 02/06 Jonathan White Scottish Paranoid schizophrenia  2013 Male 33 93:22 
10 (25) 09/06 Craig White Scottish Paranoid schizophrenia  2014 Male 48 47:53 
Note: *All names have been changed by the researcher  
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7.7 Procedure  
 
 Ethical review was obtained by the NHS Research Ethics committee, for which 
the qualitative study was presented alongside the quantitative study. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted; they lasted between 43 and 93 minutes (average time 57 
minutes). The interviews took place in the CMHT Centres (7), charity centres (2) or 
participant’s home (1). An interview schedule was developed to provide a framework 
for analysis, guidelines recommended by Smith & Eatough (2006) were used, the 
questions were open ended and neutral (Smith, 1999), and the schedule was merely 
designed to direct the researcher. The schedule (see Appendix 15) was adapted to 
ensure the interview was grounded in the participant’s experiences (Smith et al., 2009) 
and it was used flexibly, participants’ own vocabulary was used whenever possible. 
All interviews started with the question “Can you tell me a bit about your experience 
of psychosis?”. A pilot interview revealed that the questions were clear and answerable 
by the participants, therefore, the pilot interview was also included in the final analysis. 
The interviews were carried out in line with the ‘Code of Ethics and conduct’ of the 
British Psychological Society (2009). All interviews were transcribed verbatim by the 
researcher. Once the interviews were transcribed in full, audio recordings were listened 
to multiple times, they were then transferred onto a password protected USB and stored 
in a locked file cabinet. 
7.8 Analytic Procedure 
 
 The verbatim transcripts of the interviews were subjected to detailed qualitative 
analysis in order to elucidate the experiential themes in the participant’s answers. IPA 
is a two-stage interpretation process as the researcher attempts to make sense of the 
participant’s attempt to make sense of their world (Smith & Osborn, 2008). 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis draws on various analytic strategies, laid out 
as a series of steps, creating an iterative and inductive cycle (Smith et al., 2009). The 
steps taken in this project are detailed below, all of which were completed in line with 
the guidelines provided by Smith and colleagues (2009). 
 
 Transcripts were listened to multiple times before and during their analysis. Each 
transcript was analysed individually and the researcher moved on to the next transcript 
 
 
153 
following completion of the previous one, in line with the idiographic approach of 
IPA. The first step involved immersing oneself in the data. The researcher closely read 
the transcript at hand multiple times. This stage is aimed at ensuring that the participant 
is the focus of the analysis, with a phase of active engagement with the data. The 
researcher took notes about emerging observations and reflections outside of the 
transcript on a codebook, to go back to again during/after the analysis of the transcript 
is complete.  
 
 During the initial noting steps, the researcher examined the semantic content and 
language used on a more exploratory level (Smith et al., 2009, p.83), close to a free 
textual analysis. The researcher added comments about the sense of the person that is 
coming across, noting anything of interest (see Appendix 16 for an example). This step 
produced a comprehensive and detailed set of notes and comments on the data, 
different levels of analysis were separated using colour codes in order to help making 
sense of the patterns of meaning in the accounts (Smith et al., 2009, p.83).  
 
 The researcher then wrote down a version of the person’s story; the researcher’s 
view of the participant’s view of the world (double hermeneutics). This was done in 
order to further ground understanding in the transcript before starting to move away 
from it (Smith et al., 2009). Emerging themes were suggested from the various codes 
on the transcript. Themes were established within the transcript in the order they came 
up, then regrouped. With the help of mind maps, connections were drawn and possible 
clusters of conceptual themes were identified to account for the participant’s 
experiences of psychosis (Smith et al., 2009). It is only once a holistic picture of one 
participant’s story was achieved that the researcher moved on to the next transcript. 
 
 The final step required looking at the patterns across cases, in order to determine 
existing connections between cases. All emerging themes were laid out onto an A3 
sheet to help identify the similarities and differences between the participants and their 
themes. Emerging themes were further developed to incorporate what initially 
appeared to be deviant cases in the dataset. Particular care was attributed to identifying 
the similarities and differences between individual participants, specifically keeping 
in mind the two participants that were no longer supported by community mental 
health teams. This step moved the analysis of the interviews into a more theoretical 
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level (Smith et al., 2009). Analysis continued throughout the write up of the results 
chapter of the thesis. Extracts representative of emerging themes were chosen and their 
interpretation was written bringing the whole to the parts and the parts to the whole 
throughout the results chapter.  
 
7.9 Ensuring Rigour and Quality  
  
 In line with Yardley’s (2000, 2008) flexible and open-ended principles, the study 
was designed and conducted with reliability and validity in mind (see Table 11). 
Credibility checks for good practice were also utilised from design to analysis (Smith, 
1999, 2011). Sensitivity to context was ensured through a thorough literature review 
and involvement in all aspects of the research, commitment and rigour were 
maintained throughout the project. All stages of the research were designed to be 
transparent, where all steps of the research were shared with gatekeepers and 
participants, and a detailed analysis notebook was kept (see Appendix 26 for the 
researcher’s reflexivity piece). Coherence was ensured through a consistent 
philosophy and research question, as well as the logic and unambiguity of themes and 
their analysis. Lastly, impact and importance, Yardley (2000) stated that however well 
a piece of research is conducted, the real test of validity lies in whether it tells the 
reader something interesting, important or useful. Emphasising the important result for 
research is that it has impact and utility. Whether the project has an impact on care and 
research in psychosis is beyond the time of the submission of this thesis. The 
researcher agreed as part of the recruitment process to feed back to the West Lothian 
staff and service users. Staff in West Lothian are aware of the completion of the 
analysis and this will take place in due course. Overall, the researcher took great care 
to ensure the rigour and quality of this project. 
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Table 12. Detail of measures taken to ensure reliability and validity, quality and 
rigour of the process and analysis 
Type of measure Activity 
Scottish IPA Interest 
group (SIPAIG) 
Monthly meetings and trainings on the theory and 
analysis of IPA. 
 
Supervision  
 
The analysis and identified themes were discussed during 
supervision. One of the transcripts was also analysed by 
one of the research supervisors (CM). 
 
Sent transcripts to 
participants 
 
Participants were given the option to see the transcripts of 
the interviews if they want to. In order to make sure the 
qualitative interviews were transcribed appropriately. All 
participants that wanted to see their transcripts were sent 
them. No individuals replied.  
 
Conference 
presentations 
 
The findings of the qualitative research have been 
presented in a number of conferences, including the 
international IPA conference where both Jonathan Smith 
and Michael Larkin provided positive feedback  
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Chapter 8: Study 2: Results 
 
Participants provided in depth accounts of their psychosis experiences, with a 
specific focus on their appraisals of and feelings associated with their psychosis 
experiences. These were classified under four recurrent inter-related themes; lacking 
control, living in fear, renegotiating personal and social identity and multiple realities. 
All emerging themes appear to divide into two sub-themes: exploring internal and 
external dimensions. See Table 13 for an overview of the superordinate and 
subordinate themes in their entirety. Furthermore, Figure 14 represents all the themes 
and the associations between them. Where possible, participants’ words were used to 
label the subthemes to represent the essence of participants’ experiences. To ensure 
transparency, anonymised quotes are used throughout the findings chapter to reflect 
participants’ experiences.  
 
Table 13. Overview of Study 2 themes 
Superordinate themes Subthemes  
 Internal  External 
Lacking control ‘There is nothing under the 
sun I could have 
done’: Psychosis as 
the locus of control  
‘Psychosis has its own logical 
reasoning’: Psychosis in 
relation to the self 
Change – 
renegotiating 
personal and social 
identity  
‘As if you don’t know that 
person at all’: 
Changes in personal 
identity 
‘I’d like to have been listened 
to’: Changes in social 
identity 
Living in fear  ‘I am terrified’: Psychosis 
is frightening   
‘They are looking at you’: Fear 
of others’ perceptions 
Multiple realities  ‘I was conscious that I 
wasn’t in a different 
location’: 
Experiencing multiple 
realities 
‘The second side of it is the 
clinical side’: Exploring 
external perceptions of 
one’s realities 
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Figure 14. Graphical representation of the themes that emerged from the qualitative 
study and associations between them 
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8.1 Lacking Control  
 
Participants report an ongoing sense of lack of control as a result of their 
psychosis experiences. This is related to both the onset and the nature of their 
psychosis experiences. Participants report that psychosis took control over their lives 
and actions. Following this loss of control, people looked for ways of dealing with this, 
and some resorted to extreme measures while others reached out to medical 
professionals.  
8.1.1 ‘There is nothing under the sun I could have done’: Psychosis as the locus 
of control 
 
Following the onset of psychosis, people felt that they were no longer in control 
of their lives. Participants noticed that psychosis was holding the reins. Perhaps the 
most powerful example of this loss of control was expressed by Phillip. When asked 
about what he found distressing in relation to his experiences, he responded: 
 
Well, distress is um where you uh feel you are not actually in control -what is going, 
what you actually – in the back of your mind you know what should be normal but 
you’re not actually experiencing it. (Phillip, 123-126) 
 
Phillip described distress as the lack of control he felt as a result of his 
psychosis experiences. This lack of control may be related to the varied and 
unexpected nature of psychosis. As James put it ‘because it comes and goes, I can’t 
control it’ (125). This unpredictability made it difficult to plan anything. The distress 
associated with his lack of control is further heightened by the sense that he is not 
experiencing what can be considered ‘normal’ and he cannot change the outcome. 
Therefore, in addition to the lack of control, the thought of deviating from the norm 
and not being able to do anything about it, creates even more distress for him. Jonathan 
talked about how suddenly everything changed and derailed for him: 
 
It went from I have complete control over everything to nothing at all. It's almost like 
as if a bomb went off and then… and at the moment slowly kinda trying to get the 
pieces back, and like building the foundation again. (Jonathan, 155-158) 
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The above account describes how Jonathan compared the onset of his psychosis 
to a ‘bomb’ going off. Like a bomb, psychosis can be qualified as unexpected, sudden 
and destructive. He alludes to losing control of his life very quickly. In the aftermath 
of this ‘explosion’, he is left trying to rebuild his life from the base. In a similar 
comparison relating to a lack of control, Amal describes her experiences of psychosis 
as a ‘movie’ (lines, 8 and 17). This metaphor could be associated with feeling like a 
spectator of one’s own life, watching a succession of events that the person cannot 
control or influence.  
 
Hamish provides a clear account of how he perceived the role of psychosis in 
his life by comparing it to an abusive relationship. His personification of psychosis 
attests to how psychosis has claimed agency:  
 
I mean it’s like being in a relationship, any sort of relationship that is nasty right, if 
you are ever in a relationship that is nasty you would try your damnest to get out of it 
but you can't get out of that [laugh] this doesn't go away, but you think, I mean you 
have no rational, I mean what the fuck can you do about it, it just won't go away so it's 
just crazy. (Hamish, 179-183) 
 
In this comparison, psychosis is the abusive partner and their involvement is 
‘nasty’. Despite his dedication and attempts at breaking free, he feels ill-equipped to 
do so. This failure leads to a sense of being trapped and alienated by psychosis, which 
may also cause a sense of hopelessness. In presenting psychosis as a partner he is in a 
relationship with, Hamish attributes an external role to his psychosis (this is explored 
further in the next sub-theme). He also points to the lack of rationality in psychosis; 
Hamish cannot predict its trajectory, and its next moves. Thus, psychosis cannot be 
seen or prevented. People’s inability to determine how things will unfold may play a 
key role in their sense of entrapment and inability to regain control.  
 
This feeling of entrapment was common for participants. James explained, 
‘There is nothing under the sun I could have done that would have made a difference’ 
(95-96). People explain that as an extension to losing control over their lives, their 
actions no longer belong to them. Josh describes his delusional beliefs and explains 
that they systematically control his ‘actions, my thoughts and emotions’ (90-91). Craig 
 
 
160 
was very irritated by the frequency of his experiences:  
 
I just feel frustrated that I can't control the thoughts because they're just coming at me 
all the time and that’s just all the time, constant and sometimes I start thinking to myself 
what if the voices start and then […] it's like I said I worry, I worry about it. How I am 
not going to cope with this, I can't, sometimes I feel I just can't cope and it's just too 
much and there have been moments where I felt I do need to put myself into the 
hospital. (Craig, 418-424) 
 
Craig is exasperated by his inability to control thoughts brought on by 
psychosis. Craig’s account alludes to a build-up of negative feelings associated with 
the anticipation of the next time he will hear voices. Every time he hears voices he feels 
less able to control them and weaker in his attempts to regulate his worries. Whilst it 
seems like Craig accepts the control his voices have over him, at times he is very 
overwhelmed and feels he cannot cope with his experiences. He then suggests going to 
hospital as a way of placing the voices under control. Going to hospital means seeking 
mental health support. It means relinquishing control further to mental health 
professionals. It can be suggested then, that he is considering means such as medication 
that could achieve what he feels unable to do; regaining a level of control over the 
voices. This indicates a lack of belief in his own abilities to control his experiences. 
James reported that he waited for his psychotic episodes to stop, but it did not. Like 
James, most participants saw medication to be the only possible plan of action. As a 
result, they further relinquish control to medication for it to act against the symptoms. 
James described asking the psychiatrist for the ‘wonder tablet’ (68) to make it all go 
away:   
As I said before the only real difference would have been the medicines from the 
psychiatrist. (James, 96-97) 
 
Medication did not work for Craig; he tried a number of them over the years and they did 
not help with his psychosis experiences: 
 
I would love to say that [specific antipsychotic] was the solution but I don't know where I 
go from here; what is it that I do to stop it from actually happening. It’s like sometimes I 
like to think that there's a wee switch you know it’s like a switch that switches on a switch 
that you can switch it off. I would love to be able to just switch it off. (Craig, 208-212) 
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Craig’s metaphor about there being a ‘switch’ to turn off psychosis is very 
powerful in highlighting his desire for having control over his experiences as well as 
his strong desire to stop psychosis from occurring. Josh felt hopeless and stuck multiple 
times throughout the twenty-six years he has been experiencing psychosis. He 
attempted very extreme measures in trying to find relief from his experiences: 
 
I was getting quite desperate and I thought I don't want to be like this anymore and I 
took an overdose of my diabetic meds and ended up in [name of hospital] again 
pumped full of sugar and fluid and vitamins cause I had a vitamin deficiency from poor 
diet. I've tried to kill myself now about 12 times over the past 26 years, but things have 
settled down again I am starting to feel more positive. (Josh, 363-370) 
 
Josh attempted to remove himself from the situation as he could not find any 
other means of regaining control. Josh later explained that he feels ‘relieved’ (387) 
every time he wakes up, which suggests that he does not want to die but cannot find 
any other way to regain control.  
 
8.1.2 ‘Psychosis has its own logical reasoning’: Psychosis in relation to the self 
 
All participants seemed to have reached a level of acceptance in relation to their 
experiences. To facilitate acceptance, people appeared to make sense of the nature of 
psychosis in various ways. How people appraised and made sense of their psychosis 
experiences can be related to how they attempt to deal with the lack of agency they feel 
in relation to the loss of control brought on by psychosis. Some people perceived 
psychosis as internal, meaning they made sense of their experiences as part of their 
self. Other participants viewed psychosis to be external to their minds and their self. 
Phillip talked about psychosis as an entity external to his self: 
 
I never really thought that I could influence them [voices], no. These were things which 
were outside of me which were influencing me, trying to influence me to do various 
things based on what I was experiencing and what my thought processes were telling 
me to do. (Phillip, 185-188) 
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Phillip explained that he had no control over his voices. His life and actions 
were controlled by these experiences; his locus of control was external. He 
differentiated between his self and his thought processes. This suggests that he made 
sense of his experiences of psychosis as being external to his own mind. By saying that 
his voices were ‘outside of me’ he alludes to a physical barrier to this distinction. 
Perceiving his experiences as external is likely to add to his perceived inability to 
control them. Therefore, this may be a strategy for dealing with the lack of control he 
feels in relation to his experiences, as he is less likely to be able to control something 
that is external to himself. On the other hand, perceiving psychosis to be external may 
reinforce people’s perceived lack of control. Patrick, reports psychosis to be internal, 
yet separate to his mind:  
 
The mind can do some incredibly strange things and the thing is you can justify it in 
your own head as well so there is, you can reason, psychosis has its own logical 
reasoning, I don’t know if that makes sense. (Patrick, 28-31) 
 
Patrick made sense of his psychosis as part of his mind; however, it appears to have its 
own logical reasoning, taking over control while deciding the nature of thoughts and 
feelings. Not only can psychosis control people’s experiences, Patrick’s extract 
suggests that it also provides reasons to justify these actions.  
 
He explains that the things he did during his psychosis episodes, he would never 
do himself; ‘Not in 100 years I would dream of entering somebody's house or taking a 
car, it was quite interesting’ (Patrick, 160-162). In this extract, Patrick clearly 
differentiates himself from his psychosis. So, although psychosis is internal, and it is 
part of his mind, it is also distinct from him. This again can be an attempt at dealing 
with the lack of control he feels. Indeed, if psychosis is different to the self and has ‘its 
own logical reasoning’ (29), then he cannot be responsible for the actions taken during 
episodes. This perspective may help relieve the guilt, confusion or embarrassment 
resulting from psychosis experiences. A similar statement was also made by James who 
explained that psychosis ‘had a mind of its own’ (95). James perceived psychosis to be 
the result of a malfunctioning mind:  
 
The mind is an information processing device and when you start seeing things that 
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aren’t there you aren’t doing it very efficiently. The key seemed to be languages. If 
you study enough languages, you can find a language that help you think in a more 
normal fashion rather than jumping different states. (James, 46-51) 
 
James, perceived psychosis to be internal and more specifically as part of the 
brain. He explained that the onset of psychosis suggests that something in the mind is 
not functioning as it should. His strategy to stop his psychosis experiences and regain 
control of his life is to learn languages. He believes that the correct language would 
‘lift all the symptoms’ (129). Allowing his mind to start working efficiently once again. 
This was how he decided to deal with his experiences and he ‘immersed’ (125) himself 
in his studies in order to ‘ignore’ (126) psychosis. Hamish also described his voices as 
internal, yet separate: 
 
I don't know maybe it's just your mind playing tricks which by the way it loves to. All 
the time! [M: in what sense?] The voices just playing tricks on you. It just loves to, it 
loves to be engaged with you, it loves to bother you, loves to upset you, I don't know 
why. Again [laugh], maybe it's because it’s your subconscious, I don't know, I don't 
know how you describe it. (Hamish, 448-455) 
 
It seems from the extract above that Hamish personified his voices. He 
describes them as having feelings and thoughts; they are mischievous. He talks about 
the voices as part of his mind and more specifically his subconscious – this suggests 
that he perceives his voices to be a representation of his subconscious that are trying to 
communicate: 
 
And they would all chip in and they were there all the time and it was like a wee, their 
own wee World [M: Were they all talking to you?] They would talk amongst each 
other too, not very often, they would mostly talk to me. (Hamish, 524-527) 
 
In Hamish’s account, there is a distinction between himself and his voices. 
Whilst he perceives them to be part of his mind, he also clearly sees them as being 
separate. This is made evident when he mentions that his voices have their ‘own wee 
world’. Overall, most participants perceived psychosis to be internal to their self but 
separate from their mind. These perceptions can be seen as meaning-making processes 
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related to people’s understanding of psychosis, helping them to deal with their lack of 
control. Further, this distinction may help people maintain some control over their 
minds, despite their psychotic episodes. This perceived lack of control shared by 
everyone and their inability to regain agency can be very distressing.  
 
This theme outlines participants’ sense of loss of control following the onset of 
psychosis. Furthermore, the unpredictable nature of psychosis adds to a sense of 
entrapment and hopelessness they report. This theme also outlines how people try and 
make sense of the lack of control and agency that comes with psychosis. Some 
participants perceive psychosis to be internal yet separate and others perceive psychosis 
to be external to themselves. Both views can be understood as attempts to separate the 
self from psychosis in order to maintain a sense of agency over the self. Some 
participants talked about extreme measures to reclaim agency, more frequently though, 
people used medication. People’s perceived lack of control in relation to their psychosis 
experiences contributes to the difficulties associated with all other appraisals of 
psychosis experiences identified in this study. Because they feel like their experiences 
are uncontrollable, people cannot re-negotiate the personal and social self they lose 
following the onset of psychosis.  
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8.2 Change: Re-negotiating Personal and Social Identity  
 
Participants described change and transition associated with psychosis. The 
imposed and unwanted change and adjustments that psychosis brought onto people’s 
lives were likely to be exacerbated by people’s perceived lack of control; this seems to 
be distressing for people. This superordinate theme focuses on changes to personal 
identity people perceive in relation to their psychosis experiences, and changes to their 
social identity through external perceptions of themselves.  
8.2.1 ‘As if you don’t know that person at all’: Changes in personal identity  
 
The unexpected and imposing nature of these unwanted experiences leads 
people to question fundamental beliefs about their identity. Psychosis imposes a 
transition to a new way of being, a new identity and a new life. People therefore need 
to deal with an imposed self, different to their previous self and a new life they have 
never known or considered:  
 
It’s someone that I know so well because I experience and live, and I know myself so 
well because obviously you can't escape from yourself. But at the same time, it's as if 
you don't know that person at all, because of all the new challenges that have been 
presented. So not only we're trying to deal with all the challenges that you have to put 
up with, you also got you to deal with as well. (Jonathan, 473-478) 
 
Jonathan talks about the changes psychosis brought on in relation to his identity. 
He explains that there have been important changes to his identity associated with his 
experiences of psychosis and with mental health services. He portrays the change in 
identity as an added burden. He describes himself as other; a foreign addition to his 
life. This may be related to a reluctance in adjusting to the changes in his identity, 
accepting these changes could make them permanent, in turn leading to the loss of his 
previous self. While mental health staff will leave his side at some point, if he accepts 
this new identity, it will remain with him throughout his life. Accepting this change 
would result in him living with two selves, one he lost and one he is transitioning 
towards. In time, it may even lead to losing the known self and internalising the one 
brought on following psychosis. This reluctance is further illustrated by the choice of 
pronouns and linguistic characteristics of the extract. He begins by owning the 
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experiences and acknowledges that his current self is a changed version of the one he 
has always known. When he starts talking about the differences brought on by change 
he switches to ‘you’, thus, distancing himself from the transition he does not want.  
 
Whilst changes in the self are not completely unusual, the imposition and lack 
of agency in the context of psychosis are key. Therefore, people must not only adjust 
to the existence of psychosis, but also to all the changes that come with it. Indeed, all 
participants who were either studying or working had to stop following the onset of 
psychosis. This often led to people contemplating what their life would have been had 
they not experienced psychosis.  
 
Luke provides a clear account of having to let go of his work ambitions 
following the onset of psychosis; ‘High hopes of doing things […]. After that I kinda 
tailed off with that’ (Luke, 94-96). Luke was working when he started experiencing 
psychosis and there is a lot of ambivalence in his accounts as his psychosis experiences 
are closely related to his work. On the one hand, he believes he can be very successful 
in his work, but psychosis is keeping him from doing so. On the other hand, he explains 
that his experiences might result from him not being able to cope with work in the first 
place (see extract, lines 233-244 in the second subtheme of multiple realities). There is 
therefore this added layer of negotiation for Luke where he is untangling the link 
between work and psychosis and the role they play in his life, and their effect on his 
identity. Independently from this underlying explanation, Luke presents a loss of hope 
to succeed in the life he once had planned for himself. Similarly, Josh talks about his 
life before psychosis with a sense of regret, longing for this lost life; ‘I wish, I wish all 
this hadn’t happened and that I’d continued at college’ (Josh, 518). Craig also recalls 
the days he was working with a sense of nostalgia, he remembered the fun in his work 
life and social relationships; ‘There was some carry on I tell you [laughs]. We had as 
few laughs; aye it was good.’ (Craig, 371).  
 
This sense of loss and closure attributed to participants’ pre-psychosis lives 
were shared by most. Several participants explain a transitional phase where they are 
leaving part of their identity behind and are trying to create a new one that would be 
compatible with psychosis. This transition into a new life is negative compared to 
previous identities. In the extract below, James speaks to issues of a loss of life and 
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identity:  
 
Ehhh I feel as if my whole life is just kinda collapsed really, starting again maybe say 
in square one looking for employment in coffee shops and restaurants. Which is what 
I probably would have done if hadn’t went to university in the first place. (James, 411-
414). 
 
James explains that his life ‘collapsed’ which resonates with the previous 
quotes in explaining this social rupture and loss. He is now at a stage where, after 30 
years, he is considering starting over, not by going back to finish university, but to 
work in the service industry. Thus, he will not be picking up where he left, but even 
further aback. This suggests that he has done a certain level of renegotiation and 
reached a level of acceptance so he can move on with new re-focused expectations for 
his life. Both the acceptance and the new expectations took him a long time to achieve. 
Most participants in this study are yet to make this transition. 
 
Time is an important concept that came up for several participants. Different 
aspects of time seem to be key in relation to psychosis; psychosis takes time away from 
people’s daily lives, where they cannot productively focus on anything else, indeed, ‘I 
thought as if my life was just, wasting away really’ (James, 63). Further, participants 
describe that psychosis lasts a long time; ‘rumbles on for years and years’ (James, 74). 
It can also be said that adjusting to psychosis being in their lives and changing their 
identity also takes time. At the time of the interview, Patrick had accepted the change 
and rebuilt an identity, Patrick was no longer in contact with mental health services. 
He talked about growing from his experiences of psychosis:  
 
The whole thing has been life changing, it’s been, the whole experience changed my 
life it has changed my outlook in life it changed me as a person I can’t explain, it’s 
changed the person I was and where I was. I was very successful, career orientated, 
doing very well and I ended up in a mental hospital being sectioned, I gave up my job 
[..] But it has changed relationships, I changed the way I view things, it changed me as 
a person fundamentally ehm what exactly I couldn’t say in a five-minute interview 
what has changed but definitely big changes, I am much more appreciative of things. 
(Patrick, 441-454) 
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Here, Patrick describes having grieved his former self and renegotiated a new 
self thereafter. When explaining this transition, he strongly focuses on his identity shift 
that resulted from psychosis. He portrays it in a positive light, which suggests a high-
level of acceptance and normalisation.  
 
8.2.2 ‘I’d like to have been listened to’: Changes in social identity  
 
For all participants, the perceived loss of control over their social life and social 
identity was an inevitable consequence of psychosis. All participants came in contact 
with mental health services at some point after the onset of psychosis, therefore they 
faced external perception of their experiences and identity. Jonathan explains that 
psychosis can be perceived in two ways; in that there is a personal and a clinical side. 
He verbalised something shared by all participants when they come in contact with 
mental health services. This dichotomy in perception relates not only to experiencing 
psychosis, but also experiencing psychosis in society. Jonathan provides a very 
insightful account of this: 
 
One is your own personal experience of what is going on. And then the second side of 
it is the clinical side of psychosis is the treatment and how you're dealt with in relation 
to how unwell you are. And that’s how I can separate the two, so from a personal 
perspective nothing's changed, [laughs] in terms of what I've experienced before and 
after nothing has changed. Whereas from the other side, the clinical kind of side, 
everything has changed because you weren’t on the radar because you weren't showing 
any of this or doing any of that. You almost get put under the spotlight so you, you 
don't really change but you get changed by the process of what you're involved with.  
(Jonathan, 276-287) 
 
Jonathan explained that on a personal level, his perceptions, and understanding 
of his experiences have not changed. However, with the involvement of the mental 
health team, he is now feels like he is under scrutiny. The involvement of the mental 
health team in his life created a change in his social identity. The nature of the input 
received and how the mental health team perceived people’s experiences and what their 
lives will be as a result seems to be key. External perceptions affected people’s 
transition into a new social identity following psychosis. For Patrick, this was evident 
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in relation to his working life. He was working before his psychosis and this was a key 
component of his identity. The extract below illustrates the reaction Patrick received 
when he mentioned he wanted to go back to work following his release from hospital:   
 
The doctor, the first time when I had my first psychotic episode, she had said to me 
‘what is it you want to do when you get released?’ I says, ‘I want to go back to work, 
I want my life back together’ and she said that most people with the severity of 
psychosis that I had don’t ever to go back to work and I had said to her ‘well I’ll be 
going back to work’ and this was a restriction and this then became a challenge. 
(Patrick, 656-664) 
 
Patrick refused to accept this restriction of not being able to go back to work, 
instead, he challenged himself to start working again. It is likely that these strong 
statements, coming from mental health professionals in positions of authority can result 
in people accepting that outcome. People can internalise that they are unable to 
construct a new life of which working would be an important factor. This 
internalisation may lead to isolation. Patrick later explained that, not only are people 
advised against work and therefore live a ‘non-life’ (Patrick, 654), if they decide to go 
against this advice, little support was made available. Not being in employment, and 
perceiving oneself to be on the edge of society, seems to be key in perpetuating distress. 
This restrictive approach could result in people having bad psychosis experiences by 
pushing themselves too hard. Patrick went back to full-time work shortly after he was 
released from hospital. He reflected on his return to work stating: ‘that’s when I should 
have had a phased return to work’ (666). He explained going back to work too quickly 
and pushing himself, this led to another episode, thus creating a cycle that could have 
easily led him to feel too discouraged to try again, further hindering his ability to 
negotiate a new personal and social identity. 
 
This imposed restriction seemed to be the case for most participants. Patrick 
was the only one that had returned to work after his diagnosis, the others had not been 
working for between 5 and 30 years. For most participants, being able to do something 
as part of society was presented as unattainable. James started volunteering after nearly 
30 years of not working. This was a crucial step towards his transition into a new social 
identity:  
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I feel as if I am actually doing something, rather than doing nothing. As I said before, 
there is a feeling of dignity by even just volunteering a couple hours a week. Which 
otherwise you would never really experience. The problem is as I said before, 
unemployment, apart from the initial 5 or 6 weeks, where it’s a bit of a novelty, the 
novelty soon fades away. And if you try to live within the limits of the benefits, you 
are not really living a very good life. Whereas if you get a job you’ve got more income 
and you also get that social role which allows you to feel a bit of dignity. That’s why 
we look for a job. (James, 246-255) 
 
James explained that volunteering allows him to feel like he is contributing to 
society which is making him feel a sense of dignity that he had lost after quitting his 
studies. His social and personal identity are therefore intertwined where he feels his 
self-worth to be closely related to the social role he gains by being able to work. It is 
possible that the lack of structure that comes from a non-working life may shift the 
focus on being ill and incapacitated, leading people to feel stuck and hopeless.  
 
Another component that was identified by multiple participants was that often, 
mental health professionals dismissed them and did not listen to their experiences on 
the grounds of their psychosis. This further diminished people’s social and personal 
identity. They are put in a position of not being able to contribute to how their first-
hand experiences are conveyed and therefore received. Further, because of being 
deemed too unwell to be listened to, people were also not involved with the decisions 
made regarding their own treatment; Josh stated ‘I wasn’t informed. I was just given 
medication and left to my own devices’ (552-553). He believes that he went to hospital 
so often because of this lack of information. Perhaps the most descriptive account of 
this loss of social identity was provided by Patrick who felt ‘written off’ (537) when 
his ability to contribute to his own wellbeing was removed from him. He later 
described:  
 
I’d like to have been told more, I’d liked to have been listened to, that’s it. I’d like to 
have been listened to you know, and, even if someone spent half an hour with me and 
let me speak and then told me ‘this a lot of rubbish’, that would have been fine but to 
not actually let me speak and tell me this is a lot of rubbish you know, ‘you are not 
making sense’ you know, ‘but you haven’t heard what I had to say’ so that would have 
been a big driver. (Patrick, 611-617) 
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Patrick felt very angry, disappointed and disrespected for not being listened to. 
He was frustrated to have been dismissed without being heard at all. These were his 
experiences, only he knew exactly what they entailed and how they made him feel, 
this insider knowledge and his desire to contribute to his care were denied. This 
dismissal can be perceived by participants as a statement of a transition into a reduced 
social status and identity. In summary, both by discarding people’s ability to 
reintegrate into a working life and disregarding their stories, people can be made to 
feel alienated by the mental health system, thus unable to reconstruct a social identity, 
or to contrast a perceived diminished and incomplete social identity. This view was 
taken to the extreme by Alan who believed that his experiences of psychosis were 
programmed by society because he did not adhere to social expectations. He therefore 
carried a lot of anger towards the mental health system and believed that society 
supressed people’s beliefs with medication. He described psychosis as an additional 
‘self’ and quickly focused on how this was supressed and disregarded; ‘If you require 
to come out of yourself, be two selves they are not interested they give you drugs. The 
drugs put you in a false sense of security.’ (Alan, 249-250).  
 
On the other hand, people who were given the support and audience they 
sought, stated this was vital to their meaning-making and transition into a new identity. 
The involvement of mental health services in people’s lives came with increased 
scrutiny, added expectations and numerous appointments. Although these additions can 
be overwhelming, people explained that a communicative environment made it easier 
to move forward in constructing a new social identity. Moreover, this may help reduce 
distress people feel in relation to their experiences; this was illustrated by Josh:  
 
I think talking to people about my problems; a problem shared is a problem halved, the 
expression is. Also, informing my CPN or my psychiatrist on how I am feeling, how I 
am doing. (Josh, 277-280) 
 
Sharing what he was going through and making his personal experiences 
available to others helped Josh move forward. Jonathan also had a team of mental 
health professionals working closely with him. He explained the ups and downs of 
adjusting to all the changes and transitions that can occur after leaving hospital. He 
therefore felt the support he received was needed and he appreciated its availability 
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when rebuilding his identity and his life. He appraised this time as an adjustment period 
and considered that the team was there to make this transition smoother; ‘When you 
are in crisis and you are very vulnerable, I think it's very important to have that support 
because things can shift and change quite quickly’ (Jonathan, 560-562). Jonathan also 
explained how transient and delicate things can be at times of adaptation, thus further 
emphasising the role played by mental health services in helping the development of a 
new social identity. All the participants of this project encountered mental health 
services in relation to their experiences. Mental health services can therefore be support 
mechanisms or further perpetuate distress by dismissing people’s beliefs and 
perceptions. 
 
Psychosis creates a break and imposes a change to a person’s life and identity. 
For most participants, there is an intense sense of loss; they look back and reminisce 
about the lives they had that suddenly and unexpectedly were taken away from them. 
They all portray a sense of nostalgia for what they once had as they had to watch the 
life and the self they knew crumble under the imposed long-term power of psychosis. 
Accepting this transition meant that they had to accept the loss of their previous 
identity, possibly for good. These adjustments and negotiations are further amplified 
when people also consider their social identity, mainly in relation to how they are 
treated by others. The social identity that people transition towards overtime depended 
on the social context their experiences were received in. When people felt they were 
dismissed, isolated and deemed unable to reintegrate into a social working life, they 
felt stuck and hopeless therefore maintaining elevated levels of distress. Supportive 
environments, on the other hand, seemed to be beneficial in the reduction of distress 
related to their experiences.  
  
 
 
173 
8.3 Living in Fear 
 
Some participants explained that the content of their psychosis was frightening. 
Further to the content itself, most participants were also afraid of psychosis getting 
stronger and leading to acute symptoms that in turn may lead to hospitalisation. People 
had negative experiences of hospitals and were therefore very keen to avoid going 
back. Finally, people were afraid of how they would be perceived by others and 
considered the potential consequences of their behaviours on loved ones. It is likely 
that people’s fears over various aspects of their psychosis experiences are exacerbated 
by their sense of not having control; of being controlled by psychosis. 
 
8.3.1 ‘I am terrified’: Psychosis is frightening   
 
Participants talked about being afraid of the content of their experiences of 
psychosis. Specifically, the content of delusional and paranoid experiences made people 
afraid for their safety. Craig felt a lot of fear around the beliefs he held:  
 
Terrified, I am terrified, I'm fearful it starts off with feeling a little bit fearful and then I get 
terrified and I just can't move. Like I say I start sitting and I'm just rigid, I don't know what 
to do with myself. I feel like I’m never going to get up again, I feel like I'll never be able 
to move again because I am now rigid with fear. And you know, that's just absolutely 
terrifying. (Craig, 180-184) 
 
He talked about the physical impact the fear had on him, he was no longer able to move, 
stuck with fear. Patrick gave a good description of his fear as a definition for distress:   
 
M: How would you define distress? 
P: Terrifying. Absolutely petrifying I was scared to go to sleep at night really aye yes. 
M: So, distress in psychosis is something that you would define with fear?  
P: Yes, yes I got so bad they ended up putting me in a room on my own. 
M: What were you afraid of? 
P: Getting killed, quite literally. I know that sounds ridiculous, you know people in the 
next bed you know it’s like Jeeze. (Patrick, 261-276) 
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Patrick’s account of his experiences and the fear attached to them is also related 
to the content of his beliefs. At the end of the above extract, Patrick states that his fears 
sound ‘ridiculous’ looking back, but at that time, he was overwhelmed by their strength. 
Amal portrays a very similar fear to Patrick’s, describing her experiences to be very 
negative and she was very clearly afraid for her life as a result:  
 
All the bad things, all the bad things and fear because now I have to hide somewhere 
because they are outside this window, they will see, guns these are just they can see through 
the walls, they can shoot me through… the guns it was a fear also. I don't know how I 
coped if I now know it is a reality I think; I don't know how did I cope how did I survived 
that episode. (Amal, 248-253) 
 
She focused on the content of her experiences, describing the content of her beliefs. 
This focus on the content of psychosis experiences is unique to fear; at other times in 
the interviews, people talked about their experiences more generally, focusing on the 
distress associated with their experiences and its effect on their lives as opposed to the 
content of their symptoms.  
 
Aside from the content of psychotic episodes, people were concerned by the 
unpredictable nature of psychosis. This brought out a fear of their episodes increasing 
in frequency, intensity and duration. The fear people experienced was amplified by 
their inability to control their experiences (see 8.1 for more on people’s perceived lack 
of control). Throughout the course of his psychosis, James had short episodes 
approximately three times a day; the possibility of his symptoms increasing was a 
particularly daunting concern for him:  
 
I just had that sinking feeling that you know if the symptoms get much worse I will be 
in a bad way, you know. Ehh if the periods extended to hours and hours and weeks on 
time, I was thinking, hope this illness doesn’t go worse as time passes. It is bad enough 
as it is. I can’t have these symptoms 24/7. I could lose my mind altogether. Develop 
acute symptoms [which did not happen]. No, we had episodes and as severe as they 
are, I do understand there are some people that have to be put to hospital cause their 
symptoms are very very acute and I was saying that ‘oh god not me’ […] But that never 
happened it never became that acute that I needed hospitalisation. (James, 187-198) 
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James was afraid that with time, the duration of his episodes may increase. If 
his episodes lasted longer he could end up not having any time where he is not 
experiencing psychosis. Two peripheral concepts that transpire from this extract are 
related to James’ acceptance of his lack of control over his experiences (see 8.1 on lack 
of control), and fearing a loss of sense of self and identity (see 8.2 on change). The 
increase in duration and frequency of his experiences would mean his psychosis may 
become acute and lead to hospitalisation. This was something James worried about 
greatly.  
 
Nearly all participants portrayed a fear of hospitalisation, which was related to 
severe symptoms and being acutely unwell. In most cases, people had bad experiences 
at hospital. On one occasion, Josh called the police in relation to an unusual belief but 
then decided not to disclose anything because he ‘didn’t want to end up in the 
[psychiatric hospital] or anywhere like that’ (452). Josh has spent a large amount of his 
adult life either in hospital or in supported accommodation; ‘And I don't want to be yo-
yoing back and forth into the [psychiatric hospital] all the time. I've had so many bad 
experiences there’ (Josh, 266-269). Comments such as this illustrate people’s negative 
feelings and experiences about hospitals. Alan spent time in hospital in the 1960s when 
ECT was commonly administered. Looking back now, he believes the ‘so-called 
experts’ (178) caused him brain damage. People were often taken to hospital 
involuntarily, staying for long periods of time. This reticence in going to hospital may 
also be related to a fear of isolation from their social settings. When taken to hospital, 
people are removed from their known environment and isolated from the people in their 
lives; ‘we lost contact for many years ‘cause I lost contact with all my friends family 
and whatnot being in the [psychiatric hospital] so often’ (Josh, 392-395). 
 
Although negative feelings about hospitals were dominant in the sample, Amal had the 
opposite perception. For her, hospitals provided a reality check, they represented a safe 
haven where she would get better:   
 
Ok, she [the doctor] is right that's my illness, yeah. I suffer with this illness, it's coming 
back that is good and now she will make me better’ I think it's the comfort that you are 
in a safety zone. I am safe here and she is doctor. Because all my psychosis I was 
worried about my safety as well or someone else not a safe environment nothing will 
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happen in a hospital, it's safe. (Amal, 56-61) 
 
For Amal, the hospital seems to block off all the negativity and fear that comes 
with psychosis. Amal’s psychosis experiences are closely related to her home life and 
the difficulties she has with her husband, his family and the pressures for her to lead 
her life a certain way. She strongly believes in the hospital’s safety; it can be suggested 
that in her view, psychosis cannot penetrate the walls of the hospital. Amal is a medical 
doctor by training, which probably plays a key role in her experience of hospitals and 
how she feels about them. Similarly, her strong belief in the hospital can also be 
associated with a need to further relinquish control to a trusted professional. 
 
8.3.2 ‘They are looking at you’: Fear of others’ perceptions   
 
People also expressed fear over the consequences of the actions they may 
undertake when controlled by psychosis, specifically relating to how others perceive 
them. Most participants were reluctant to share their experiences with others, from fear 
of how they would be perceived. Similarly, people were afraid of how their behaviours 
were perceived by others; Phillip gives a good example of this fear from when he had 
a psychosis episode in a very busy place:  
 
Um but uh psychosis I think is not only frightening for the individual it is frightening 
for other people as well. Because, I ended up; I became psychotic in London which is 
not a very nice place to be when you have got loads of people around, uh, because they 
are looking at you – you think that they are eh eh eh, you are seeing things. (Phillip, 
30-34) 
 
At that time, he not only had to deal with what he was going through, but he 
was also dealing with feeling like he was being watched. He was convinced that others 
were looking at him, and seeing him unwell. This reticence to be seen during psychosis 
may be associated to people feeling that others are not supportive or understanding of 
their experiences. Phillip’s reaction may be understood as self-stigmatising behaviour 
where he felt people were judging him.  
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Later in the interview he once again mentioned the fear he believes to have 
caused in others; ‘So, I think if you spoke to anyone else they would say that, not only 
do you find you’re frightened, but other people get frightened too. Very frightened’ 
(Phillip, 114-116). Thinking of others’ perceptions and reactions to one’s experiences 
adds an additional level of awareness. This can be distressing for the person that not 
only needs to deal with what they are experiencing at the time, but also how they come 
across. Moreover, some people became isolated because of their psychosis experiences. 
Participants suggested a few reasons for this isolation; some have difficulty 
understanding what they are going through and what it means. Therefore, it is difficult 
to share and include others in their experiences. Others feel shame in what they are 
going through and fear people’s reactions.  
 
Phillip had been in touch with mental health services for a long time before he 
disclosed his visions: ‘Also, because you don’t want to admit to other people that you 
are actually seeing real things. My diagnosis was not made complete until quite a long 
time later’ (Phillip, 26-29). Disclosing his visions was too difficult; he mentioned he 
did not want to ‘admit’ their existence, which may be associated with shame. His 
secrecy resulted wrong diagnoses and treatment, however, he still chose not to disclose 
his hallucinations. The shame and the fear of others’ perceptions and reactions was too 
strong. Thus, shame may perpetuate the beliefs that psychosis experiences are a 
problem people attempt to hide instead of understanding, and a lack of knowledge 
about psychosis puts people in a position where they cannot seek support.  
 
In addition to a fear of others’ perceptions, people also expressed fear in relation 
to the potential consequences of the behaviours they do not have control over. Craig 
talks about this fear in relation to others in his life, where, he is afraid of doing 
something he will regret: ‘Something that I might do. In that case I feel like I might do 
something silly and then live to regret it so it's not that I want to do anything but it just 
feels that way’ (Craig, 201-203). Craig is afraid of what he might do, outwith his 
control, when in psychosis. The fear of doing something he will have to live with 
increases the distress he feels in relation to his experiences. His fear is strongly related 
to his worry of others’ reactions and how he would explain and justify his actions:  
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I'm just scared of what might happen if something actually happened. How am I going 
to explain it how am I going to control it? […] I think I've got over that side of things 
but, but I honestly just, I just think if I do do something silly; how is it going to affect 
me and those around me? (Craig, 473-485) 
 
Craig describes fear, worry and shame about something he has not done, does not want 
to do but cannot be certain he will not do when experiencing psychosis. Luke explained 
that he started taking medication because of similar concerns:  
 
I realise that if I didn't take the medication which would help me with that, help me 
with being paranoid and thinking people were out to get me. Then if I didn’t take the 
medication I reckon I would have ended up, anything could have happened. So I was 
really worried at that time, so I decided to start taking the medication again after about 
5 years. (Luke, 81-87) 
 
Luke was not compliant with medication for a long time, but the fear of his 
illness was worsening and the potential consequences of his behaviours during 
psychosis experiences convinced him to take the medication. Indeed, in his narrative, 
it comes across as he is taking the medication as it provides a safety net against what 
he cannot control.  
 
This theme highlights people’s fears related to their psychosis experiences. For 
the participants in this study, fear is divided into four categories; first, participants 
feared the content of their psychotic beliefs. They described fear for their lives as their 
beliefs were related to people trying to hurt them. Second, people were afraid of their 
experiences increasing in frequency, intensity and duration, potentially leading to 
acute symptoms. This caused fear, not only because they have no control over the 
trajectory along which their experiences will unfold, but also because it may lead to 
hospitalisation. All the participants in this study spent time in hospital due to 
psychosis, and excepting Amal, all had bad experiences and were dreading the thought 
of having to return. Third, people internalised others’ perceived feelings and reactions 
to their experiences. At times, people chose to hide their experiences from fear of what 
people may think. This secrecy led some people to become isolated. Another reason 
people isolated themselves was related to their fear of doing something that may be 
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harmful and regretful. The possibility of doing something under the influence of 
psychosis and the social consequences that may have were very distressing for people.   
 
8.4 Multiple Realities  
 
People described perceiving multiple realities as a result of their psychosis 
experiences. One reality that is shared with others, and another that is added onto the 
first one by their experiences of psychosis. How others reacted and interpreted 
people’s experiences and their added reality were once again very important to how 
participants made sense of their experiences. This led to participants experiencing an 
ontological dissonance that emerged from the differences between people’s perception 
and how they perceived others’ understanding of their experiences. Once more, the 
imposing and unpredictable nature of psychosis meant that people felt like they were 
not in control of the changes and added realities they were experiencing 
8.4.1 ‘I was conscious that I wasn’t in a different location’: Experiencing 
multiple realities 
 
Participants talked about their experiences of psychosis as being very real to 
them, so much so that they were often intertwined and indistinguishable from the reality 
participants shared with others. People explained that although they can be aware that 
what they are seeing or hearing are not necessarily the reality shared by others, however 
at the precise moment, it is overwhelmingly real, which can occasionally lead them to 
act upon that reality.  
 
James explained that when experiencing a visual hallucination, he knows that 
the location he perceives himself to be in is not where he physically is – for example, 
‘a 300-year-old living room’ (16-17) when he knows he is in hospital. He feels as if he 
is ‘moving to a different location’ (12) and is ‘actually seeing something there’ (13). 
There is a strong focus on movement in the way James describes these experiences; ‘I 
would feel differently inside […] like something inside was moving’ (61-62). He 
associates this to the loss of one of his senses; ‘my vision came back again’ (18). These 
quotes emphasise an understanding where he is attaching his experiences to his 
physicality. This may be an attempt to ground his experiences in something more 
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concrete and tangible, rather than relying on his beliefs and perceptions. In a similar 
attempt, Craig used a more extreme outlet; he hit his head on the wall: ‘to knock 
thoughts out of my head’ (466). This draws a clear connection between the physical 
and the mental where he is inflicting physical pain in an attempt to force unwanted 
thoughts away. Both James and Craig show clear efforts to make sense of their 
experiences through the tangible body. It seems as they use the body as a vehicle to 
make sense of multiple ontologies. The spatial dissociation James experienced is what 
led him to seek support:  
 
Because I was conscious that I wasn’t in a different location. But when I perceived 
reality, it looked like a different location. Even in my book I would call that psychotic 
symptom. I present myself to the psychiatrist and asked for tablets. (James, 31-36) 
 
This is a good example of the discontinuity and imposed distraction brought 
onto James’ life by psychosis. It is clear that James is not only aware that his 
experiences do not match normative reality, he is also very distressed by this. By saying 
‘even in my book’ he shows an awareness of differences in perceptions when it comes 
to his experiences and acknowledges that his experiences deviate from others’ 
experiences and expected social norms. Although James explains knowing that his 
experiences were a result of psychosis, he describes being perplexed by their strength:  
 
It’s still puzzling what was happening there [pause]. I mean [pause], I do understand 
that is psychosis. A kinda break with reality as you might call it, define it. That’s what 
was happening basically – [mumbles] nobody else could… (James, 22-26)  
 
And later…. 
 
I was aware that what I was seeing wasn’t there, but it just looked so real sometimes. 
(James, 91-92) 
 
He grounds his understanding of psychosis as a ‘break with reality’ (24). He also says 
‘as you might call it’ (24) this begs the question as whether that is how he feels about 
his experiences or that this is how other people defined it to him. Although he knew 
his perceptions were not real, this was not enough to disregard the strength of his beliefs 
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as he describes being ‘puzzled’ (22). This further highlights his perception of there 
being multiple realities. The image of reality provided by psychosis is portrayed to be 
stronger yet intertwined with normative reality, leading people to experience what can 
be termed an ontological dissonance. The strength of these experiences and their 
ascendancy over people’s own perceptions is eloquently described by Phillip:  
 
Well, psychosis is a very frightening experience because uh what you actually see is 
what you believe that you are seeing. So it’s as if so everything, it’s not like taking any 
other med... any other illegal drugs or anything like that because your brain is aware 
of the fact that you are seeing something that you know that you’re actually in an 
altered state of mind. So, it’s similar to that, except, you are actually seeing what you 
are seeing and because you are seeing what you’re seeing you’ll act upon it. Quite 
naturally. (Phillip, 12-19) 
 
In the above extract, Phillip compares experiencing psychosis to being on 
drugs. This comparison is based on the level of awareness, where with drugs the 
person’s perceptions are altered, he explains that this is also the case in psychosis 
however, without the drugs, a safety barrier is lifted and there is not a tangible 
explanation for his experiences, which renders them more difficult to dismiss. So there 
is an added reality that participants don’t have any justification or explanation for. He 
finds this very frightening, and ‘unpleasant’ (114). Unlike drugs, he has no way of 
knowing when the effects of psychosis will dissipate, this is likely to heighten and 
perpetuate people’s perceived lack of control over their experiences. Later in the 
interview, Phillip talks again about his perceived ontological dissonance and reiterates 
the strength of his beliefs despite this awareness; ‘So, you are thinking well uh this 
can’t be right, this can’t be right, but then you are acting on what you are visually seeing 
[yeah] so that is very distressing’ (Phillip. 126-127). 
 
His awareness of experiencing multiple realities is expressed by his physical 
senses that push him to act upon his visions instead of his beliefs. He explains these 
differences in perception and the strength of the reality brought on by psychosis, 
combined with an inability to act upon them, as being very distressing.  Interestingly, 
throughout both extracts, Phillip only used the pronoun ‘you’ (e.g. ‘you are seeing’) 
when explaining his experiences; the use of an objective pronoun can suggest an effort 
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to distance himself, and this may also be a way of normalising and generalising his 
perceptions of multiple realities when experiencing psychosis. 
 
In addition to the strength with which participants perceive reality brought on 
by psychosis, people also describe a level of fluidity associated to their perceived 
multiple realities. This is clear in Phillip’s comparison of psychosis and drugs where 
there is a continuity between a lucid and an ‘altered state of mind’ (17) that is induce 
beyond his control. Amal also focuses on the overwhelming reality of her experiences 
and the merger between these experiences and the normative reality:  
 
It is very real. The first thing is there's a time when you know that you are in reality 
and there's a time when, I have seen before going into psychosis each time there was a 
period where I was lost and I'm standing, I'm not concentrating in the present. But it's 
very real, I could see people, I could believe, I could hear those voices and it's like a 
movie what thought and for my psychosis my own logic, simple logic was exaggerated. 
(Amal, 4-10) 
 
And later… 
 
I think is there is always a truth platform; the things are real but they're more 
exaggerated in the psychosis and you become a part of that. (Amal, 12-14) 
 
She reflects on the signs that emerge when she is drifting into a psychosis 
episode. Amal talks about her experiences as continuous from reality, as a more 
exaggerated version of her everyday life. She also uses the word ‘surreal’ (93) to 
emphasise an addition onto normative reality; a mixture of reality and fantasy. She 
provides a good example of the fluidity between non-psychosis (or ‘normal’) and 
psychosis states; one aspect of her psychosis experiences was a belief that her son had 
turned into a bird. Shortly after a psychotic episode, her son came to see her, and she 
recalled the event saying: ‘he was not a bird anymore’ (32). The use of the word 
‘anymore’ in that context suggests that she believed that her son had turned into a bird 
but was again human, which further attests to a sense of continuity and fluidity between 
perceived multiple realities.    
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8.4.2 ‘The second side of it is the clinical side’: Exploring external perceptions of 
one’s realities  
 
All participants that talked about questioning the legitimacy of their 
experiences also talked about external perceptions of their reality. Participants 
described a perceived ontological dissonance in relation to how their experiences are 
perceived by others. People explain that, not only are they trying to make sense of 
what is happening to them, but they are also trying to incorporate and deal with 
external reactions and interpretations to their experiences.  
 
For Jonathan, sharing his experiences with the mental health team and his 
friends and family meant that alongside the help they provide, this also added 
challenges as people were contesting his individual ontology and therefore his 
ontological security. This put him in a position where he needed to weight his 
perceptions and deal with them in relation to how others perceive what reality should 
be:  
Even now, that leaves me really perplexed because; do you go with gut instinct, your 
eyes in terms of what you can see? Or do you go with family members that go: “oh 
there's nothing there!” Or like every IHTT member that is like ‘what are you seeing? 
and ‘where is it?’, ‘Can you point it out to me?’, and then clarify that there is nothing 
there. That over a period of time gets very frustrating because not only you're trying 
to deal with this in the best way that you can, there is almost a sense that what you 
are experiencing is instantly dismissed. (Jonathan, 391-398) 
 
Jonathan is confused by others’ expectations of him. He explains that people 
disregard his perceptions on the grounds that they do not perceive them. However, 
Jonathan struggles with the understanding that reality is dependent on external 
acceptance. Jonathan is angry about people’s questioning of his beliefs and 
experiences. His distress results from having to justify this dissonance:   
 
One that I get bemused by constantly is, I get questioned about my beliefs and why I 
think things but how I see the world and how I'm responding to the world is no different 
to someone who follows a religion and I find that really fascinating. (Jonathan, 878-
881) 
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Luke also explains the dissonance between his beliefs and other people’s beliefs 
and expectations. He describes being in a position where he had to defend his beliefs 
and prove them to others:  
 
I still believe the distress comes from some kind of difference of, belief in philosophy 
between me and any number of other people out there. I sit there hearing a voice in my 
head saying ‘prove it, prove it, prove it’ from certain people and it is just like trying to 
prove there is a God, trying to prove that this strange thing is real that there is 
something to it you know. And it just, if that works on me causes me quite a bit of 
distress and you know, I sit here and I think: it’s either real and people aren’t expressing 
themselves the way they should or it’s all made up in my mind, just I have created a 
whole strange world for me to occupy because I can’t cope with work.  (Luke, 233-
244) 
 
Luke explains the source of his distress associated to psychosis to be caused by 
differences in perceptions. He is aware that his perception of the world is different to 
other people’s; therefore, he feels the need to justify and ‘prove’ his beliefs. By 
comparing people’s expectations from him as having to prove there is a God, Luke 
alludes to the impossibility of the task at hand. He needs to justify the existence of 
something omniscient; his beliefs and the reality he perceives. Both of which are not 
tangible to others. Further, Luke seems aware of this ontological dissociation. This is 
evident when he later says about his experiences: ‘either may be real or may not be 
real, but I am taking them as real and I am going to go for it’ (700-701). He is aware 
of the different hermeneutic possibilities and choses to believe them despite his 
awareness of them being ‘all made up’ (243) in his mind. This may be his way of 
coping with his experiences as his choice of accepting his beliefs allows him to resist 
the psychiatric gaze, thus undermining others’ perception that his beliefs are 
dysfunctional.  
 
Jonathan and Luke’s hermeneutics of the self and ontological beliefs allow them 
to resist others’ interpretations of their experiences. They both challenge the idea that 
they need to justify and prove the legitimacy of their perceived reality because it does 
not fit into societal expectations and wider understandings of reality.  
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For both Luke and Jonathan, as well as other participants, their distress emerges 
from the strings attached to their diagnoses. Because they are seen as having psychosis, 
their beliefs are discarded by others. Jonathan clearly states his disagreement in the 
following extract:  
 
So I kind of from my standpoint, from where I'm sitting, I don't suffer from 
schizophrenia because what is there is there and that is my experience and my 
understanding of that and someone else saying that that's not there; it's quite a strange 
thing to even wrestle with. (Jonathan, 367-372) 
 
Here, Jonathan shows that he is making sense of dissonant ontologies in a way 
that allows him to resist his diagnosis. Both Jonathan and Luke’s understandings and 
ways of dealing with their experiences highlight the importance of, not only 
investigating and understanding people’s beliefs and perceptions, but also the role 
others play in people’s understanding and acceptance of their psychosis experiences. 
This dissonance between their beliefs and others’ expectations seem to be what creates 
distress. Phillip talks about how he considers his behaviours in the eyes of others: 
 
Also um, the fact that you know that your behaviour is odd or you perceiving that 
your behaviour is odd and other people are going to see your behaviour is odd. But 
actually they don’t necessarily see that at all [right]. Because it’s only your 
perception. Because its only your own perception, your perception of what distress 
is which you hide from other people that you feel, not other people, unless you do 
something to act - physically or verbally do something to actually cause that. So you 
could be very distressed but other people not distressed at all. But you feel that other 
people are distressed at your behaviour. (Phillip, 126-137) 
 
Phillip explains feeling distressed in relation to how others perceive his 
experiences and his behaviour. While he is aware that others may not even notice what 
he is going through, the possibility that people may actually see what is going on is 
very important to him. Participants suggest that their diagnosis assumes the dismissal 
of their beliefs. This in turn pushes them to cling to their reality while also being aware 
of the existence of a normative reality. The presence of this dissonance brought on by 
the involvement of others seems to create and maintain the distress they relate to their 
experience of psychosis.  
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Unlike the other participants that talked about reality, Amal finds solace in 
mental health professionals’ perspective in understanding her experiences. This is 
illustrated by the following extract; ‘When someone tells me that's not real you are in 
psychosis, I am relieved ok mine was very negative, very traumatic, very horrible so 
it's not a pleasant thing’ (Amal, 28-30). And later: 
 
That's the point, once I'm in a hospital I recovered like this [Amal, snaps fingers] [M: 
all of the time?] all of the time. Second time there was no medicine, just in the hospital, 
just in an environment which people live in care you, you just go and eat breakfast, 
someone cooks for you, you go and eat lunch and you can have tea coffee in a very 
healing environment and second time there was no medicine and I recovered. But 
people who understand you, people who listens to you, or a company maybe. (Amal, 
277-284) 
 
Amal finds her psychosis to be profoundly disturbing and traumatic so when 
experts tell her that her beliefs are not real, she embraces this with great relief. She 
describes the hospital to be a safe space and finds people to be caring and 
understanding, which seems to be sufficient for her to leave her unusual beliefs 
behind. This is an uncommon approach as other participants repeatedly mentioned 
negative experiences about their time in hospital. This may differentiate people who 
are distressed by the perceived ontological dissonance brought on by psychosis and 
people, like Amal, that seem to be distressed by aspects of their experiences of 
psychosis independent from others’ interpretations.  
 
To summarise, in this theme, people describe experiencing multiple realities. It 
appears that people’s experiences are more similar to a continuity amongst these 
realities. Further, they experience an ontological dissonance where the reality 
experienced during psychosis does not coincide with the perceived normative reality. 
Another interesting aspect that came out of the first subtheme is that people stated a 
clear awareness of their multiple realities. This was however not enough to discard 
their content, as psychosis experiences were too strong to dismiss. People’s experiences 
of reality were also put to the test by both their loved ones and mental health 
professionals. For people who maintain multiple realities, a diagnosis can in itself 
crease dissonance, as people are then expected to justify and attest to the validity of 
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their ontology and are subsequently dismissed because they do not fit with normative 
expectations. External perceptions of people’s realities can therefore be a source of 
distress for participants. On the other hand, it can be suggested from Amal’s experience 
that some people may feel distress associated with the perceived multiple realities 
independently of others’ perceptions and benefit from others perspectives to resolve 
this multiplicity.  
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8.5 Study 2 Discussion 
8.5.1 Introduction  
 
This study set out to investigate people’s appraisals of their experiences of 
psychosis in relation to the distress they experience. Following an in depth analysis of 
the transcripts, four themes emerged from the data. These are; lacking control, change, 
living in fear, and multiple realities. They are inherently and deeply intertwined and 
they all influence each other. The nuance and variations observed amongst participants 
and within the themes further illustrate the variability and multidimensionality of 
experiences and beliefs that can lead to distress related to psychosis experiences.  
 
Quantitative inquiries found that people’s understandings of their experiences 
are not associated with the content of their experiences, but the beliefs people hold 
about them (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994, 1997; Chin et al., 2009). Indeed, when 
asked about their experiences of psychosis, participants of this study focused on their 
beliefs and appraisals of their psychosis experiences rather than specific symptoms. 
The clinical research literature on psychosis seems to be taking a different direction by 
using a single symptom approach to investigate distress (Davies, Griffin & Vice, 2001; 
Vaughan & Fowler, 2004; Startup, Freeman & Garety, 2007; van Os et al., 2000). This 
approach can be helpful in gaining a better understanding of individual differences and 
specific experiences of psychosis.  It is also helpful to move away from the diagnostic 
approach which is widely criticised on its validity and reliability (Cuthbert & Insel, 
2010; Read, 2004). However, focusing on specific symptoms may cloud understanding 
of people’s appraisals of their psychosis experiences. The experiential findings that 
emerged from this study suggest that appraisals of psychosis need to be understood in 
terms of the overall experience; including meaning making, being diagnosed with and 
being treated for psychosis. The findings of this study also suggest that appraisals are 
closely related to external perceptions of people’s experiences as well, thus people’s 
networks are important in dealing with distress related to psychosis experiences. In 
order to reduce distress related to psychosis experience, the attention in treatment 
should be given to the negative appraisals people hold of their psychosis experience.  
 
The current study provides a nuanced and holistic representation of people’s 
appraisals of their psychosis experiences. The four constructs that emerged from 
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analysis overlap with each other to constitute people’s experiences of psychosis. They 
have been presented in themes as a function of analysis, thus making sense of them in 
isolation from one another should be done cautiously. Control is presented first as it 
influences all the other appraisals. Participants’ negative experiences are made worse 
by their perceived lack of control. It is therefore key to tackle perceived control to 
reduce distress related to psychosis experiences. Next, change and the re-negotiation 
of personal and social identity is presented because of its fundamental and existential 
impact on people’s functioning. Fear is presented third as it is heightened by 
components of both change and perceived lack of control. The multiple realities theme 
is presented last as it explores a fundamental aspect of psychosis experiences, thus 
rounding up the analysis.  
 
Appraisals identified in this study were all composed of two dimensions; one 
internal and one external. The internal dimension relates to how people appraise and 
deal with their experiences, while the external dimension relates to the interpersonal 
aspects of people’s appraisals. The inter-personal interactions people described 
highlight the role of external input and influences on individuals’ understanding and 
dealing with their experiences. Depending on the nature of the interactions people 
engage in, the perceptions and reactions others have may lead to negative emotional 
experiences and further heighten distress (Chadwick, 2006). The data generated 
represents the impressions, perceptions and understandings participants had of their 
interactions. No assumptions can be made about other people’s thoughts and 
perceptions.  
 
 The themes presented in this chapter are supported by and reflect on concepts 
that have previously been explored in psychosis research. This suggests that these are 
common difficulties people experience in relation to psychosis. The findings of the 
current study expand on previous quantitative research, using the AANEX interview, 
focusing on people’s appraisals of psychosis experiences (Brett et al., 2007, 2014; 
Lovatt et al., 2010; Underwood et al., 2016). To construct the AANEX interview, Brett 
and colleagues (2007) identified appraisals of psychosis experiences in line with the 
cognitive models of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001, 2007; Morrison, 2001). They found 
that higher distress related to appraising psychosis experiences as uncontrollable (Brett 
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et al., 2007, 2014), indeed the role of control and people’s lack of control is expanded 
extensively in this study. Moreover, they found that clinical groups were more likely 
to appraise their experiences to be caused by ‘other people’ (Brett et al., 2007). This 
was not directly corroborated by the findings of this study, however, participants did 
discuss how they perceived psychosis in relation to the self, and the role others play in 
their understanding. Similarly, externalising and personalising appraisals were also 
related to an increased need-for-care (Brett et al., 2014); both of which can be 
associated with people’s accounts of psychosis in relation to the self. Lastly, Lovatt 
and colleagues (2010) found that people who sought help for their psychosis 
experiences had less psychological/normalising appraisals (Lovatt et al., 2010). This is 
expanded in the current study as all themes had an external component, where 
participants discussed their understanding of others’ perceptions and reactions to their 
experiences.   
 
 There were clear parallels between the findings of this study and other qualitative 
work exploring lack of control (Holt & Tickle, 2016; Tully, Wells, & Morrison, 2017), 
losing one’s sense of self (Charmaz, 1983; Mawson, Berry, Murray, & Hayward, 2011; 
Waite, Knight, & Lee, 2015), fear (Campbell & Morrison, 2007), and perceptions of 
reality (Tully, Wells & Morrison, 2017). This analysis, although anchored to these 
themes both supports and extends this previous work. The results further illustrate the 
importance of people’s beliefs, perceptions and understandings of their experiences of 
psychosis and the maintenance of emotional experiences attached to them. This is 
important as negative appraisals are likely to lead to and contribute to the maintenance 
of distress related to psychosis experiences. Details of each theme will be discussed in 
relation to the wider literature, including quantitative literature on appraisals about 
psychosis experiences, in the following sections.  
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8.5.2 Control  
 
Participants described feeling like they were no longer in control of their lives 
following the onset of psychosis. This lack of control was exacerbated by the 
unanticipated occurrence and unpredictable trajectory of psychosis. As a result, people 
described feeling both trapped and hopeless. Both defeat and entrapment are related to 
a perception of loss without escape or potential for improvement and therefore can 
lead to hopelessness (Gilbert & Allan, 1998; Karatzias et al., 2007). In the literature, 
hopelessness appears to be related to personal beliefs about illness, even when 
depression is controlled for (Rooke & Birchwood, 1998; White, McCleery, Gumley & 
Mulholland, 2007). If people feel unable to control their experiences then, they cannot 
influence their consequences. Thus, people’s perceived lack of control in relation to 
their psychosis experiences are likely to have negative consequences on how people 
feel and can lead to negative outcomes. 
 
The literature emphasizes the important role of control in relation to acceptance 
and distress. In a qualitative study with people experiencing psychosis, Tully and 
colleagues (2017) identified that there are different levels of control, ranging from not 
being in control at all to accepting that some things cannot be controlled. Further, they 
suggested that lacking control can contribute to the maintenance of distress related to 
psychosis experiences. In the current study, participants consistently reported that they 
had no control over their experiences, and suggested that psychosis was controlling 
their thoughts, emotions and behaviours. Participants often sought support from 
medical professionals, with the belief that medication can help make their experiences 
go away. This is somewhat paradoxical in that they seem to trade one loss of control 
for another. They trade a lack of control caused by psychosis itself for a diminished 
control that results from medication. This begs the question as to what is the object of 
control and whether all efforts should focus on making psychosis go away regardless 
of its cost to the person’s sense of agency.  
 
Participants of this study also described psychosis in relation to their self; the 
majority of participants in this study perceived psychosis to be internal, yet separate 
and different from their minds and their self. This separation might represent a way 
people manage or perpetuate their perceived lack of control. Indeed, if psychosis is 
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separate to the person’s self and their mind then they cannot control it. If they cannot 
control their experiences, then they are not fully responsible for the consequences of 
their behaviours related to psychosis. This is also likely to be an important factor for 
their help seeking behaviours, where mental health professionals and medication are 
as likely to have a grasp on their experiences as they are. People’s perceived lack of 
control is the overarching theme as it relates to all the other themes that emerged from 
this study. 
 
Contrastingly, Boumans and colleagues (2016) proposed that their non-clinical 
sample found it was more important to develop a sense of agency than to eliminate 
psychotic-experiences themselves. In turn, if people hold normalising and spiritual 
beliefs about their experiences, they may not seek help from medical professionals 
(Brett et al., 2007; Lovatt et al., 2010). People with a need for care may be more likely 
to have developed a medicalised understanding of their experiences and seek medical 
support to deal with their experiences rather than the distress attached to them 
(Boumans et al., 2016; Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012). Which can contribute to the 
maintenance of distress associated with people’s psychosis experiences as they do not 
think they can contribute to changing or controlling them. The literature relating to 
people’s locus of control and sense of agency are further discussed in line with the 
study findings in the overall discussion (Chapter 9).  
 
8.5.3 Change in identity 
 
Psychosis prompted changes in how people defined themselves, their personal 
and social identity underwent unexpected and unwanted changes as a consequence of 
psychosis experiences. Participants articulated a sense of need to re-negotiate their 
personal and social identity. The extant self-felt alien to the self they always knew, 
which they had somehow lost to psychosis. Previous qualitative research has found 
that psychosis can lead to a ‘catastrophic disruption’ of peoples’ lives (Barker, 
Lavender & Morant, 2001, p. 203). This was also the case in the current study, 
participants who were studying had to give up university and the ones working had to 
give up their jobs without knowing when they will resume them or whether they will 
be able to resume them at all. The experience of this disruption and loss was often an 
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emotional one, in which the unknown and uncertain nature of psychosis made it 
difficult for people to adjust to and move beyond their loss. The duration of this 
psychosis imposed self and new life course was undetermined, and they expressed 
awareness that it may entirely replace those revered pasts and possible futures. 
Therefore, in some cases, people went through a period of mourning their old self. The 
duration of this psychosis imposed self and new life course was undetermined, and 
they expressed awareness that it may entirely replace those revered pasts and possible 
futures. 
 
How people perceive the self, others and the world is key to understanding the 
development and maintenance of psychosis experiences (Holt & Tickle, 2015). 
People’s meaning making processes and their perception of their self are bound to 
interpersonal relationships (Mawson et al., 2011). External perceptions of one’s mental 
illness can alter one’s social identity and their social status. People’s interaction with 
mental health services early on and the nature of the information they receive is central 
to their meaning making and emotional experience. Participants described all their 
experiences being scrutinized by family and mental health services. They explained 
feeling that they were dismissed by mental health services, and that their stories were 
unheard. Once someone is perceived to have lost ‘reason’, their credibility is 
undermined (Garfinkel, 1956). In the literature, internalising negative emotional 
experiences following pathologising inter-personal interactions was a key difference 
observed between clinical and non-clinical groups (Boumans et al., 2016; Heriot-
Maitland et al., 2012). Heriot-Maitland and colleagues (2012) compared others’ 
appraisals of psychosis experiences in clinical and non-clinical groups, and found that 
people who weren’t diagnosed with psychosis were more likely to have interacted with 
people in contexts where their experiences weren’t discussed as an illness.  Their 
experiences were normalised as something spiritual or religious (Heriot-Maitland et 
al., 2012). Interestingly, in the current study, when the participants’ networks and 
mental health services were described as supportive, they were more positive and 
accepting of the changes and the transitions psychosis prompted in their lives. The 
present study’s findings and the literature, both emphasise the importance of others on 
people’s understanding and acceptance of their psychosis experiences. Feeling 
unheard, dismissed and people’s experiences pathologised are thus likely to increase 
the distress people feel in relation to their experiences of psychosis. 
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These consequences for identity extend beyond the present and permeate 
possible futures. Participants were often told that they will not be able to go back to 
work. Beyond its obvious immediate detrimental potential, this is problematic as 
research suggests that unemployment can cause further practical, social and emotional 
difficulties (Boydell, Stasiulis, Volpe & Gladstone, 2010; Romano, McCay, Goering, 
Boydell & Zipursky, 2010; Thornicroft, 2007). For some participants, representations 
of being unable to work relegated to feeling restricted and living a ‘non-life’ (Patrick, 
654). Therefore it is very important for people’s both personal and social identity to 
regain a level of social involvement and activity.  
 
Consequently, and in order to bypass and avoid these imposed restrictions on 
their social identity participants described engaging in secrecy, social withdrawal and 
isolation. Indeed, some participants described disclosing all mental health difficulties 
but chose not to disclose visions. While they didn’t state it explicitly, this suggests that 
while mental health difficulties are stigmatised in themselves, hearing voices has 
added stigma attached to it (Angermeyer, Buyantugs, Kenzine & Matschinger, 2004). 
For instance, Phillip did not disclose that he had visions for years, this led to a number 
of wrong diagnoses. He preferred to keep this to himself even though he was already 
in contact with mental health services and was being treated for a number of 
difficulties. This may relate to an anticipation of the social costs of their experiences 
and the diagnostic label attached to them.  
 
Cognitive models of psychosis, especially Morrison’s (2001) model, consider 
‘cultural unacceptability’ as a defining feature of psychosis experiences. People’s 
experiences being outside of the normative expectations, and thus being treated as such 
is an important factor in their distress. Participants in this study questioned why certain 
beliefs (e.g. believing that God exists) do not require justification, whilst other beliefs 
lead to a mental health diagnosis. This puts people in a position of having to justify 
themselves and prove their beliefs to others. For some participants, the cultural 
acceptability of others’ beliefs in comparison with their own produced tension, and led 
them to resist their diagnostic label. They challenged the idea that believing in talking 
to a god was any less pathological or any more normal than the beliefs they held. These 
subtle forms of resistance may have positive effects. This resistance can be understood 
as an effort aimed at reducing the distress that emerges from the labelling process and 
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its consequences. In relation to people’s perceived lack of control, this is an important 
step towards and an attempt at regaining agency over ones’ experiences, their beliefs 
and their lives.  
  
It is suggested in the literature that acceptance is key to the resolution of 
difficulties with identity, and relatedly with rebuilding a sense of self is key to recovery 
(Bonney & Stickley, 2008; Noiseux et al., 2010; Romano et al., 2010). It can be argued 
that, for some people, having to re-negotiate a self and a life is likely to be distressing. 
Therefore, acceptance of such changes may reduce distress, facilitate engaging in self-
compassion (Scheunemann et al., 2018; Waite et al., 2015) and lead to personal growth 
and recovery. The only participant that described this change of identity to be positive 
was no longer in contact with mental health services and had returned to work. He 
described a sense of personal growth following his experiences, stating that he is more 
appreciative of his life as a result of his experiences (also described in Mapplebeck, 
Joseph & Sabin-Farrell, 2015). It would be beneficial to focus on people’s 
understanding of their experiences in relation to their personal and social identity in 
order to reduce the distress associated with psychosis experiences.  
 
8.5.4 Living in fear 
 
People reported fears related to the content of their symptoms, an increase of 
their symptoms which may lead to hospitalisation, and a fear of others’ perceptions of 
their behaviours. Even though the themes that emerged from this research are 
intertwined, the only time participants clearly mentioned specific symptoms of 
psychosis was when they described the fear specific beliefs caused them. This fear is 
a product of how vivid people’s experiences are and how strong their convictions about 
them can be (Morrison, 2001).  In the current study, participants that described 
persecutory delusions feared for their life. Indeed, Morrison and Wells (2003) 
suggested that strong beliefs people hold about the danger of their thoughts can be 
source of distress when these beliefs are very strong. Moreover, in line with the 
findings of this study, it can be stated that people’s fear was exacerbated by the 
unpredictable nature of psychosis and people’s perceived lack of control over their 
experiences.  
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Participants also reported fear about the potentiality of their episodes 
increasing in frequency, intensity and duration. An increase in either of these could 
lead people to lose control completely and possibly lead to hospitalisation. All 
participants had been in hospital, and all (except one, Amal) had negative experiences 
while hospitalised. Therefore, beyond the experiential content of psychosis itself, 
people also felt fearful about the possibility of returning to hospital. Previous literature 
highlighted the way in which the process of hospital admission after the onset of 
psychosis can be shocking and therefore is likely to induce distress (Tan et al., 2014). 
Thus, people were determined to not let it happen, which is likely to contribute to the 
stress and worry they experience.  
 
How others would perceive and interprete people’s behaviours was also a 
source of fear for participants. The potential consequences their actions may have on 
other people when under the control of psychosis was something participants found 
distressing: the possibility of doing something they would regret; potentially hurting 
someone or engaging in behaviours they then would be unable to explain. One 
participant explained that psychosis could induce fear in others around the individual 
as well as the participants themselves. It was this concern, rather than a concern for 
their own health and well-being, that motivated some participants to comply with their 
medication regime. The wellbeing of others took primacy, and medication was felt to 
reduce the idea that ‘anything could have happened’ (Luke, 86). Therefore, the 
external dimension of distress in the context of this theme is a double edged sword. 
Participants experience distress not only as a result their worries about other’s 
perceptions of them (and their beliefs and behaviours), but they also fear scaring the 
people around them or causing them harm. One strategy participants deployed to 
manage this worry was self-isolation. In some cases, participants also isolated 
themselves because they felt shameful about their psychosis.  
 
8.5.5 Multiple realities  
 
It is suggested that a key characteristic of psychosis is that people experience 
a break from reality. This implies that people lose touch with the accepted reality 
shared by other people. If people were unaware that their perceived reality is a result 
of their psychosis experience, then they are unlikely to be aware of their illness or 
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symptoms. As a result, it is suggested that people experiencing psychosis lack insight. 
Dimensions of insight typically include awareness of illness, awareness of symptoms 
and recognition of a need for treatment (David, 1990). Poor insight can be construed 
as a symptom in itself or as a manifestation of the disorder (Cuesta & Peralta, 1994). 
However, another conceptualisation is that poor insight can represent an individual’s 
response to their diagnosis (Cooke, 2014). Research suggests that insight in psychosis 
is not independent from psychopathology, course or outcome (Jacob, 2017).  A key 
component of and frequent example for poor insight relates to people’s lack of 
awareness about the reality they experiences. However, participants in the current 
study made it clear that they were aware of the added reality brought on by psychosis, 
however they did not have the means to disregard it.  
 
Strand and colleagues (2015) briefly mentioned that some of their participants 
showcased awareness of their ‘symptoms being symptoms’ (p. 113). This is also the 
case in the current study and it is not aligned with the general understanding that people 
experiencing psychosis lack insight into their symptoms. Rather than ‘a break from 
reality’, the participants in the current study described experiencing multiple realities. 
People explained that their delusional beliefs and hallucinations were an addition to 
the reality shared with others, rather than something separate. Despite an awareness of 
the incompatibility of their experiences with the reality they shared with others, some 
participants described being unable to set aside their beliefs.  Rather than producing a 
‘break’, participants experienced these beliefs in addition to or alongside the 
experiential reality shared with others. This seems to produce a perceived ontological 
dissonance, where participants simultaneously experience multiple realities which are 
at odds with one another. For some participants of this study, what is distressing is not 
the added reality in itself, but their awareness of this ontological dissonance; 
highlighting the incompatibility of these multiple realities. The participants were 
aware that the reality added by psychosis is not shared by others, but felt unable to 
control or dismiss it. This inability to dismiss their added reality and focus on the one 
they felt was accepted by others heightened their experience of distress.  
 
A further emotional feature of the experience of multiple realities was how, as 
a result of their inability to control these experiences, people inadvertently acted upon 
them. Participants talked about their fear of acting upon their beliefs and worries about 
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how these actions could affect people around them. They had to navigate the reality 
brought on by psychosis to fit the normative reality shared by others in order to avoid 
unwanted consequences. On other occasions, these beliefs led them to come in contact 
with mental health services and at times be sectioned. When people came in contact 
with mental health services, they explained that their reality and beliefs were 
interpreted, and at times judged, by their mental health teams which added another 
layer of complexity to the process of sense making. This led to ontological dissonance 
between people’s individual beliefs and the beliefs asserted by others. This itself was 
an added source of distress. This is closely related to people’s perceived lack of control 
and the external component to their experiences and how they see others perceiving 
them. 
 
This theme builds on the literature concerned with psychosis experiences by 
highlighting that to reduce the experience of psychosis to a ‘break with reality’ is an 
oversimplification. On the contrary, these participants were not dismissive of the 
reality shared by others, but instead described experiencing an additional one. They 
experienced ontological dissonance in the process of trying to determine and not act 
on the reality they perceived to be the wrong one. Therefore, far from being a break 
from reality, in the case of these participants at least, they attempted to carefully 
navigate multiple realities, hoping to stay within the boundaries of that which they are 
often characterised as ‘breaking’ from. It is therefore important to work with people’s 
beliefs and understandings of their experiences and the appraisals they make of them 
instead of dismissing them (Peters, Williams, Cooke & Kuipers, 2012).  
 
It is worth noting that the experiences participants refer to are in the past and 
their accounts retrospective, thus they may be reflecting on these experiences more 
clearly than when they are experiencing it. Furthermore, it is possible that because this 
sample was constituted by a majority of people who have experienced psychosis and 
been in contact with services for a long time, they may have developed a more 
insightful and reflexive understanding of their experiences.   
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8.5.6 Limitations of the study 
  
This study had some limitations. Firstly, this analysis presents a small 
collection of perceptions of experiences of a humble sample of participants, and it 
needs to be remembered that the findings are specific to this group of people. However, 
there are similarities between the conclusions of this study and others which have 
investigated psychosis experiences (e.g. Tully et al., 2017), and therefore they should 
not be disregarded as anomalous. Second, the majority of the participants were 
recruited from community mental health settings and two of them were seeing a 
clinical psychologist at the time of interview. As a result, it is possible that they may 
be more aware of their experiences than people experiencing psychosis who are not in 
regular contact with community mental health services. Furthermore, nine out of the 
ten participants were using antipsychotic medication at the time of the interviews. It is 
thus likely that their feelings associated to some of their experiences may be 
blunted (Kirkpatrick, 2014).  
  
8.5.7 Future research 
 
This chapter will conclude with considerations for further research. Future 
research should include longitudinal studies to look at people’s appraisals of their 
psychosis experiences at different times, as they may vary at different stages of 
people’s experience. Similarly, recruiting people who are at risk for psychosis and with 
first episode psychosis experiences can be helpful in determining the variations in 
people’s appraisals of their psychosis experiences. Moreover, it may be beneficial to 
investigate distress related to specific symptoms of psychosis (e.g. hallucinations and 
delusions). This would allow for the differentiation between experiences, identify 
those which are most troubling, thus allowing for more targeted approaches to 
recovery. However, the themes that emerged from this study were predominantly 
related to overall experiences of psychosis rather than specific symptoms, thus 
appraisals are likely to be holistic encompassing multiple symptoms. Next, future 
research could focus more explicitly on identifying ways in which people’s sense of 
control could be augmented. This would assist people with adapting to changes in both 
personal and social identity, help manage fears, and promote the development of tools 
for managing multiple realities. In relation to the external factors identified in the 
 
 
200 
themes emerging from this study, a comparative study including multiple stakeholders 
investigating mental health professionals’ and carers’ perceptions of service users’ 
appraisals of their psychosis experiences should be conducted in the future.  
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Chapter 9: Integration of the Quantitative and Qualitative Findings and Overall 
Discussion  
 
This chapter sets out to integrate the quantitative and qualitative findings 
described in the previous chapters of the thesis, and discuss them in the context of 
wider psychosis literature. By integrating these findings, a conceptual model of 
distress related to psychosis experiences is proposed. This model is intended to 
generate hypotheses that may benefit future empirical investigation. Mixed methods 
research offers the potential to synergise the strength of quantitative and qualitative 
methods, thus providing greater advantages than discrete studies. The full potential of 
mixed methods can only be realised through the integration of the two studies. Before 
integrating the findings however, a summary of both studies’ findings are presented.  
9.1 Summary of Both Studies and their Findings 
 
The following paragraphs will provide a very brief summary of both the 
quantitative and qualitative studies contained in this thesis. This is necessary 
foundational work to set up the primary purpose of this chapter – a synthetic account 
of these findings which draws core results together and provides a more complex and 
detailed picture of distress related to psychosis experiences.  
 
Study 1 identified emotion regulation and metacognitive difficulties that 
contributed to the maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences within an 
attachment framework. After initial associations were established, regression analyses 
were conducted to determine which emotion regulation subscales significantly 
predicted distress related to psychosis experiences (positive, negative and depressive 
symptoms) when the other subscales were controlled for. This was also done for the 
metacognition subscales. Significant predictors were then carried forward onto simple 
mediation models. Insecure attachment dimensions (anxious, avoidant) had an indirect 
effect on distress related to positive symptoms through need for control. These 
findings are novel in that even though need for control had previously been identified 
in relation to distress related to psychosis (Brett et al., 2014), it had not been identified 
as a mediator between insecure attachment dimensions and distress. Anxious 
attachment had an indirect effect on distress related to negative and depressive 
symptoms through limited access to emotion regulation strategies. Insecure 
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attachment dimensions had an indirect effect on distress related to depressive 
symptoms through negative beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts. 
A multiple mediation model was conducted to test whether negative beliefs about 
uncontrollability and danger of thoughts or limited access to emotion regulation 
strategies acted as a mediator when the variance of the other was accounted for. It was 
found that anxious attachment had an indirect effect on distress related to depressive 
symptoms through limited access to emotion regulation strategies and negative beliefs 
about uncontrollability and danger of thoughts did not. Furthermore, limited access to 
emotion regulation strategies was related to distress associated with psychosis 
experiences for the first time. Another interesting finding is that different mechanisms 
mediated the relationship between attachment and distress related to positive and 
negative symptoms. These findings are corroborated with people’s accounts of their 
experiences, suggesting that indeed symptoms are not necessarily central to 
experiences of psychosis and recovery stories (e.g. May, 2000; Pitt et al., 2007). 
 
Study 2 identified a number of dimensions across people’s experiential 
accounts that were important for understanding both the participants’ psychosis 
experiences, and their appraisals of them. A recurrent theme emerging in participants’ 
accounts of their appraisals was a perceived ‘lack of control’ of their lives. The sudden 
and unpredictable nature of psychosis exacerbated this feeling, making it more 
difficult for people to regain control over both their self and their life. This is related 
to another prominent theme that emerged; participants’ perceptions of psychosis in 
relation to their self. Paradoxically, the majority of participants posited that psychosis 
was internal, and yet separate from the self. Although internal to their minds, 
psychosis was sufficiently separate from their sense of self which reinforced people’s 
perceived lack of control. A third theme highlighted participants feeling that there 
were changes imposed on their personal and social identities. Psychosis upset the 
participants’ everyday lives and future aspirations, on which much of their sense of 
identity had been build. As a result, people had to stop working and studying. Often 
they were told that they could not go back to work. Relatedly, participants also 
articulated that they felt ‘dismissed’. Their stories and experiences which they wanted 
people to acknowledge tended to go unheard as mental health professionals often did 
not discuss their experiences with them. Fear also emerged as an important 
component of people’s appraisals of their experiences. 
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Interestingly, few participants feared the content of their experiences. 
However, most participants feared that their psychosis might increase in frequency, 
duration and intensity, thus leading to acute symptoms. That alone did not cause fear. 
On the contrary, it was the consequences of this escalation that provoked a fearful 
response. If this occurred, a hospital admission was likely, which most participants 
feared as a result of previous negative experiences. Another dimension to this fear 
also related to consequences, but not for their own bodies or minds.  The participants 
expressed fear about how they may interact and behave during an episode of 
psychosis. Their fear in relation to this emerged from the prospect that they may cause 
harm to others as a result.  The final theme concerned the participants’ experiencing 
multiple realities rather than an alternative. They explained that the ‘psychosis reality’ 
was added to the reality they shared with others who did not have psychosis, which 
resulted in an ontological dissonance. Equally, other people’s perceptions and 
understandings of participants' realities were important to them, participants 
described feeling dismissed and unheard, in some cases others’ perceptions of their 
experiences were a source of distress. Overall this analysis provides an original and 
detailed account of important dimensions of both people’s appraisals of their 
experience of psychosis, and what matters to them in relation to their experience of 
distress.  
 
Looking at the two studies in parallel can allow further conclusions to be 
drawn. One broad finding that comes out of this project is that rather than psychosis 
itself being a root of distress, distress is the result of a complex amalgam of people’s 
experiences of psychosis and how they appraise them. It is important to acknowledge 
that distress is related to such a range of experiences, rather than specific symptoms. 
Indeed, the qualitative findings highlight important components of people's appraisals 
of their experiences, most of which relate to the consequences of having psychosis in 
their lives rather than the psychosis itself. These appraisals are likely maintained by 
people’s need for control and limited access to emotion regulation strategies, all of 
which contribute to the maintenance of distress related to their experiences. Thus, this 
research argues that both emotion regulation and metacognition difficulties contribute 
to the maintenance of distress within an attachment framework. Therefore, it can be 
argued that specific emotion regulation and metacognition factors can be employed to 
help reduce the distress people feel in relation to their experiences as a whole, instead 
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of focusing on specific symptoms. People’s beliefs about both their lack of and need 
for control are key findings of both the quantitative and qualitative studies. In order to 
make sure that the two studies in this project were integrated as rigorously as possible, 
the literature on mixed methods was studied, and the most appropriate, effective ways 
to integrate data were selected (Bazeley, 2018).  
 
9.2 Integration of the Quantitative and Qualitative Studies  
 
Despite a growing interest in the field of health research, the use of mixed 
methods is somewhat limited in psychology and psychosis research. Furthermore, 
when mixed methods are employed, the integration of various methods and their 
findings is sometimes not well developed or practised. Commonly, researchers may 
fail to provide justifications for, and transparency of their mixed methods design 
(O’Cathain, Murphy & Nicholl, 2007). O’Carthain and colleagues (2007) also 
highlight that qualitative components of mixed methods studies are often inadequately 
described, with inferences disproportionately founded on one method rather than the 
findings as a whole. In response to such criticisms, more rigorous approaches to 
integration are being developed and adopted in order to ensure that data from 
qualitative and quantitative methods are better integrated and draw on the strengths of 
both methods (Guetterman et al., 2015).  
The findings of the quantitative and qualitative studies of this project were 
integrated to be interpreted together using ‘triangulation’ methods. This approach 
allows the researcher to assess concordance and discordance between the studies 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). The integration of findings ought to be achieved at 
both methodological level and interpretive level. At a methodological level, 
integration was developed by connecting the participants of both studies. That is to 
say, the qualitative sample was recruited from the same sample that participated in the 
quantitative study. It is crucial in mixed methods research that prior to integration both 
the quantitative and the qualitative components of the research are well developed 
(Creswell & Tashakkori, 2007). Each part needs to have their own data, analysis and 
inferences. To ensure that, the quantitative and qualitative research was conducted in 
parallel and data were analysed separately and written up independently. This allowed 
focus to remain on the aspects of the two studies that converged and diverged during 
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integration, as well as preventing the independently essential aspects of either study 
being neglected.  
 
In this project, the primary integration effort took place at the interpretation 
phase for which joint displays was adopted. Joint displays provide a visual 
representation of the data and facilitates the process of analysis and interpretation in 
order to generate new inferences (Guetterman et al., 2015). It is an increasingly valued 
approach to integrating qualitative and quantitative findings in mixed methods 
research (Guetterman et al., 2015). The joint display matrix created for this project was 
inspired by the works of Classen and colleagues(2007), Fitzpatrick (2016) and von der 
Lippe (2010). This integration effort involves multiple steps including the exploration 
of ‘fit’, ‘confirmation’, ‘expansion’ and ‘discordance’.  
The full data matrix (see Appendix 27) reports comparisons between and the 
integration of significant findings from the mediation models with the relevant 
qualitative findings of the IPA analysis. The author looked for convergences, 
divergences and discrepancies between findings from the different methods 
(O’Cathain et al., 2007). The ‘fit’ of data integration, defined by Fetters, Curry and 
Creswell (2013) as the coherence of the qualitative and quantitative findings, was 
determined in line with the outcomes. Confirmation occurs when the two data sources 
suggest similar conclusions and one confirms the result of the other. Expansion occurs 
when the findings of the qualitative and quantitative sources diverge, and as a result 
provides greater insight by highlighting differing or complementary aspects of a 
central phenomenon of interest. In contrast then, Discordance is a product of 
inconsistent, incongruent, contradictory, or conflicting findings across the two studies 
(Fetters et al., 2013). 
The data-matrix is constituted of findings from both studies (see Appendix 27). 
The mediation models uncovered that need for control and limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies mediated the relationship between insecure attachment 
dimensions and distress related to psychosis experiences. The quantitative findings 
investigated specific vulnerability factors, therefore, the quantitative findings were 
collocated with qualitative findings. Need for control and limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies were the key components to be integrated with qualitative 
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findings. In addition, ‘interpersonal relationships’ was also included in the joint 
display table. This was done for two reasons; first, attachment theory provides a 
framework for understanding psychosis in the literature (Berry et al., 2007b), and the 
quantitative study where the mediation models were developed to investigate the 
relationship between insecure attachment and distress related to psychosis. The second 
reason is that interpersonal relationships played a key role in people’s experiential 
accounts, evident from the discussion of themes that emerged from the qualitative 
analysis. People talked about their appraisals of their psychosis experiences not only 
by focusing on internal processes but also by talking about external influences and 
interpretations of their experiences – the wider interpersonal context in which their 
experience took place. Overall, ‘need for control’, ‘limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies’ and ‘interpersonal relationship’ were the key findings integrated 
in the joint display matrix.   
 
The following paragraphs will explore the elements of concordance and 
discordance emerging from this exercise. The joint display of the key findings of the 
quantitative and the qualitative studies revealed that ‘limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies’ aligns with ‘lacking control’. A strong sense of not being in 
control ran through the ways people tended to discuss their emotional difficulties. This 
perceived lack of control brought a sense of ‘pessimism’, evident from their accounts. 
Therefore, in addition to integrating quantitative and qualitative findings for 
interpretation, the following discussion also integrates the cognitive and emotional 
experiences people had in relation to psychosis through their perceived lack of control 
and consequences on people’s experiences. By merging the emotional and cognitive 
vulnerability factors, the divide often created in the literature that had also formed in 
the quantitative study was eliminated.  
 
In sum, the following discussion will focus on two components. First, lack of 
control will be discussed and related to both quantitative and qualitative literature. 
Next, the role and importance of interpersonal relationships for people’s appraisals of 
their psychosis experiences and overall acceptance of their experiences will be 
discussed. The findings of this thesis support and expand on the fundamental cognitive 
approaches to psychosis (Bentall et al., 2001; Garety et al., 2001, 2007; Morrison, 
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2001) that deem appraisals, and social context as the key determinant to distress related 
to psychosis experiences. 
 
9.2.1 Control  
 
In the context of this discussion, control has a number of important elements 
that need to be addressed. In doing so, the findings of both studies will also be situated 
in the wider context of the literature to make connections, and draw support from or 
critical attention to its various components. First, people’s perceived loss of control is 
situated in the qualitative study, and its relation to people’s overall experiences is 
illustrated. Second, people’s perceived lack of control is associated with where people 
perceive the ‘locus of control’ (Rotter, 1960) to be, this will be described and related 
to previous literature. Last, when the qualitative findings were investigated in relation 
to the quantitative subscale ‘limited access to emotion regulation strategies’, it was 
uncovered that people’s inability to access emotion regulation strategies related to a 
perceived lack of control.  
 
Previous theoretical research related high levels of distress associated with 
psychosis experiences to worries that psychosis experiences are uncontrollable 
(Birchwood et al., 1993; Freeman & Garety, 1999; Freeman et al., 2002; Hill et al., 
2012). Moreover, Peters and colleagues (2012) identified control appraisals in relation 
to symptom-related distress. The findings of this project provide further empirical 
evidence for the importance of people’s perceived lack of control. Metacognitive 
research found that people experiencing psychosis held negative beliefs about the 
uncontrollability and danger of thoughts at significantly higher levels than non-
psychotic groups (Morrison & Wells, 2003). Arguably, if people find their experiences 
uncontrollable, they will need and seek control. Furthermore, feeling a lack of control 
is more likely to be distressing in itself, particularly if individuals are predisposed to 
expectations of control and consistency (Brett et al., 2014). Other metacognitive 
research also concluded that metacognitive difficulties were associated with distress 
related to psychosis and need-for-care rather than symptoms of psychosis (Hill et al., 
2012, Sellers et al., 2017). The present findings corroborate and extend previous 
research by explicitly linking people’s need for control to distress related to positive 
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symptoms within an attachment framework in the quantitative study. The qualitative 
finding also expand on previous research, importantly, the findings of the qualitative 
study suggest that people’s perceived lack of control also influences other appraisals 
people make of their psychosis experiences.   
 
The findings of the qualitative study illustrate that ‘loss of control’ alone 
doesn’t seem to maintain distress associated with psychosis experiences. The 
appraisals people make of their experiences and their implications as a whole seem to 
contribute to the maintenance of distress. People were afraid of losing control over 
their behaviours and doing something they would later regret. They felt like they could 
not control their perceptions and beliefs, and as a result had to manage and navigate 
multiple realities characterised by different beliefs. Lack of control also led to changes 
in their personal and social identities: who they were, were going to be, and how people 
perceived them. Navigating these dimensions of identity were difficult and in some 
cases distressing. The lack of control people feel about their experiences feeds into all 
other aspects of their experiences, and influences the appraisals they make of different 
psychosis experiences. This relates to people’s perception of who or what is in control.   
 
9.2.1.1 Locus of control 
 
Previous studies investigating distress related to psychosis experiences found 
that people who were seeking help for their experiences were more likely to appraise 
their experiences to be external and caused by other people (Brett et al., 2007; Lovatt 
et al., 2010). This suggests that people were more likely to attribute their locus of 
control to be external when compared to non-psychotic populations (Harrow et al., 
2009). Locus is defined as an individual’s expectation as to where control over 
subsequent events resides (Rotter, 1960, 1966 in Hutcheson et al., 2014). Internal locus 
of control is the belief that events that happen in a person’s life result from their own 
efforts, skills and internal disposition. An external locus of control, in the other hand, 
is when the individual expects reinforcement to be the result of change, being under 
the control of powerful others or just to be unexpected (Rotter, 1966). People 
experiencing psychosis have an external locus of control when compared to non-
psychotic populations (Haley, Drake, Bentall & Lewis, 2003). Locus of control is not 
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a stable trait in individuals with schizophrenia, it is affected by recent experiences and 
symptoms (Bentall & Kaney, 2005; Harrow, Hansford & Astrachan-Fletcher, 2009). 
Negative events seem to increase the externality of locus of control in individuals 
experiencing schizophrenia (Melo, Taylor & Bentall, 2006). External locus of control 
has been related to lower self-concept, a higher degree of negative symptoms and 
depression (Hoffmann, Kupper & Kunz, 2000). The locus of control held by people 
can play an important role in the maintenance of distress associated with psychosis 
and subsequent outcome and recovery. Qualitative research allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of people’s experiences of loss of control.  
 
Participants of the qualitative study in this project, attributed control to 
psychosis, and they talked about where they situated psychosis in relation to 
themselves. For example, one participant explained that psychosis was ‘in your head’ 
but had ‘its own logical reasoning’ (Patrick, 29) highlighting that it is something 
contained within, yet cognitively quite separate. This effort to differentiate psychosis 
from the core self may relate to people’s attempt to retain, or regain a level of agency 
over their life (Barker et al., 2001). By making this difference, people are alluding to 
the coexistence of both an internal and an external locus of control. By distinguishing 
their sense of self from psychosis, people perceive the part of their mind that is free 
from psychosis to be under their control and relinquish responsibility for harmful 
actions and behaviours that they may undertake ‘under the influence’ of psychosis. 
Phillip compared psychosis to being ‘under the influence’ of ‘illegal drugs’ but when 
unusual experiences occur as a consequence of taking drugs, he explains that there is 
a sense of control over these experiences as their source is known; this is not the case 
with psychosis. This comparison illustrates the link between sense of control and 
distress related to psychosis.  
 
Internal locus of control has been associated with less positive symptoms, 
better self-concept and increased use of active change coping (Hoffmann et al., 2000), 
active problem solving (Bak et al., 2003), and greater self-esteem (Harrow & Jobe, 
2007). If people cannot re-establish agency over psychosis, it is likely that distress they 
associate with their experiences will be maintained and individual recovery hindered. 
Therefore, focusing on re-gaining an internal locus of control can be more beneficial 
to increasing people’s wellbeing than focusing on symptoms (Boumans et al., 2016). 
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Further research is required to determine the role locus of control plays in distress 
associated with psychosis.  
 
9.2.1.2 Limited access to emotion regulation strategies  
 
The joint display matrix highlighted similarities between need for control and 
limited access to emotion regulation strategies. Limited access to emotion regulation 
strategies is a measure of one’s inability to make flexible use of situationally 
appropriate emotion regulation strategies that aim to modulate emotional responses. 
When integrating it with the qualitative study findings, it became clear that all the 
relevant extracts belonged to the qualitative analysis theme: lacking control. If the 
person feels like they are not in control of their thoughts and emotions, they are 
unlikely to use situationally appropriate emotion regulation strategies. Relatedly, if a 
person repeatedly employs inappropriate emotion regulation strategies and fails to 
achieve their set goal for regulation, they are also likely to feel that they are not in 
control of their thoughts and feelings. Therefore, if the person attempts to self-regulate 
their emotions and thoughts to reduce distress and lack appropriate strategies to do so, 
distress is likely to be maintained or exacerbated. Overall, this suggests that emotional 
and cognitive difficulties work in tandem in the production, maintenance and 
exacerbation of distress. This is an important finding which links emotional and 
cognitive factors to the maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences. 
Moreover, this finding further evidences the value of investigating metacognition and 
emotion regulation within the same mediation model, when appropriate, thus 
accounting for the variance between them (Hayes, 2013). The integration of the two 
studies has provided empirical evidence for the associations between cognition and 
emotions, as well as the role they play in the maintenance of distress related to 
psychosis.   
While this section has focused on control, its role in distress is not separate 
from the other key finding of interest here: Interpersonal relationships. People’s 
perceived lack of control in relation to their experiences of psychosis is likely to be 
influenced by their interpersonal relationships and the social context in which they find 
themselves (e.g. the hospital) (see Perry, Taylor & Shaw, 2007). How other people 
respond to participants’ psychosis experiences is essential in determining how in 
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control people will feel about their experiences. The second key finding that was 
integrated using quantitative and qualitative findings was the role of interpersonal 
relationships.  
9.2.2 Interpersonal relationships 
 
The findings of this study suggest that attachment dimensions also contribute 
to the maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences. Attachment is a 
developmental theory of interpersonal and psychological functioning which draws on 
affectionate bonds created in the context of close relationships (Bowlby, 1982). 
Conceptualising psychosis within an attachment framework highlights the functional 
nature of the individual's methods of dealing with distress. Insecure attachment 
strategies develop out of a maladaptive care environment, in order to help infants 
survive them by reducing threat (Berry & Bucci, 2016). These strategies are 
maintained throughout life where they are used to cope with threatening situations or 
when threat is misperceived. There are then a number of dimensions in which 
interpersonal contributions play into people’s beliefs and feelings about psychosis. 
How people are reacted to, treated by medical staff but also friends and family are 
hugely influential on how participants come to make sense of their experiences. 
Previous experiences they have had in hospital and beyond its walls, as well as their 
imaginaries about how people will react to them in the future are factors that must be 
considered in understanding distress related to psychosis experiences. ‘Interpersonal 
relationship’ as a construct is the result of the two studies’ integration, as both studies 
found important associations between difficulties relating to the self and others, and 
unhelpful interpersonal relationships and increased distress related to psychosis 
experiences. In the following paragraphs there will be a discussion of the importance 
of interpersonal relationships to how people make meaning and deal with psychosis 
experiences. Negative and pathologizing experiences were related to increased 
distress, while contrastingly supportive relationships related to lower distress.  
 
Many individuals with distressing psychosis will have experienced 
predominantly negative schematic conceptions of their self in their intra-personal and 
interpersonal experiences (Chadwick 2006). These interactions may pre-date the onset 
of psychosis experiences and people coming in contact with mental health services. 
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The relationships people build following the onset of psychosis experiences are of 
great importance to the process of meaning-making and coming to understand their 
new circumstance (Brett et al., 2014). It is suggested in cognitive models of psychosis 
that people’s personal and cultural metacognitive beliefs are likely to influence their 
appraisals of their experiences (Morrison, 2001). The reactions and interpretations of 
others to individual’s psychosis are likely to influence their own appraisals of their 
psychosis experiences. The findings of the qualitative study provide further support 
and nuance to this argument. People’s perceptions of others’ understandings and 
reactions to their experiences of psychosis proved hugely important to how they felt 
about and made sense of psychosis overall. In fact, all emerging themes had what was 
referred to as this ‘external’ component. In each theme, participants described how 
others’ perceptions and understanding influenced and shaped their appraisals of their 
experiences. For examples, social networks, mental health professionals and perceived 
societal expectations played an important role in the process of changing individual’s 
social identity. Participants felt fearful about the potential consequences their actions 
might have for others’ beliefs about them, and as a result had to manage and cope with 
these external (and possibly negative) perceptions of their reality. These images and 
beliefs of interactional experiences heavily shape individuals’ appraisals of and 
feelings about their psychosis experiences. One consequence of negative interactions 
(such as feeling ‘written off’ (Patrick, 537)) with those who are believed to be a part 
of their support network is the exacerbation of feelings of distress. Social networks 
and mental health teams, therefore, play an essential role in people's ability to make 
meaning and deal with their psychosis experiences (Berry & Drake, 2010; Schuengel 
& van Ijzendoorn, 2001).  
 On the other hand, studies have found that appraisals relating to psychological 
explanations (Brett et al., 2014; Peters et al., 2012) or normalising appraisals of 
people’s psychosis experiences was statistically related to less distress and less 
negative affect. This was corroborated by qualitative research, both Boumans (et al., 
2016) and Heriot-Maitland (et al., 2012) identified that a key difference between help-
seeking and non-help seeking participants was that non-help seeking participants had 
normalising experiences, and received validation and acceptance from their peers, 
friends, or family. This provides strong support to the argument that others’ reactions 
and responses to individuals’ psychosis experiences are important to how they come 
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to feel about and appraise them. Some participants focused on the positive influence 
of supportive environments, ‘it’s [hospital] a safety zone’ (Amal, 58) on their 
wellbeing. Other participants cherished that support and found it vital to their meaning 
making, Josh said ‘a problem shared is a problem halved’ (277-278) referring to the 
importance of sharing his experiences with his mental health team. Social support and 
acceptance of psychosis experiences, can contribute to lower distress related to 
psychosis experiences (Brett et al., 2014). It can therefore be beneficial, in order to 
lower distress related to psychosis experiences to create and maintain more supportive 
and understanding environments.  
 
These findings align with the findings of a recently published systematic 
review aimed at understanding the views and experiences of key stakeholders (service 
users, clinicians, carers, and family) on diagnostic practice (Perkins et al., 2018). From 
their comprehensive synthesis of qualitative data, Perkins and colleagues developed a 
model considering factors influencing service-users’ experiences of mental health 
diagnosis (Perkins et al., 2018). They found that both external and internal factors 
influenced service-users experiences throughout the diagnostic process. External 
factors include the impact of culture, stigma and discrimination on service users, as 
well as the support available from others. This corroborates the findings of the 
qualitative study and further emphasises the importance of others perceptions in 
people's meaning-making processes. Focusing on both internal and external factors 
encourages a well-rounded and more complete understanding of people’s appraisals 
of psychosis. In their model, this is accompanied by service provision factors (e.g. 
quality of diagnostic assessment, timing, and the functional value of diagnosis). Carers 
and mental health professionals were not interviewed for the current project, therefore 
all aspects of external factors that are identified come from service users' perceptions 
of their experiences and relationships. However increasing the focus of mental health 
services and care provision on reducing distress related to psychosis experience by 
focusing on increasing perceived control and supportive interpersonal relationships 
can be beneficial to people’s wellbeing. The integrated findings of this thesis have 
important implications for clinical practice which are considered below.  
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9.3 Implications for Clinical Practice  
 
In addition to the theoretical implications that have been presented throughout 
the discussions of the quantitative study (see 6.9) for the refinement of the role of 
attachment theory as a framework for understanding psychosis experiences, and its 
application to distress related to psychosis experiences, this project has a number of 
clinical implications. Studies presented in this thesis have accessed meanings that are 
not unique to these samples (e.g. Brett et al., 2014; Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012), 
however this is the first study that focuses on and combines these components to better 
understand distress related to psychosis experiences. A number of tentative 
recommendations for clinical practice can be drawn out from the findings.  
This project highlighted the role of appraisals people make of their psychosis 
experiences and associated them with distress related to psychosis experiences. 
Moreover, the qualitative investigation of people’s appraisals highlighted their 
idiographic nature. Appraisals have an important role in cognitive formulations of 
psychosis. Cognitive models of psychosis propose that emotional reactions and 
behavioural responses are dependent on appraisals of people’s psychosis experiences 
(Garety et al., 2001, 2007; Morrison, 2001). Metacognitive and emotion regulation 
difficulties are likely to contribute to the lack of control people experience. In turn, 
this perceived lack of control likely contributes to the maintenance of distress related 
to psychosis experiences. Therefore, there is a cyclical link between negative 
appraisals and emotional and cognitive difficulties that contribute to the maintenance 
of distress related to psychosis experiences, figure 14 provides a visual representation 
of the associations suggested by this project.  
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Figure 15. Visual representation of integrated study findings 
 
The experience of distress in psychosis is emphasised in the literature review 
as being an important differentiating factor between clinical and non-clinical samples 
(Brett et al., 2009; Heriot-Maitland et al., 2012; Peters et al., 1999). Additionally, the 
experience of distress also plays an important role in help-seeking (Brett et al., 2009). 
Therefore, by identifying the psychological and contextual vulnerability factors 
contributing to the maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences, this 
project has implications for the reduction of distress in clinical populations. Moreover, 
this research can be expanded to non-clinical and at-risk samples in order to determine 
whether these factors can be identified and used to prevent the development of full-
blown psychosis experiences. In line with the findings of this thesis, distress related to 
psychosis experiences is likely to be maintained by people’s perceived lack of control 
and unhelpful interpersonal relationships. Thus focusing on these factors in care 
settings can help reduce distress and increase wellbeing.   
In line with these findings, three approaches are discussed below. First, 
attachment informed care approaches are reviewed as they aim to create a secure base 
for people as well as promoting helpful interpersonal relationships. Next, peer support 
is discussed as it is likely to help reduce perceived lack of control and provide 
supportive external input. Lastly, metacognitive therapy is presented as it focuses on 
facilitating the use of new ways to respond to psychosis experiences.  
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9.3.1 Attachment informed care 
 
 Recently, clinical research has focused on the role attachment informed 
practices can have to provide more effective care to people experiencing psychosis. 
The attachment system can be understood as a help-seeking system (Bowlby, 1982). 
People's attachment dimensions are closely associated with how they seek help 
following the onset of psychosis (Gumley et al., 2014), the therapeutic alliance they 
form (Macbeth et al., 2011) their engagement with services (Macbeth et al., 2011) and 
outcomes they achieve (Mikulincer, Shaver & Berant, 2013). Macbeth and colleagues 
(2011) found that avoidant attachment was associated with worse engagement with 
services and worse treatment adherence than secure attachment. The relationships 
between people experiencing psychosis, staff and services are particularly important 
as they provide the context in which recovery is promoted (Gumley et al., 2014). The 
associations found between insecure attachment dimensions and distress related to 
psychosis experiences suggests that the maintenance of distress may be partially 
explained by people’s attachment dimensions on the one hand,  and their engagement 
with services on the other. Therefore, attachment informed care can help promote 
engagement, encourage better treatment adherence, promote better outcomes and help 
reduce distress related to psychosis experiences. To illustrate how attachment 
informed care is relevant and can be beneficial when tackling distress related to 
psychosis experiences, a review conducted by Berry and Danquah (2016) describing 
the key goals and strategies of attachment-informed psychotherapy is summarised 
next. Moreover, it is suggested that attachment-informed care does not need to be 
confined to dyadic relationships.  
Attachment informed therapy can be useful in changing people's perception of 
the self, others and the world by contributing to the development of more secure 
attachment working models. The therapeutic relationship should, therefore, aim to 
provide a secure base for the person. This secure relationship with the therapist can 
then be used as a base on which attachment related therapeutic tasks can be carried out 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). The aim is to help people understand how their past 
experiences influence their current behaviour, experiences and relationship (Berry & 
Danquah, 2016). Interpretations attuned to people’s affective state were hypothesised 
to strengthen their self-reflection and metacognitive functioning leading to more 
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coherent narratives of attachment-related experiences (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; 
Cobb & Davila, 2009; Heard, Lake & McCluskey, 2009; Holmes, 1993; Wallin, 2007). 
Therapists should create supportive conditions for the service user to determine a 
course of action for themselves (Bowlby, 1977b, 1988; Heard & Lake, 1997; Sable, 
1992, 2000, 2007 in Berry & Danquah, 2016). Co-creation, leading to a tailored 
intervention that fits individuals’ needs, can help enhance the perceived control people 
have over their lives and experience, which in turn may lead to reductions in distress 
associated with psychosis experiences.  
Berry and Danquah (2016) also suggested that it is important to adapt the tasks 
and styles of therapy in a way that accounts for differences between attachment anxiety 
and avoidance. For example, consistency in interpersonal relationships and reliability 
of carers are key for people with anxious attachment dimensions, as these therapeutic 
features  help  self-expression of the strengths and needs they may have been denying 
themselves due to fear of abandonment. Conversely, for avoidant attachment 
dimensions, which are associated with an apparent lack of care in attachment 
relationships, it is important to account for the limited expression of affect (Berry & 
Danquah, 2016). Therapists need to be cautious not to reinforce people’s self-
sufficiency and lack of emotional expression. For instance, using telephone sessions 
(Biringen, 1994), and focusing on concrete problems (Connors, 1997), can help 
overcome difficulties engaging with services that people with avoidant attachment 
experience (Dozier, 1990). Following this, tailored therapies that account for the 
person’s insecure attachment dimensions are likely to also be effective in managing 
distress related to psychosis experiences as distress is likely to be presented differently 
depending on the person’s attachment dimensions (Berry et al., 2012).   
It is important to note that Berry and Danquah’s (2016) review is a theoretical 
overview and not a synthesis of outcome data. Further empirical work is necessary to 
establish the effect of attachment-informed therapies in reducing distress associated 
with psychosis experiences. Specifically, longitudinal studies may overcome the 
challenge posed by changing attachment styles over time.  Investigating the effect of 
changing from insecure to more secure attachment working models on distress related 
to psychosis experiences may prove useful in informing more effective tailored 
therapies. 
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Attachment-informed interventions do not need to be confined to the dyadic 
relationship between a therapist and the person in care. Often, in community mental 
health teams, people have a team of mental health professionals that support them and 
can adhere to attachment informed care. Services that inspire hope and optimism, and 
allow the service user to retain feelings of control over their experiences and treatment 
seem likely to result in better outcomes and arguably a reduction in distress (Dixon, 
Holoshitz & Nossel, 2016). As evidenced in the qualitative findings of this thesis, it is 
critical that services account for the influence of external and internal factors on 
psychosis experiences and promote wider ‘relational security’ (Department of Health, 
2011), while also emphasizing safe and secure staff-patient relationships. Peer support 
interventions are another way to facilitate supportive interpersonal relationships.  
9.3.2 Peer support interventions   
 
While peer support is not a new concept in chronic health conditions 
(Davidson, Chinman, Sells & Rowe, 2006), initiatives have only begun to flourish in 
recent years. Internationally, peer support interventions have been widely advocated 
by service user researchers (Clay et al., 2005; Faulkner & Basset, 2012) and 
professional organisations (e.g. Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2009; NICE, 2014). 
Currently, there is not a single accepted definition of peer support. The National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE, 2014) adopted Solomon’s (2004) 
definition that highlights the importance of non-coercive and informal approaches to 
offering social, emotional and instrumental support. It is mutually offered or provided 
by people with mental health difficulties to others with similar conditions in order to 
bring about a desired personal or social change (Solomon, 2004). This definition 
touches on some of the integrated findings of this thesis, as it directly addresses the 
importance of external factors and the negative consequences unhelpful interpersonal 
relationships that emerged from the qualitative analysis can have on people’s 
appraisals of their psychosis experiences and in turn increase distress. Indeed, NICE 
(2014) emphasise the importance of offering informal peer support as people with 
psychosis or schizophrenia often find engagement with mental health services difficult 
and avoid contact. Peers with similar lived experiences may help overcome these 
barriers, and help mitigate individuals’ concerns about how they are perceived by 
others around them. Through role modelling, peer support workers can also promote 
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self-efficacy (e.g. demonstrating recovery; Salzer & Shear, 2002) and help reduce 
internalised stigma (Pyle, Pilling, Machin, Allende-Cullen & Morrison, 2018). In turn, 
peer support workers gain therapeutic value from helping others. Relatedly, peer 
support workers can also challenge the attitudes of clinical staff and contribute to a 
cultural change within mental health services (Repper & Watson, 2012; NICE, 2014).  
Peer support has been implemented in a variety of ways, which includes: peer 
support groups (face-to-face or online), peer-delivered services, peer partnerships, 
peer researchers and peer employees (Davidson et al., 1999; Solomon, 2004). The 
range of functions fulfilled by peer support workers includes offering understanding, 
acceptance and empathy, role-modelling, providing practical information and 
supporting service users to access community facilities (Davidson et al., 2006; 
Davidson, Bellamy, Guy & Miller, 2012). All of these functions are likely to help 
reduce distress associated with psychosis experiences, mainly by empowering people 
through helping them achieve a better grasp of their experiences, help increase their 
self-esteem (Repper & Carter, 2011). The maintenance of helpful and supportive 
interpersonal relationships are then likely to provide a sense of connection 
(Embuldeniya et al., 2013) and reduce shame and isolation (Pauldel & Baral, 2015). 
This is also likely to help increase people’s perceived control over their experiences 
and help reduce distress related to psychosis experiences. Moreover, the development 
and maintenance of meaningful relationships is very important for a successful 
recovery journey and increased wellbeing (e.g. McCabe, 2004). 
Reviews of peer support have found moderate evidence that it does indeed lead 
to higher levels of empowerment, hopefulness for recovery, engagement with care and 
patient activation. Reductions in the use of inpatient services were also found, as well 
as improved relationships with care providers (Chinman et al., 2014; Davidson et al., 
2012). Moreover, it should be noted that other studies found significant differences in 
outcomes between people who were and were not offered peer support (Lloyd-Evans 
et al., 2014; Pitt et al., 2013). Most recently, in a randomised controlled trial of peer 
support mentorship intervention, O’Connell and colleagues (2018) found that 
participants assigned to the peer mentor condition reported significantly greater 
reductions in substance use and psychiatric symptoms and greater improvement in 
functioning when compared to people assigned to standard care. They also observed 
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important reductions in hospitalisation rates and the duration of hospital stays. Despite 
the study’s small size, the results are promising and warrant further exploration. 
Further research is needed to establish the benefits of peer support workers, 
specifically investigating how they influence people’s perceived lack of control, 
insecure attachment dimensions and distress related to psychosis experiences.  
9.3.3 Metacognitive therapy 
 
Metacognitive therapy (MCT; Wells, 2009; Wells & Matthews, 1994) assumes 
that distress is associated with the activation of unhelpful forms of perseverative 
processing which includes: ‘rumination’, ‘focusing on threat’ and ‘thought control’. 
These processes relate to people’s metacognitive beliefs about the utility, 
controllability and danger of these processes (Morrison et al., 2014). MCT emphasises 
the development of a detached awareness of people’s thoughts and the development 
of new and more helpful beliefs. This is done in order to decrease people’s use of 
unhelpful strategies (e.g. rumination and worry) and unhelpful attentional strategies 
(Wells, 2009), in turn facilitating the development of more productive strategies 
(Wells, 2009). Overall, metacognitive therapy may improve people’s perceived 
control and contribute to the reduction of distress related to psychosis experiences.  
Early evidence of MCT for OCD (Fisher & Wells., 2008), PTSD (Wells et al., 
2008), GAD (Wells & King, 2006) and psychosis (Hutton, Morrison & Taylor, 2012; 
Hutton, Morrison, Wardle & Wells, 2014; Morrison et al., 2014) suggests it shows 
promise as a treatment. Hutton and colleagues (2014) investigated whether a short 
number of MCT sessions would provide clinically significant, and sustained 
improvements in delusions, hallucinations, anxiety, depression and subjective 
recovery in ‘treatment-resistant’ long-standing psychosis. Two of their participants 
achieved clinically significant improvements across the components listed above. For 
one participant, this improvement was sustained over three months. While this study 
demonstrates the feasibility of using MCT, the very small number of participants 
makes it difficult to draw concrete conclusions. In another study, Morrison and 
colleagues (2014) conducted a feasibility study, where ten participants received 12 
MCT sessions in an open trial. Exploratory analyses revealed that metacognitive 
beliefs changed significantly during treatment and follow-up periods. However, the 
small sample size and absence of control group warrants that the findings be taken 
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tentatively. Nevertheless, these preliminary findings are promising (Hutton et al., 
2014), and further research is needed to determine the efficacy and safety of MCT for 
dealing with distress related to psychosis experiences.  
9.4 Reflexivity  
 
 “Personal reflexivity involves reflecting upon the ways in which our own 
values, experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and 
social identities have shaped the research” (Willig, 2001, p.10). It relates to examining 
the effect of a researcher in the research process (Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 1999; 
Yardley, 2000). Whilst being deeply committed to honouring the data, no researcher 
is without bias, irrespective of the specific methods used. It is therefore important that 
the researcher is transparent about their own stance and perspective (Smith & Osborne, 
2008). This is why I attempted to acknowledge my values, beliefs and expectations 
from the outset of the project, and revisited them throughout my PhD journey (see the 
researcher’s reflexivity piece in Appendix 26). I also collated a reflective journal 
during recruitment and data collection that includes information on the keyworkers 
contributing to recruitment, thoughts on the referral meetings I attended and most 
importantly reflections on the emotional impact of each data collection meeting and 
interview I conducted. I also kept detailed analysis notebooks for both study 1 and 
study 2. I endeavoured to conduct a rigorous project in line with guidelines available 
for the respective methods I employed. Overall, the information provided in this thesis 
is my interpretation of the data I collected.   
9.5 Strengths  
 
A strength of this research stems from its mixed methods design. First, the use 
of mixed methods allowed for a broader range of research questions to be addressed 
than would have been possible in a solely quantitative or qualitative study. Second, the 
use of qualitative methods gave a voice to the subjective experiences of service users, 
ensuring the research didn’t become detached from people’s lived experience of 
psychosis. Third, the integration of the quantitative and qualitative studies prompted 
the development of a comprehensive framework for understanding distress related to 
psychosis experiences.  This framework highlights the importance of perceived 
control, as an internal factor and interpersonal relationship as an external factor 
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contributing to the maintenance of distress related to psychosis experiences. Both of 
these concepts be the subject of future empirical investigations.  
Psychosis research predominantly focuses on single symptoms (e.g. Bentall, 
2003). This is essential to the understanding of specific components of people’s 
psychosis experiences, and distress associated with specific symptoms (e.g. Hill et al., 
2012). However, the majority of people’s psychosis experiences include multiple 
symptoms and a variety of associated difficulties. Thus, in line with the wide array of 
appraisals of psychosis experiences uncovered in the qualitative study of this project, 
it is clear that distress related to psychosis cannot be fully isolated and attributed to 
specific symptoms. Instead, people’s experiences are intertwined with multiple 
appraisals and external factors that further shape and change how they make sense of 
their experiences. There is, therefore, strength in considering positive, negative, 
depressive symptoms and experiential components of people’s psychosis experience 
as a whole. 
9.6 Limitations 
 
The limitations of each study have been discussed at the end of their respective 
chapters. This section concerns itself with the limitations of the project as a whole. 
It is crucial to any mixed methodology that that data is meaningfully converged 
in a clear and transparent way. In the case of this study, the core method by which the 
integration was carried out, the descriptions and meta-matrix table - which can be 
found in the appendices (see Appendix 27) - was constructed to facilitate integration 
and provide a transparent illustration for the reader as to how this process was carried 
out.  However, it is worth noting a number of subjective decisions necessarily made 
by the researcher which may be construed as limitations. Researcher-designed 
individual themes were selected from the study findings in order to provide a combined 
understanding of both studies. This may have limited the scope of the findings by 
oversimplifying complex concepts (Fitzpatrick, 2016). The use of an external audit 
might be helpful in establishing the reliability of the integration and trustworthiness of 
the themes chosen. However, the researcher did not have the resources to do that.  
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Second, the datasets were heterogeneous, as not only data was collected using 
different methods, the object of investigation in the two studies were complementary 
yet different. The quantitative data focused on specific psychological vulnerability 
factors contributing to the maintenance of distress associated with psychosis 
experiences, the qualitative interviews investigated people’s appraisals of their 
psychosis experiences which influences the distress people feel in relation to their 
experiences. Measures were therefore taken from the design stage of the study to 
maintain the individual strengths of each studies in order to maintain their full potential 
before they were integrated. This was mainly achieved through both studies being 
analysed and discussed individually before they were integrated. Nevertheless, the 
potentiality of researcher bias needs to be recognised, as it might have influenced the 
integration of the quantitative and qualitative studies.  
Another limitation from which both studies are likely to suffer is that people’s 
beliefs about and understandings of their experiences fluctuate over time, depending 
on the environment and internal states (Peters et al., 2012). People’s insight and 
distress related to their psychosis experiences can also change over time. Longitudinal 
research represents one way of accounting for such variations in understanding and 
distress related to psychosis experiences. Such an approach might concentrate on key 
turning points in people's experience: such as first episode of psychosis, following the 
diagnosis, prior to and following hospitalisation.  
In line with the inclusion criteria of the research, the majority of people who 
took part in this research were in care at the time of data collection and therefore had 
sought and were receiving support. This may have led people to be more reflexive and 
accepting of their experiences than a sample that was not receiving support, this may 
have influenced people’s reported levels of distress or types of appraisals.  The fact 
that people were actively seeking support may also indicate that they were at a 
particular stage of their illness, different to people having similar experiences but have 
yet to come in contact with mental health services. Individuals that had managed to 
self-regulate their distress are unlikely to be attending community mental health teams 
and charities where recruitment took place, and as a result are not represented in this 
sample. Therefore, the findings do not provide information on the attachment 
dimensions, emotion regulation and metacognition skills of people who are not 
 
 
224 
distressed by their experiences enough to come in contact, and remain in contact with 
mental health services. Additionally, many participants were using medication at the 
time of data collection. Therefore, the perceptions they held about their emotion 
regulation and metacognitive abilities and their appraisals of psychosis may be 
moderated by the effects of medication. While participants were recruited across the 
psychosis spectrum of disorders, acute services were excluded from the research. All 
participants were therefore well enough to live in the community (with the support of 
their community mental health teams), thus people who are highly distressed about 
their experiences may have been omitted. Relatedly, as mental health staff served as 
gatekeepers for the recruitment an unconscious selection bias may have affected the 
sample. It is possible that clinicians approached people they trust were eligible, willing 
or well enough to participate. 
9.7 Future Research 
 
Future research for individual studies has been discussed at the end of both the 
quantitative and qualitative chapters. This section, therefore, concerns itself with 
suggestions about studies that may benefit from the integrational approach to mixed 
methods data adopted here.  
It was established, through the integration of the studies, that the metacognitive 
and emotion regulation difficulties contributing maintenance of distress related to 
psychosis experiences are not only associated with the maintenance of distress related 
to psychosis but they also influence each other. Future research needs to break the 
divide between cognitive and emotional research on psychosis. Further experimental 
research could effectively elucidate how and at what stage emotional and cognitive 
mechanisms interact within the S-REF model.  
There is a lack of mixed methods research that is integrated and published as 
one coherent whole in psychosis research. In recent years, there has been an increase 
in research focusing on subjective first-person accounts of lived experiences of 
psychosis (Geekie, Randal, Lampshire & Read, 2013). Qualitative research like this 
can help improve researchers’ understandings of how idiographic and socio-cultural 
perspectives shape individual’s psychological experiences (Wilkinson et al., 2003), 
this can help to enrich the exploration of different perspectives, while quantitative 
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research facilitates the investigation of associations. Combined, they provide an 
avenue for producing more detailed, nuanced and comprehensive investigations of 
complex psychological concepts.  
9.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
In conclusion, this project has found that the factors relating to the maintenance 
of distress associated with psychosis experiences are complex, and that people’s 
appraisals of their psychosis experiences are idiographic and context dependent. This 
project provides preliminary findings which associate insecure attachment dimensions 
with distress related to psychosis. The quantitative results suggest that different 
psychological vulnerability factors may relate to the maintenance of distress related to 
positive, negative symptoms of psychosis and depressive symptoms in psychosis. 
Cognitive and emotional vulnerability factors should be investigated in tandem as they 
influence each other in the maintenance of distress related to psychosis. The qualitative 
findings highlighted the importance of perceived lack of control, and internal and 
external factors on people’s appraisals of psychosis experiences. By integrating 
quantitative and qualitative findings, the emphasis falls on the importance of 
interpersonal relationships and perceived lack of control related to both cognitive and 
emotional vulnerability factors that people hold in relation to their psychosis 
experiences. Attachment-informed care, peer support interventions and metacognitive 
therapy are proposed for clinical practice as ways to help people feel more in control 
and build more effective and supportive interpersonal relationships. Beyond the novel 
findings, this project is also unique in its design, with the use of mixed methods and 
method of integration. As it is demonstrated in this thesis, mixed methods research has 
the potential to shed light on complex psychological constructs in a way that is not 
accessible to quantitative or qualitative methods independently. 
Ultimately, there is little merit to gaining a better understanding of distress 
related to psychosis experiences if this is not translated into better outcomes for people 
experiencing psychosis. Therefore, further research seeking to develop and evaluate 
resources and interventions to help people reduce distress related to psychosis 
experiences is vital. It is hoped that the work described in this thesis can be of some 
assistance in defining the focus of such endeavours for those working to improve the 
lives of people suffering from distress related to their psychosis experiences. 
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Participant 
Information Sheet -Study 1 
  
Emotion management 
  
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or 
not you want to take part I would like you to understand why the research is being 
done and what taking part would involve for you. Please take the time to read the 
following information carefully. It describes the study in detail.  
Your participation would involve filling in 5 short questionnaires. If you like, I can 
read them to you. Your participation would be very much appreciated. 
What is the purpose of the study?  
This research is being carried out to help us learn more about the way people 
experience psychosis. Experiences may include hearing voices, seeing things that 
other people do not and feeling confused. A lot of people experience psychotic 
phenomena at some point in their lives, yet often they will not be distressed by them. 
I am interested in what makes one person more distressed about these experiences 
than another. Therefore, I am looking at emotional processes (such as, how a person 
reacts to other’s emotions) as well as attachment (such as relationship to one’s 
family) and how they relate to the experience of psychosis.  
Why have I been invited?  
You have been referred to the study by a member of the Community Mental Health 
team responsible for your care. 
Do I have to take part?  
No. It is up to you to decide to take part in the study. If you agree to take part in the 
study, I will ask you to sign a consent form. The consent form is a way of making 
sure that you know what you have agreed to.   
This project is part of my studies, and it is not related to the care you receive nor 
your treatment. You are free to withdraw from the study at any point, this will, in any 
way, affect the standard of care you receive. 
What will happen next?  
After reading this document, if you want to take part, return the reply slip you were 
given to either your CMHT worker or to someone in the centre. I will then get in 
Appendix 6 Participant information sheet 
study 1 
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touch with you to arrange a meeting at a convenient time for you to take part in the 
study.  
 What will happen if I take part?  
The study is expected to take up to an hour. I will start by answering any questions 
you might have. Then I will ask you to fill out a form about yourself and 5 
questionnaires. If you want, I can read the questions to you.  
The questionnaires will ask you to indicate how often a statement applies to you or 
how much you agree with it. There are no right or wrong answers. 
If you are not finished by the end of the hour or you feel tired or distressed before, 
we can rearrange another meeting time. You can stop for a break whenever you want 
to, or if you want to stop taking part you can say so at any time. You do not need to 
provide a reason.  
Expenses and payments?  
Unfortunately there will be no payment offered for taking part in the study.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There is no guarantee that taking part in this research will lead to benefits for you, 
however it will give you a voice in contributing to research that may inform the care 
of others in the future. 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part?  
There are no known risks with taking part in this study. If you feel distressed or 
overwhelmed from the nature of the questions, data collection will be stopped 
immediately and will only resume when or if you feel up to it, after a break or 
another day that is convenient for you.  
If you do not want to resume the study and the questionnaires are not finished I will 
withdraw your information. This will have no effect on any other care or treatment 
you are receiving.  
If you feel very distressed, not only the study will stop immediately but a CMHT 
worker will be called in to support you if you want that.  If you would prefer to talk 
to someone else, I can call a Clinical Psychologist that would be of support.   
What happens if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
You can leave the study at any time without giving a reason; this will have no effect 
on any other care or treatment you are receiving.  
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What if there is a problem?  
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study please contact Dr. Sean Harper; 
Sean.Harper@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk and he will do his best to address your 
concerns.  
  
If you want to talk to a person independent from the research, you can contact: 
 
Dr. Fiona Barry 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
2ndFloor Mackinnon House 
Royal Edinburgh Hospital 
Tipperlinn Road  
Edinburgh EH10 5HF 
Email: Fiona.Barry@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk 
Tel: 0131 537 6902 
 
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this at NHS 
Lothian Customer Relations and Feedback Team, 0131 536 3370. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
I will replace your name with a number so that the answers from the questionnaires 
cannot be matched to you. The questionnaire data will be seen by me and my 
supervisors only. It will not be possible to identify you from the data.  
The consent form, demographics information and questionnaires will be stored 
securely at the University. The anonymised information will be entered into a 
statistical computer programme. All data will be destroyed within five years.  
To ensure that the study is run correctly, I will access your case notes to carry out 
this research, I only need very basic information that will be anonymised with the 
rest of your data.  
With your consent, I will inform your GP that you are taking part. 
If you share with me information that leads me to believe that you might be putting 
your safety or the safety of others at risk, I am required to inform other people 
involved in your care.  
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What will happen to the results of the study?  
The results of the study will be written up as part of a doctoral thesis and may be 
published in an academic journal. You will not be identified in any report or 
publication with all data remaining strictly confidential. 
If you want information on the results of the study, I will write up a summary of the 
results and leave copies of the summary at the CMHT Centre, just ask a member of 
staff.  
I will also put the summary of the results on my University profile page: 
http://www.qmu.ac.uk/psych/people/Akoral.htm 
If you would like me to email you the summary, send me an email and I will happily 
forward you a copy. 
Time to consider  
You should take at least 24 hours to decide if you wish to take part. 
Who has reviewed the Study?  
All research in the NHS is looked at by independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given favourable opinion by the South East Scotland Research Ethics Committee 
REC2.  
Further information and contact details 
If you require further information or have any questions or concerns you can contact:  
Researcher:                                                                                                    
Melissa Akoral, PhD Candidate                                                                                 
Queen Margaret University                                                                                                     
Queen Margaret Drive,                                                                                     
Musselburgh EH21 6UU 
Email: makoral@qmu.ac.uk 
Tel: 0131 474 0000     
 
Clinical supervisor: 
Dr. Sean Harper 
2ndFloor, Mackinnon House 
Royal Edinburgh Hospital 
Tipperlinn Road 
EDINBURGH EH10 5HF  
Email:
Sean.Harper@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk 
Tel: 0131 537 6912 
Dr. Karen Goodall  
Psychology & Sociology 
Queen Margaret University 
Queen Margaret Drive, 
Musselburgh EH21 6UU 
Email: KGoodall@qmu.ac.uk   
Tel : 0131 474 0000                Thank 
you 
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Appendix 7. Participant information Sheet Study 2 
Participant Information Sheet - Study 2 
                          
Emotion management 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or 
not you want to take part I would like you to understand why the research is being 
done and what taking part would involve for you. Please take the time to read the 
following information carefully. It describes the study in detail.  
Your participation would involve taking part in a follow-up interview expected to 
last around 1 hour. Your participation would be very much appreciated. 
What is the purpose of the study?  
This research is being carried out to help us learn more about the way people 
experience psychosis. Experiences may include hearing voices, seeing things that 
other people do not and feeling confused. A lot of people experience psychotic 
phenomena at some point in their lives, yet often they will not be distressed by them. 
I am interested in what makes one person more distressed about these experiences 
than another. Therefore, I am looking at emotional processes (such as, how a person 
reacts to other’s emotions) as well as attachment (such as relationship to one’s 
family) and how they relate to the experience of psychosis.  
Why have I been invited?  
You have showed interest in taking part following the questionnaire session. You 
returned the reply slip I gave you, allowing me to contact you for this study. 
Do I have to take part?  
No. It is up to you to decide to take part in the study. If you agree to take part in the 
study, I will ask you to sign a consent form. The consent form is a way of making 
sure that you know what you have agreed to.   
This project is part of my studies, and it is not related to the care you receive nor 
your treatment. You are free to withdraw from the study at any point, this will, in any 
way, affect the standard of care you receive. 
What will happen next?  
After reading this document, if you want to take part, I will get in touch with you to 
arrange a meeting at a convenient time for you. We will meet at the CMHT Centre at 
your convenience. 
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What will happen if I take part?  
I will start by answering any questions you might have. Then I will ask you a few 
questions. The interview is expected to take approximately an hour.  
I will be audio-recording the interview to make sure that I do not miss anything you 
say and to make sure the interview is transcribed appropriately. I will be the only one 
to listen to the recordings and I will transcribe the information in private. The 
transcripts will be anonymised with the ID number I already gave you in the first 
study.   
If we are not finished by the end of the hour or you feel tired or distressed before, we 
can rearrange another meeting time. We can stop for a break whenever you want to, 
or if you want to stop taking part you can say so at any time. You do not need to 
provide a reason.  
Expenses and payments?  
Unfortunately there will be no payment offered for taking part in the study.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There is no guarantee that taking part in this research will lead to benefits for you, 
however it will give you an opportunity to talk about your experience of psychosis. 
As well as having a voice in contributing to research that may inform the care of 
others in the future.  
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part?  
There are no known risks with taking part in this study. If you feel distressed or 
overwhelmed from the nature of the questions, the interview will be stopped 
immediately and will only resume when you feel up to it, after a break or another day 
that will be convenient for you.  
If you do not want to resume the study, I will keep the answers you already gave me. 
Unless you ask me to do otherwise.  
If you feel very distressed, not only the interview will stop immediately but a CMHT 
worker will be called in to support you if you want that.  If you would prefer to talk 
to someone else, I can call a Clinical Psychologist that would be of support.   
  
What happens if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
You can leave the study at any time without giving a reason; this will have no effect 
on any other care or treatment you are receiving.  
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What if there is a problem?  
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study please contact Dr. Sean Harper; 
Sean.Harper@nhslothian.scot.nhs.ukand he will do his best to address your concerns.  
  
If you want to talk to a person independent from the research, you can contact: 
Dr. Fiona Barry 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
2ndFloor Mackinnon House 
Royal Edinburgh Hospital 
Tipperlinn Road  
Edinburgh EH10 5HF 
Email: Fiona.Barry@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk 
Tel: 0131 537 6902 
  
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this at NHS 
Lothian Customer Relations and Feedback Team, 0131 536 3370. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
I will replace your name with a number so that the transcribed answers from the 
interview cannot be matched to you. The transcribed data will be seen by me and my 
supervisors only. It will not be possible to identify you from the transcripts.  
I will be the only one to transcribe the audio-recordings of our interview. The audio 
files will be stored securely at the University. The anonymised information will be 
entered into a computer programme. All audio files will be destroyed after the 
information is analysed, in less than five years. 
With your consent, I will inform your GP that you are taking part. 
If you share with me information that leads me to believe that you might be putting 
your safety or the safety of others at risk, I am required to inform other people 
involved in your care.  
What will happen to the results of the study?  
The results of the study will be written up as part of a doctoral thesis and may be 
published in an academic journal. You will not be identified in any report or 
publication with all data remaining strictly confidential. 
If you want, I will send you the interview transcripts for you to verify that all the 
information is there in the way you meant it. If you want to, I will also send you the 
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analysis of your interview for you to comment on. Just let me know if you are 
interested or not, when we meet, by email or phone. 
If you want information on the results of the study, I will write up a summary of the 
results and leave copies of the summary at the CMHT Centre, just ask a member of 
staff.  
I will also put the summary of the results on my University profile page: 
http://www.qmu.ac.uk/psych/people/Akoral.htm 
If you would like me to email you the summary, send me an email and I will happily 
forward you a copy. 
Time to consider  
You should take at least 24 hours to decide if you wish to take part. 
Who has reviewed the Study?  
All research in the NHS is looked at by independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given favourable opinion by the South East Scotland Research Ethics Committee 
REC2.  
Further Information and contact details  
If you require further information or have any questions or concerns you can contact 
me at:
Melissa Akoral, PhD Candidate                                                                                          
Queen Margaret University                                                                                                     
Queen Margaret Drive,                                                                                     
Musselburgh EH21 6UU 
Email: makoral@qmu.ac.uk 
Tel: 0131 474 0000     
 
 
Or my supervisors:                   
Dr. Karen Goodall
Psychology & Sociology             
Queen Margaret University 
Queen Margaret Drive, 
Musselburgh EH21 6UU 
Email:KGoodall@qmu.ac.uk   
Tel : 0131 474 0000 
Clinical supervisor:                                     
Dr. Sean Harper                                  
2ndFloor, Mackinnon House                      
Royal Edinburgh Hospital 
Tipperlinn Road 
EDINBURGH EH10 5HF 
Email: Sean.Harper@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk 
Tel: 0131 537 6912 
Thank you 
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Appendix 8. Professionals' Information Sheet 
Professionals’ information sheet 
  
Emotion management 
 
My name is Melissa Akoral and I am a PhD 
candidate at Queen Margaret 
University. I am currently undertaking a study which examines the factors that relate 
to distress in people with experiences of psychosis.  
The purpose of this sheet is to explain more about the study so you can decide if any 
of your clients might wish to take part.  
Psychosis can be a very distressing experience and yet there are people who 
experience psychosis, and do not come into contact with mental health services 
because they are not distressed by their experience. This study will investigate the 
extent to which certain factors can predict how distressing people feel their 
experience of psychosis to be. The factors to be measured are attachment (i.e. the 
individual’s internal model of relationships), emotion regulation skills and 
metacognition (i.e. beliefs about our own thinking).  
- Psychosis and distress – which experiences they might have had and how they 
felt about these experiences 
- Attachment – this describes their own model of how relationships work 
- Emotion regulation – this refers to people’s ability to know what they are feeling 
and ways in which they might manage emotions (e.g. listening to nice music 
when you are feeling down) 
- Metacognition – this refers to how people think about their own thinking, for 
example noticing when your thoughts are negative or unhelpful. 
These factors have been noted to play a significant role in the development and 
maintenance of psychosis experiences and therefore distress levels. I am interested in 
how they interact. 
Who to refer to the study?  
Participants must be aged over 16 years old but there is no upper age limit.  
For inclusion, participants need to meet the ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) criteria for 
Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective or Schizotypal disorders, Bipolar disorders with 
psychotic features or psychosis not otherwise specified and/or the DSM-V criteria for 
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psychosis (APA, 2014).  Individuals who have a learning disability (as stipulated by 
the ICD-10 or the DSM-V) are not eligible for participation. 
Participants have to be in a capacity to consent and speak English (as all 
questionnaires have been validated in English). I will offer to read the questions 
aloud if the participants prefer. 
How to refer into the study  
Identify someone that fits the inclusion and exclusion criteria in your Community 
Mental Health Centre. If the potential participants show interest give them the 
information pack. There is a reply slip in the pack. If the participant is interested ask 
them to complete the reply slip and return it to you to give me. Or ask them to return 
the reply slip to reception next time they are in the centre.   
What happens to people in the study?  
People will meet with me (Melissa Akoral; principal investigator) up to an hour to 
answer several questionnaires on attachment, emotional processes, metacognition 
and psychosis. They will have the opportunity to do this over more than one session 
if they prefer.  
Participants will be asked if they would like to participate in a follow-up interview at 
the end of the session and if they agree, they will be ask to complete a reply slip 
allowing the researcher to contact them once more for a semi-structured interview 
expected to last up to an hour.  
What will happen to the results of the study?  
The results of the study will be written up as part of a doctoral thesis and may be 
published in an academic journal. Participant data will be stored using participant 
numbers. These numbers will be stored separately to consent forms. Only my 
supervisors and I will have access to the data. It will not be possible to identify 
individual participants in any subsequent report.   
Participants who take part in the second study (the interview study) will be offered 
the opportunity to comment on the transcripts of their interview to verify that all the 
information accurately represents what they intended it to mean. Also, if they are 
interested, I will send them the analysis of their interview for them to contribute to its 
analysis. They will only need to let me know if they are interested when we meet, by 
email or telephone.  
If you want information on the results of the study, I will write up a summary of the 
results and leave copies of the summary at the CMHT Centre. 
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I will also put the summary of the results on my University profile page: 
http://www.qmu.ac.uk/psych/people/Akoral.htm 
If you would like me to email you the summary, send me an email and I will happily 
forward you a copy. 
What are the benefits of this research?  
There is no guarantee that taking part in this research will lead to benefits for the 
participants, however it will give them a voice in contributing to research that may 
inform the care of others in the future.  
Who has reviewed the Study?  
All research in the NHS is looked at by independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given favourable opinion by the South East Scotland Research Ethics Committee 
REC2.  
Any Questions? If you have any more questions please get in touch with me at:  
Researcher:                                                                                                                        
Melissa Akoral, PhD Candidate                                                                                    
Queen Margaret University                                                                                                     
Queen Margaret Drive,                                                                                     
Musselburgh EH21 6UU                
Email: makoral@qmu.ac.uk                                                                                                       
Or, feel free to contact my supervisors 
at: 
 Dr. Karen Goodall  
Psychology & Sociology                           
Queen Margaret University                             
Queen Margaret Drive,             
Musselburgh EH21 6UU 
Email:KGoodall@qmu.ac.uk   
Tel: 0131 474 0000 
 
 
Thank you
Clinical supervisor: Dr. Sean Harper                                              
2ndFloor, Mackinnon House
Royal Edinburgh Hospital                   
Tipperlinn Road                                     
Edinburgh EH10 5HF                         
Email:Sean.Harper@nhslothian.scot.n
hs.uk      Tel: 0131 537 6912 
If you want to talk to an independent 
adviser please contact: 
Dr. Fiona Barry 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
2ndFloor Mackinnon House 
Royal Edinburgh Hospital 
Tipperlinn Road  
Edinburgh EH10 5HF 
Email: 
Fiona.Barry@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk 
Tel: 0131 537 690
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Appendix 9. Recruitment flowchart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information about the 
study 
Happy to 
help 
I am not sure 
I have 
enough 
information t 
Please contact me at 
makoral@qmu.ac.uk 
I am happy to provide 
any further 
information or arrange 
a meeting if you want 
to talk about the 
project in person 
Upon identification 
of suitable 
participants (see 
Information sheet 
inclusion criteria) 
Give them  
è Participant 
Information 
sheet  
è Reply slip 
 
Participant 
returns reply slip 
Participant 
doesn’t return 
reply slip 
Drop off at 
centre if 
possible   
Let me know 
and I will 
pick it up 
from you at 
your 
convenience 
Thank you 
very much 
for trying 
 
Any other potential 
participants in mind?  
Recruitment process for 
PhD research – Distress 
in psychosis.  
Melissa Akoral  
Supervisor Dr. Sean 
Harper 
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Appendix 10. Reply Slip Study 1 
Reply slip study 1 
  
Emotion management 
  
If you decide to take part, please keep the information sheet and return this reply 
form to your CMHT worker or to anyone in the centre. 
Name: __________________________________________  
Address: 
____________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________ 
  
Would you prefer to be contacted by: 
 phone call                                           Text message                                       email 
  
Telephone number at home /work/ mobile (if appropriate): 
____________________________ 
Email: _______________________________ 
Best time to telephone / text / email (tick when appropriate): 
  Monday Tuesday Wed Thursday Friday Sat Sunday 
Morning               
Evening               
 
 
Thank you very much   
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Appendix 11. Reply Slip Study 2 
Reply slip Study 2 
Emotion management 
  
Thank you so much for participating in the 
questionnaire study. 
One last thing I would like to ask you today. Would you like to participate in a 
second study that will be a semi-structured interview that is expected to last up to an 
hour. You do not have to if you don't want to. This will not have any impact on the 
questionnaires you just completed. 
Participant ID Number: ______________________ 
Address: 
______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Would you prefer to be contacted by: 
 Phone call                                          Text message                                       email 
Telephone number at home / work/ mobile (if appropriate): 
____________________________ 
Email: _______________________________ 
Best time to telephone / text / email (tick when appropriate): 
 Monday Tuesday Wed Thursday Friday Sat Sunday 
Morning               
Evening               
   
Thank you very much 
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Appendix 12. Consent form Study 1 
         
Consent form Study 1 
        Emotion management 
Name of Researcher:   Melissa Akoral   
Email: makoral@qmu.ac.uk                      Participant ID No.: __________                 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Participant Information Sheet dated 
13 May 2015 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and had these answered satisfactorily (Version 2, 13 
May 2015). 
2. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my medical care or 
legal rights being affected.  
3. I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected during 
the study may be looked at by individuals at QMU or authorities from NHS 
Lothian, when it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission 
for these individuals to access my records. 
4. I understand that it may be difficult or upsetting to talk about my experiences of 
mental health difficulties, and that I will be given information on how to obtain 
support if this is required.  
5. I understand that if there are concerns about a risk of harm to myself or others 
during my participation, the researcher will take appropriate action. This will 
involve contacting other professionals, including my GP, in order to 
communicate information relevant to concerns about risks of harm.  
6. I understand that I will be required to meet with the researcher on one or more 
occasions, for approximately one hour overall. 
7. I agree to my General Practitioner being informed of my participation to this 
study. 
8. I understand that I will not be identified in any publications that may arise 
following this study. 
9. I agree to participate in the above study.  
____________________  _____________________       ______________________ 
      Name of participant                             Date                                               Signature 
____________________  _____________________        ______________________  
Name of person taking consent                 Date                                               Signature 
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Appendix 13. Consent form Study 2 
Consent form Study 2 
Emotion management 
       Name of Researcher:   Melissa Akoral        
Email: makoral@qmu.ac.uk        Participant ID No.: __________                                 
                     Please tick: 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Participant Information Sheet dated 13 
May 2015 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information 
ask questions and had these answered satisfactorily (Version 2, 13 May 2015)  
2. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being 
affected.  
3. I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected during the 
study may be looked at by individuals at QMU or authorities from NHS Lothian, when 
it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals 
to access my records. 
4. I understand that it may be difficult or upsetting to talk about my experiences of mental 
health difficulties, and that I will have access to professional support if this is required.  
5. I understand that if there are concerns about a risk of harm to myself or others during 
my participation, the researcher will take appropriate action. This will involve 
contacting other professionals, including my GP, in order to communicate information 
relevant to concerns about risks of harm.  
6. I understand that I will be required to meet with the researcher on one or more occasions, 
for approximately one hour overall. 
7.  I understand that my interview will be audio-recorded for the purposes outlined in the 
in the Participant Information Sheet (Version 2, 13 May 2015) 
8. I understand that excerpts from the interview maybe included in the thesis/publications 
from the research, and the understanding that the quotations will be anonymous. 
9. I agree to my General Practitioner being informed of my participation to this study.  
10. I agree to participate in the above study.  
______________________    _________________________      ___________________  
     Name of participant                                      Date                                      Signature 
_____________________      ___________________________    __________________  
Name of person taking consent                          Date                                      Signature 
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Appendix 14. GP Letter 
    GP Letter 
  
Emotion management 
  
 
 
Date: 
Dr [xxx] [Address] 
Dear Dr [xxx] 
Re:   Study title: From attachment to distress in psychosis: exploring emotional 
processes  and metacognition as mediating factors 
              REC reference: 15-SS-0069 
    
Patient name  
 
The above patient has kindly agreed to take part in a research entitled: From attachment to 
distress in psychosis: exploring emotional processes and metacognition as mediating 
factors. The study is part of an educational project at Queen Margaret University. This is a 
mixed methods study investigating factors between adult attachment patterns and distress 
levels in psychosis. The factors to be investigated in this study are metacognition, emotional 
awareness, emotion regulation and beliefs about emotions. The participants will be asked to 
complete five short questionnaires on emotion regulation, attachment and metacognition. 
They will also be asked to participate in a follow-up semi-structured interview afterwards, 
participants will not be contacted again if they are not interested in taking part in the 
qualitative study. 
This study reviewed and given a favourable ethical opinion by the South East Scotland 
Research Ethics Committee 2 (15-SS-0069) is being conducted by Melissa Akoral, PhD 
Candidate.  
  
A copy of the participant information sheet is enclosed for your information. Should you 
have any questions regarding this study, please do not hesitate to contact me by email 
(MAkoral@qmu.ac.uk), or telephone (0131 474 0000; voice operated, state “Melissa 
Akoral” when prompted). 
   
Yours sincerely, 
Melissa Akoral 
PhD Candidate 
Queen Margaret Drive, 
Musselburgh EH21 6UU 
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Appendix 15. Study 2 Interview Schedule 
 
We will start with reintroduction and rapport building between the participant and 
the researcher.  
Confidentiality and consent will be re-emphasised and the information sheet will be 
re-read and discussed. 
 
 “The interview will last about an hour, we can stop at any time. I will be asking you 
about your experience. Any questions you may have will be addressed.” 
  
Semi-structured interview schedule 
  
1. Can you tell me a bit about the experiences that you had that led you to 
seek medical help? Or did someone seek it for you? 
·     What types of experiences did you have? 
·     When did they begin? 
·     If someone made them seek help: who was it? How did that make you 
feel? 
2. How long did you have these experiences before you/someone felt they 
had become problematic? 
·     What kinds of problems did they pose? 
·     Did you feel you had any control over these experiences? 
3. How would you describe the feelings that you had in relation to any of 
these experiences? 
·     For example, were any of the experiences a positive experience? 
·     Which experiences were good ones? 
·     Did any of the experiences make you feel a negative feeling?  
·     Any experiences that were particularly distressing? 
·     Did your feelings towards these experiences change over time? 
4. Did you feel that you could influence the way you felt about these 
experiences at any point? 
·     Were there circumstances that could change the way you felt about 
your experiences? 
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·     For example, did day-to-day stress affect your perceptions? 
·     Or were there people who/things that helped make you feel better? 
5. Is there anything that you have learned that helps you to cope with these 
feelings?  
6. How well does it work to deal with your feelings the way that you do? 
·     Is there anything you could recommend to others in a similar situation 
that might help to make them feel better? 
·     What advice would you give to friends or family of people in your 
situation that might help them to help that person cope with their 
feelings? 
 
General prompts: Can you tell me more about that? 
Probes: You mentioned..............what do you mean by that?                                                                                                                  
In what way?  
 
Ending: 
Is there anything you would like to share with me about your experience? 
Can you tell me a bit about how it has been like to be interviewed today and what 
impact it will have on you? 
Has there been anything particularly difficult or distressing to talk about? 
Is there anything you would like to ask me?  
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Appendix 16. Example of transcript coding 
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Appendix 17. Demographics form 
 
Participant ID No.: __________ 
  
D.O.B _____________                                  Gender(please circle) Male 
/Female/other 
Relationship status (please circle) 
Single - In a relationship - Married - Divorced - Widowed - Other (please state) 
__________ 
 
Ethnicity(please circle) 
White 
Mixed - Asian; Asian Scottish; Asian British - Black; Black Scottish; Black British  
 Other ethnic background / Prefer not to answer 
  
What age were you when you first experienced mental health 
difficulties?________________________ 
  
When did you first feel the need to seek support in dealing with your experiences? 
____________________________ 
  
Are re you currently taking any 
medication?__________________________________ 
  
If yes, do you know the name of your 
medication?____________________________________ 
 
When (if at all) were you last admitted to hospital?  _________ 
  
  
   
312 
 
Appendix 18. Psychosis Attachment Measure 
 
We all differ in how we relate to other people. This questionnaire will ask you about 
different thoughts, feelings and ways of behaving in relationships with others. 
Thinking generally about how you relate to other key people in your life, please use a 
tick to show how much each statement is like you from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’.  
Key people could include family members, friends, partner or mental health workers. 
There are no right or wrong answers. 
  
    Not 
at all  
A little  Quite 
a bit 
Very 
much 
1 I prefer not to let other people 
know my ‘true’ thoughts and 
feelings. 
1 2 3 4 
2 I find it easy to depend on other 
people for support with problems 
or difficult situations. 
1 2 3 4 
3 I tend to get upset, anxious or 
angry if other people are not 
there when I need them. 
1 2 3 4 
4 I usually discuss my problems 
and concerns with other people. 
1 2 3 4 
5 I worry that key people in my life 
won’t be around in the future. 
1 2 3 4 
6 I ask other people to reassure me 
that they care about me. 
1 2 3 4 
7 If other people disapprove of 
something I do, I get very upset.  
1 2 3 4 
8 I find it difficult to accept help 
from other people when I have 
problems or difficulties.  
1 2 3 4 
9 It helps to turn to other people 
when I’m stressed. 
1 2 3 4 
10 I worry that if other people get to 
know me better, they won’t like 
me.  
1 2 3 4 
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11 When I’m feeling stressed, I 
prefer being on my own to being 
in the company of other people. 
1 2 3 4 
12 I worry a lot about my 
relationships with other people. 
1 2 3 4 
13 I try to cope with stressful 
situations on my own. 
1 2 3 4 
14 I worry that if I displease other 
people, they won’t want to know 
me anymore. 
1 2 3 4 
15 I worry about having to come 
with problems and difficult 
situations on my own. 
1 2 3 4 
16 I feel uncomfortable when other 
people want to get to know me 
better. 
1 2 3 4 
  
  
PART B 
  
In answering the previous questions, what relationships were you thinking about? 
  
  
____________________________________________________________________ 
(E.g. relationship with mother, father, sister, brother, husband, wife, friend, romantic 
partner, mental health workers etc) 
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Appendix 19. Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale 
 
Please indicate how often the following statements apply to you. 
 Ranging from 1=almost never (0-10%), 2=sometimes (11-35%), 3=about half the 
time (36-65%), 4=most of the time (66-90%), 5=almost always (91-100%). 
There is no write or wrong answer. 
  
  
    almost 
never   
   
somet
imes 
 about 
half 
the 
time  
most 
of the 
time       
 almost 
always  
1 I am clear about my feelings.  1 2 3 4 5 
2 I pay attention to how I feel.  1 2 3 4 5 
3 I experience my emotions as 
overwhelming and out of 
control.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4 I have no idea how I am 
feeling.  
1 2 3 4 5 
5 I have difficulty making sense 
out of my feelings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 I am attentive to my feelings.  1 2 3 4 5 
7 I know exactly how I am 
feeling.  
1 2 3 4 5 
8  I care about what I am feeling.  1 2 3 4 5 
9 I am confused about how I feel.  1 2 3 4 5 
10 When I’m upset, I acknowledge 
my emotions.  
1 2 3 4 5 
11  When I’m upset, I become 
angry with myself for feeling 
that way.  
1 2 3 4 5 
12 When I’m upset, I become 
embarrassed for feeling that 
way.  
1 2 3 4 5 
13 When I’m upset, I have 
difficulty getting work done. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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14 When I’m upset, I become out 
of control.  
1 2 3 4 5 
15 When I’m upset, I believe that I 
will remain that way for a long 
time.  
1 2 3 4 5 
16 When I’m upset, I believe that 
I’ll end up feeling very 
depressed.  
1 2 3 4 5 
17 When I’m upset, I believe that 
my feelings are valid and 
important.  
1 2 3 4 5 
18 When I’m upset, I have 
difficulty focusing on other 
things.  
1 2 3 4 5 
19 When I’m upset, I feel out of 
control.  
1 2 3 4 5 
20 When I’m upset, I can still get 
things done. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21 When I’m upset, I feel ashamed 
with myself for feeling that 
way.  
1 2 3 4 5 
22 When I’m upset, I know that I 
can find a way to eventually 
feel better.  
1 2 3 4 5 
23  When I’m upset, I feel like I 
am weak.  
1 2 3 4 5 
24 When I’m upset, I feel like I 
can remain in control of my 
behaviours.  
1 2 3 4 5 
25 When I’m upset, I feel guilty 
for feeling that way.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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   almost 
never   
   
somet
imes 
 about 
half 
the 
time  
most 
of the 
time       
 almost 
always  
26 When I’m upset, I have 
difficulty concentrating.  
1 2 3 4 5 
27 When I’m upset, I have 
difficulty controlling my 
behaviours.  
1 2 3 4 5 
28 When I’m upset, I believe 
that there is nothing I can do 
to make myself feel better 
1 2 3 4 5 
29 When I’m upset, I become 
irritated with myself for 
feeling that way. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30 When I’m upset, I start to 
feel very bad about myself.  
1 2 3 4 5 
31 When I’m upset, I believe 
that wallowing in it is all I 
can do 
1 2 3 4 5 
32 When I’m upset, I lose 
control over my behaviours.  
1 2 3 4 5 
33 When I’m upset, I have 
difficulty thinking about 
anything else.  
1 2 3 4 5 
34 When I’m upset, I take time 
to figure out what I’m really 
feeling.  
1 2 3 4 5 
35 When I’m upset, it takes me 
a long time to feel better.  
1 2 3 4 5 
36 When I’m upset, my 
emotions feel overwhelming. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 20. Metacognitions Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is concerned with beliefs people have about their thinking. Listed 
below are a number of beliefs that people have expressed. Please read each item and 
indicate how much you generally agree with it by circling the appropriate number. The 
answers can be rated from “Do not agree” = 1 to “Agree very much” = 4.  
Please respond to all of the items, there are no right or wrong answers.  
  
    Do not 
agree 
Agree 
slightly 
Agree 
moderately  
Agree very 
much 
1 My worrying is 
dangerous for me. 
1 2 3 4 
2 My worrying could 
make me go mad.  
1 2 3 4 
3 I have poor memory  1 2 3 4 
4 I cannot ignore my 
worrying thoughts 
1 2 3 4 
5 I need to worry in order 
to remain organised 
1 2 3 4 
6 I pay close attention to 
the way my mind works 
1 2 3 4 
7 I could make myself 
sick with worrying  
1 2 3 4 
8 I have little confidence 
in my memory for words 
and names  
1 2 3 4 
9 I need to worry in order 
to work well 
1 2 3 4 
10 I think a lot about my 
thoughts  
1 2 3 4 
11 I do not trust my 
memory  
1 2 3 4 
12 I have little confidence 
in my memory for words 
and names  
1 2 3 4 
13 I will be punished for 
not controlling certain 
thoughts  
1 2 3 4 
14 It is bad to think certain 
thoughts  
1 2 3 4 
15 I am aware of the way 
my mind works when I 
am thinking through a 
problem  
1 2 3 4 
16 My worrying thoughts 
persist, no matter how I 
try to stop them 
1 2 3 4 
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17 I constantly examine my 
thoughts  
1 2 3 4 
18 I have a little confidence 
in my memory for 
actions  
1 2 3 4 
19 I should be in control of 
my thoughts all of the 
time  
1 2 3 4 
  
  
    Do not 
agree 
Agree 
slightly 
Agree 
moderately  
Agree very 
much 
20 Worrying helps me to 
solve problems  
1 2 3 4 
21 Worrying helps me to 
avoid problems in the 
future 
1 2 3 4 
22 Worrying helps me cope 1 2 3 4 
23 If I did not control a 
worrying thought and 
then it happened, it 
would be my fault 
1 2 3 4 
24 I am constantly aware of 
my thinking 
1 2 3 4 
25 Not being able to control 
my thoughts is a sign of 
weakness 
1 2 3 4 
26 If I could not control my 
thoughts, I would not be 
able to function 
1 2 3 4 
27 My memory can mislead 
me at times  
1 2 3 4 
28 Worrying helps me to 
get things sorted out in 
my mind 
1 2 3 4 
29 I monitor my thoughts  1 2 3 4 
30 When I start worrying I 
cannot stop 
1 2 3 4 
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Appendix 21. Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences 
 
This questionnaire is designed to assess beliefs and vivid mental experiences. We 
believe these are much more common than previously believed, and that many people 
have had such experiences during their lives. Please answer these questions as honestly 
as you can. There are no right and wrong answers and no trick questions. Each question 
can be treated from “never” to “nearly always”. 
We are not interested in experiences you may have had under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol. 
In the questions you answered "sometimes", "often" or "nearly always" we are 
interested in how distressing those beliefs or experiences are. So choose one alternative 
that best describes the degree of discomfort that belief created. 
 
1. Do you ever feel sad? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 2 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
  
2. Do you ever feel as if people seem to drop hints about you or say things with a 
double meaning? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 3 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________  
 
3. Do you ever feel that you are not a very animated person? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 4 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
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4. Do you ever feel that you are not much of a talker when you are conversing 
with other people? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 5 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
5. Do you ever feel as if things in magazines or on TV were written especially for 
you? (please tick) 
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 6 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
6. Do you ever feel as if some people are not what they seem to be? (please tick)  
  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 7 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed 
___________________________________________________________________ 
7. Do you ever feel as if you are being persecuted in some way? (please tick)  
  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often             Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 8 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
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8. Do you ever feel that you experience few or no emotions at important events? 
(please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 9 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________  
9. Do you ever feel pessimistic about everything? (please tick)  
  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 10  
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
10. Do you ever feel as if there is a conspiracy against you? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 11 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Do you ever feel as if you are destined to be someone very important? 
(please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 12 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
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12. Do you ever feel as if there is no future for you? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 13 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________  
13. Do you ever feel that you are a very special or unusual person? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 14 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
14. Do you ever feel as if you do not want to live anymore? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 15 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
15. Do you ever think that people can communicate telepathically? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 16 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed 
____________________________________________________________________ 
16. Do you ever feel that you have no interest to be with other people? (please 
tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                   Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 17 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
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17. Do you ever feel as if electrical devices such as computers can influence the 
way you think? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 18 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
18. Do you ever feel that you are lacking in motivation to do things? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 19 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
___________________________________________________________________ 
19. Do you ever cry about nothing? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 20 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
20. Do you believe in the power of witchcraft, voodoo or the occult? (please tick)  
  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 21 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
21. Do you ever feel that you are lacking in energy? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 22 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
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Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
22. Do you ever feel that people look at you oddly because of your appearance? 
(please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 23 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
23. Do you ever feel that your mind is empty? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 24 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
24. Do you ever feel as if the thoughts in your head are being taken away from 
you? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 25 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
___________________________________________________________________ 
25. Do you ever feel that you are spending all your days doing nothing? (please 
tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 26 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
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26. Do you ever feel as if the thoughts in your head are not your own? (please 
tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 27 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
27. Do you ever feel that your feelings are lacking in intensity? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 28 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
28. Have your thoughts ever been so vivid that you were worried other people 
would hear them? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 29 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
29. Do you ever feel that you are lacking in spontaneity? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 30 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
30. Do you ever hear your own thoughts being echoed back to you? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 31 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
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Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
31. Do you ever feel as if you are under the control of some force or power other 
than yourself? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 32 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________  
32. Do you ever feel that your emotions are blunted? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 33 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
33. Do you ever hear voices when you are alone? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 34 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
34. Do you ever hear voices talking to each other when you are alone? (please 
tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 35 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________  
35. Do you ever feel that you are neglecting your appearance or personal 
hygiene? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 36 
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If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________
36. Do you ever feel that you can never get things done? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 37 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________  
37. Do you ever feel that you have only few hobbies or interests? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 38 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
38. Do you ever feel guilty? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 39 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________ 
39. Do you ever feel like a failure? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 40 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
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40. Do you ever feel tense? (please tick)  
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 41 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________  
 
41.     Do you ever feel as if a double has taken the place of a family member, 
friend or acquaintance? (please tick) 
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", please go to question 42 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed  
____________________________________________________________________  
42.     Do you ever see objects, people or animals that other people cannot 
see?(please tick) 
Never                            Sometimes                    Often              Nearly always 
  
If you ticked "never", you are now ready 
If you ticked "sometimes" , "often" or "nearly always" please indicate how 
distressed you are by this experience: (please tick) 
 
Not distressed               A bit distressed             Quite distressed            Very 
distressed   
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Appendix 22. Duration of tasks Study 1 
 
Task Duration 
Demographic information sheet  approx. 2 minutes 
Community Assessment Psychic Experiences-42 
(CAPE-42)  
approx. 13 minutes 
Psychosis Attachment Measure approx. 6 minutes 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale - Part 1 approx. 5 minutes 
Break - If needed 5 to 10 minutes 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale - Part 2 approx. 5 minutes 
Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ-30)  approx. 10 minutes 
Total  up to approx. 45 minutes 
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Appendix 23. Participant debriefing sheet  
Participant debriefing sheet 
Emotion management 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in this research. 
This sheet lets you know more about the study in which you have taken part.  If you 
have any questions about the study, the questionnaires or the interview please feel free 
to ask them. Please keep this sheet for reference. If you have questions afterwards you 
can contact me using the details below. 
An experience of psychosis can be very distressing. These experiences include hearing 
voices or seeing things that others do not hear or see or noticing things that other people 
tend not to pay attention to. Some people find this more distressing than others and the 
study you took part in examines what might make one person more distressed about 
these experiences than another. In this study you filled out questionnaires on: 
- Psychosis and distress – which experiences you might have had and how you 
felt about these experiences 
- Attachment – this describes your own model of how relationships work 
- Emotion regulation – this refers to people’s ability to know what they are 
feeling and ways in which they might manage emotion (e.g. listening to nice 
music when you are feeling down) 
- Metacognition – this refers to how people think about their own thinking, for 
example noticing when your thoughts are negative or unhelpful. 
All of these factors have been related to how distressed people are about unusual 
experiences that they have had. I am interested in how all of these relate to each other 
and which factors might be related to people being less distressed about experiences 
of psychosis. 
In addition, these aspects relate to a life long theory that is applicable to all of us called 
‘Attachment’. Attachment theory gives us information on the nature of our close 
relationships; our relationships to our carers, family and friends. Research shows that, 
different types of attachment will have various impacts on the experience of psychosis. 
So, this study will give us an overview of how all of these emotion related factors 
relate to each other, attachment and psychosis.  
Understanding how these factors relate and interact can, in the future, help us develop 
methods to reduce distress felt from the experience of psychosis.  
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What will happen to the results of the study?  
The results of the study will be written up as part of a doctoral thesis and may be 
published in an academic journal. You will not be identified in any report or 
publication with all data remaining strictly confidential. 
If you want information on the results of the study, I will write up a summary of the 
results and leave copies of the summary at the CMHT Centre, just ask a member of 
staff.  
I will also put the summary of the results on my University profile page: 
http://www.qmu.ac.uk/psych/people/Akoral.htm 
If you would like me to email you the summary, send me an email and I will happily 
forward you a copy. 
What if there is a problem?  
If you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries please 
raise this with the investigator (and quote your participant number). However if you 
would like to contact an independent party please contact the individuals named below:  
 
Participant ID number: _________ 
Clinical supervisor: 
Dr. Sean Harper 
2nd Floor, Mackinnon House 
Royal Edinburgh Hospital 
Tipperlinn Road 
Edinburgh EH10 5HF  
Email: 
Sean.Harper@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk 
Tel: 0131 537 6912 
Dr. Karen Goodall  
Psychology & Sociology 
Queen Margaret University 
Queen Margaret Drive, Musselburgh 
EH21 6UU 
Email: KGoodall@qmu.ac.uk   
Tel : 0131 474 000
If you want to talk to an independent person from the research, you can contact: 
Dr. Fiona Barry 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
2nd Floor Mackinnon House 
Royal Edinburgh Hospital 
Tipperlinn Road  
Edinburgh EH10 5HF 
Email: Fiona.Barry@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk 
Tel: 0131 537 6902 
 
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this at NHS 
Lothian Customer Relations and Feedback Team, 0131 536 3370. 
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You can also contact me if you have any questions about the study: 
Melissa Akoral, PhD Candidate 
Queen Margaret University                 
Queen Margaret Drive,                   
Musselburgh EH21 6UU 
Email: makoral@qmu.ac.uk  
Tel: 0131 474 0000     
 
If any of the questions has made you feel upset of distressed and you did not want to 
talk to me about it. You can also contact your CMHT worker if you feel the need to 
talk to someone you know.  
You may also find the following contacts useful: 
 
Mind  
Website: www.mind.org.uk  Phone: 0300 123 3393 (Mon-Fri, 9am-6pm) 
 
The Mental Health Foundation 
Website: www.mentalhealth.org.uk 
 
 
NHS 24 
111 is the new free way to phone the NHS 24 helpline from landlines and mobiles. 
www.nhs24.com 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in the study 
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Appendix 24. Email from Jim van Os about the association between symptom 
frequency and distress associated with psychosis 
 
 
 
20/08/2018, 15)56Re: CAPE - independence of distress score enquiry - Akoral, Melissa
Page 1 of 4https://outlook.office.com/owa/?viewmodel=ReadMessageItem&Ite…UMszrJwEAAKs62b9AAA%3D&IsPrintView=1&wid=23&ispopout=1&path=
Re: CAPE - independence of distress score enquiry
Melissa I gues the problem is that they are so strongly and fundamentally associated that is becomes impossible to investigate separately -
it would be like trying to analyse the association with weight independent of length in developing children - a well known problem in
statistics...
Met vriendelijke groet,
 
WWW.PSYCHOSENET.NL - VOOR NORMALE INFORMATIE EN ZELFHULP BIJ PSYCHOSE
 
Prof. dr. Jim van Os
 
 
Voorzitter Divisie Hersenen
Universitair Medisch Centrum Utrecht | Kamernummer B 01.223| Huispostnummer B 01.304| Postbus 85500 | 3508 GA  UTRECHT
T: +31 88 75 560 25 | www.umcutrecht.nl | j.j.vanos-2@umcutrecht.nl
 
De informatie opgenomen in dit bericht kan vertrouwelijk zijn en is uitsluitend bestemd voor de geadresseerde. Indien u dit bericht onterecht ontvangt, wordt u
verzocht de inhoud niet te gebruiken en de afzender direct te informeren door het bericht te retourneren. Het Universitair Medisch Centrum Utrecht is een
publiekrechtelijke rechtspersoon in de zin van de W.H.W. (Wet Hoger Onderwijs en Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek) en staat geregistreerd bij de Kamer van
Koophandel voor Midden-Nederland onder nr. 30244197.
 
! Denk s.v.p. aan het milieu voor u deze e-mail afdrukt.
jim van os <vanosj@gmail.com>
Thu 27/07/2017 18:00
To:Akoral, Melissa <MAkoral@qmu.ac.uk>;
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Appendix 25. PAM avoidance subscale reliability issues 
 
Alpha is considered to be the estimate of the interrelatedness of a set of scale’s items 
(Schmitt, 1996). The alpha value is also indicative of how similar or unique the items 
of the scale are. In the literature it is often recommended that alpha is between .7 and 
.9 (Field, 2013), with others stating that .6 is reasonably high (Coolican, 2014). The 
subscale attachment avoidance of the Psychosis Attachment measure (Berry et al., 
2008) has a reliability alpha of .491. This is considered to be too low a Cronbach’s 
alpha for the scale to be reliable. Hence, the details of the reliability for this subscale 
were further investigated.  
First, the researcher checked that all reverse items were correctly reversed. This 
was done on SPSS with crosstabs of reversed items and non-reversed items. 
Afterwards, the relationship between items who have similar meanings were 
investigated. For instance, item 9 states “it helps to turn to other people when I am 
stressed” this item is then reversed, a similar meaning is found in item 13 “I try to 
come with stressful situations on my own” when correlated, these two items do not 
have a significant relationship (r=.022, p=.869).  
Furthermore, this sub-scale measures attachment avoidance, hence all items of 
the subscale are expected to correlated positively with each other. The inter-item 
correlation matrix shows that the reverse items of the scale (PAM2, PAM4 and PAM9) 
have negative and small effect correlations with other items of the subscale. 
Furthermore, the correlations are low, which the literature suggest is an argument for 
the items to be removed (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011).  
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Pam Avoidance subscale Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
  PAM2R PAM4R PAM8 PAM9R PAM11 PAM13 PAM16 
PAM1    -.098 .032 .367 -.116 .273 .149 .224 
PAM2R   .393 -.261 .312 -.003 -.024 .017 
PAM4R    -.163 .372 .063 .105 -.112 
PAM8     .114 .202 .139 .301 
PAM9R      -.130 .022 .066 
PAM11       .470 .053 
PAM13        .175 
PAM16         
 
Moreover, the Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted suggests that the reliability of the 
subscale would increase to .506 if item PAM2 was deleted. This was still deemed to 
be too low an alpha. As the other reverse items also had low and negative 
correlations, the exclusion of different combinations of one two or all three reverse 
items were tried out. It is only when all three were taken out that the alpha was up to 
.607.  
 
Pam avoidance subscale Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
PAM1 9.52 11.949 .253 .232 .443 
PAM2R 9.72 13.393 .086 .266 .506 
PAM4R 9.70 12.688 .202 .295 .464 
PAM8 10.18 12.559 .216 .329 .458 
PAM9R 9.97 12.880 .169 .292 .476 
PAM11 9.48 11.440 .295 .306 .424 
PAM13 9.38 11.393 .328 .260 .410 
PAM16 9.87 12.626 .217 .162 .458 
 
In order to further investigate the subscale, the split-half method was used. The 
method splits the scale set into two sets of items. A score for each individual is 
calculates for each half of the scale. If a scale is reliable, a person’s score should be 
the same, or similar in each half of the scale. Therefore, the scores from the two 
halves should correlate very highly. Since at this stage it was already identified that 
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the reliability issues were related to the reversed items, the subscale was split with 
the reversed items on one side and the others on another. The findings are 
summarised in table X.  
 
Reliability statistics for the pam avoidance subscale individual items (N=60)  
 Cronbach’s alpha 
Part 1                 Part 2 
Correlation 
between forms 
Spearman 
brown 
Coefficient 
(equal length)  
 PAM2, PAM4, 
PAM9 
Other Items   
And PAM1 .391 .539 .129 .228 
And PAM8 .369 .543 .133 .234 
And PAM11 .419 .533 .120 .214 
And PAM13 .479 .550 .071 .133 
And PAM16 .463 .595 .041 .079 
 
The correlations between the reversed items and other items are very low. This further 
justifies taking the three reversed items out.  
The Spearman-Brown formula was used to estimate the internal consistency of the scale 
when shortened by three items.  
The formula is: 
rkk = k(r11) / [1 + (k – 1)* r11] 
In our case, we were looking at reducing the subscale by 3 items 
r7 = .49 
k = 5/8= .625 
rkk = .625 (.49) / [1 + (.625– 1)* .49] = .375 
The Spearman-Brown estimation is expected to go down with the removal of items, 
with the removal of three items, alpha is expected to drop to .375. Nevertheless, 
in this case, the removal of items increases the alpha which suggests that there is 
indeed an issue with these items, further justifying their removal.  
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Appendix 6. Reflexivity 
          
         I am a 26 year old half-French half-Turkish woman. I moved to Scotland in 2012 
for a Masters degree and stayed. Although my accent makes it clear that I am not 
Scottish it is soft and inclusive enough for participants not to be too caught up on my 
background. I did my undergraduate degree in Psychology in France. The French 
school is closely related to psychoanalysis, a lot of the knowledge and practice of 
clinical psychology is very anecdotal and still strongly attached to its psychoanalytic 
roots. Whilst I knew that I did not adhere to a purely psychoanalytic approach, not yet 
having worked with a psychosis population, I was unsure of my stance. This led me to 
have no set expectations about the stories people were willing to share with me 
regarding their backgrounds, experiences and lives. This allowed me to be open and 
non-judgemental of their narratives. I did my best to give priority to the people this 
project is about. I tried to understand how people understand their world through 
double hermeneutics as described in IPA.  
          
Throughout the research recruitment and data analysis phases, I was 
continuously surprised and impressed by the breadth of experiences people had, their 
strength, the emotional weight they carried and the strong feelings they had towards 
their experiences, their lives and the care that is offered to them. Through the time I 
spent with my participants, reading about psychosis and attending conferences I 
developed my own understanding. I adhere to the bio-psycho-social perspective of 
psychosis and strongly believe that mental health difficulties lay on a continuum with 
so-called normality, that there are tremendous individual differences amongst people 
who experience psychosis when it comes to their experiences and their perceptions 
and that recovery from psychosis is a very possible prospect. Further, people in this 
research described their experiences with a lot of awareness and insight into both their 
and others’ perceptions of themselves. I struggled with this at the beginning as, often, 
the psychosis literature mentions on people’s lack of insight as a key component of 
psychosis.  
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An important part of my understanding that relates to the ontological 
perspective taken in this project and in my life is a focus on the meaning and place of 
reality. I went into every one of my meetings with a thirst and eagerness to learn about 
people’s experiences trying to make sense of it through their words, with a strongly 
held belief that the participants are the expert. I never questioned the meaning of reality 
or what actually constitutes reality in their context. I never assumed that my 
understanding of reality was more nor less than theirs. I took what was real to them 
and made it my reality in their idiographic context whilst trying to make sense of it in 
relation to the experiences, perceptions and beliefs they shared with me. Of course, I 
did not start this research project knowing that that was where I stood. At a conference, 
whilst I was still analysing my data someone asked me if I was afraid that my 
participants may be lying to me. This question took me aback; not only I never even 
considered that to be an option, I realised I did not care as it had no impact on the way 
I perceived and understood my data. What mattered was what people had told me and 
I made no assumptions about any ultimate truth nor did I investigate the reality their 
reality was real in.  
 
         Overall, through this research project and the intensive recruitment phase, I 
gained invaluable knowledge on the workings of the NHS, on the varied team 
dynamics in different community mental health teams and the breadth and depth of 
experiences in people have. 
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Appendix 27. Multi-methods meta-matrix table 
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